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Abstract in English - Perception, Action and 
Neuroscience 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to offer new insights in our understanding of the 
relationships between visual perception and action. Starting from experimental results in 
vision and motor neuroscience, it will do this by suggesting new functional characteristics 
– which are neglected in the literature – of vision-for-action and of motor perception. 
The crucial task of these characteristics is to compute, from a motor point of view, the 
most suitable way we can interact with the external environment. A better understanding 
of these characteristics requires an investigation into the nature of the computational 
mechanisms through which our visuomotor brain can lead us to perceive the possibilities 
of action in this external environment. 
 
       Describing in a coherent way the nature of the relation between the visual processes 
that allow us to guide action and the motor processes at the basis of our motor skills is 
one of the most yarned enterprises in both contemporary philosophy and neuroscience, 
insofar as opening the “black-box” of the mental representations by which vision-for-
action is subserved – in the literature they are called motor representations (MRs) – 
means to understand in general how the way embodied agents can actively couple with 
the external environment.   
        Here, I want to offer a specific contribution to several open, central issues, each 
concerning the relation between visual perception and action, and each familiar from the 
literature concerning the philosophy of neuroscience. 
 
         Starting from two specific empirical frameworks, the one of the ‘Two Visual 
Systems Model’ and the other of a model of ‘Motor Perception', the project will shed 
new light on the mental processes that allow us to visually perceive action possibilities in 
the external environment. Indeed, it is known that these processes convert the visual 
information about the objects we are faced with into motor information that we can use 
to interact with those objects. But what kind of mental representations do these 
processes rely on? This is the foundational question guiding my overall research. 
Answering this general question requires a discussion of several more specific issues 
connected with it. I will confront these issues, and thus answer my main question, by 
starting from the philosophical analysis of the processing of the cortical anatomo-
functional correlates, as well as the computational mechanisms these mental phenomena 
– that is, MRs – rely on.  
 Here is a brief overview of the chapters of this thesis, and the related issues I focus 
on. Chapter 1 introduces the topic. Chapter 2 reviews and synthesises the massive sets of 
neuroscientific evidence in a coherent philosophical theory of MRs, something we lack at 
the moment. The goal of chapter 3 is to show that emotions play a crucial role in 
forming our mental antecedents of action, insofar as they assist vision-for-action from its 
early stage processing. Chapter 4 aims to defend the idea, completely new, that the 
representation of action properties, which is a function of MRs, is possible not only for 
normal objects, but also for depicted objects. Chapter 5 suggests that depicted objects 
cannot foster the visual feeling of presence because it is strictly linked to the perception 
of absolute depth cues that give rise to qualitatively rich stereopsis, which is linked to the 
perception of the possibility of reliable motor interaction with the object we face with. 
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Abstract in Dutch - Waarneming, Handeling, en 
Neurowetenschap 
 
Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is nieuw inzicht te verschaffen in ons begrip van de 
verhouding tussen visuele waarneming en handeling. Het doet dit door nieuwe 
functionele eigenschappen van visie-voor-handelen en motorwaarneming aan te dragen, 
uitgaande van experimentele bevindingen in de visuele en neurowetenschappen. De 
hoofdtaak van deze eigenschappen is het bepalen, bezien vanuit een motor-perspectief, 
van de meest geschikte vorm van interactie met de externe omgeving. Deze 
eigenschappen zijn in de huidige discussie nog niet adequaat behandeld. Een beter begrip 
van deze eigenschappen vereist een onderzoek naar de aard van de computationele 
mechanismen waarmee onze visuomotorhersenen ons in staat stellen 
handelingsmogelijkheden in de externe omgeving waar te nemen. 
 
 Een coherente beschrijving van de aard van het verband tussen enerzijds de 
visuele processen die ons in staat stellen handeling te sturen, en de motorprocessen aan 
de basis van onze motorische vaardigheden anderzijds, is vandaag één van de grootste 
struikelblokken zowel voor de wijsbegeerte als voor de neurowetenschappen. Dit komt 
omdat het openen van de ‘zwarte doos’ van mentale representaties die visie-voor-
handelen dienen—de literatuur spreekt van ‘motor representaties’ (MRs)—een algemeen 
begrip vergt van de manier waarop belichaamde actoren zich actief kunnen koppelen met 
een externe omgeving. 
 
 Ik zal een bijdrage leveren aan enkele openstaande centrale vraagstukken, bekend 
uit literatuur over de filosofie van de neurowetenschappen, over de verhouding tussen 
visuele waarneming en handelen. 
 
 Het project zal uitgaan van twee specifieke empirische raamwerken, het ene het 
'Two Visual Systems Model' en het andere een ‘Motor Perception’-model, en zal op basis 
hiervan nieuw licht te werpen op de mentale processen die ons in staat stellen om 
handelingsmogelijkheden in de externe omgeving te zien. Het is inderdaad bekend dat 
deze processen de visuele informatie over de objecten waar we tegenover staan omzetten 
naar motorinformatie die we kunnen aanwenden in interactie met deze objecten. Maar 
op wat voor soort mentale representaties berusten deze processen? Dit is de 
fundamentele vraag die mijn onderzoek stuurt. Het beantwoorden van deze meer 
algemene vraagstelling vereist discussie van een aantal specifieke problemen die ermee 
verbonden zijn. Ik zal deze specifieke problemen behandelen, en zodoende mijn 
hoofdvraag beantwoorden, door te beginnen met een filosofische analyse van de 
verwerking in de corticale anatomo-functionele correlaten, alsmede de computationele 
mechanismen waarop deze mentale fenomenen – MRs – berusten. 
 
 Hier is een kort overzicht van de hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift, en de 
relevante problemen waar ik me op richt. 
 
 Hoofdstuk 1 leidt het onderwerp in. Hoofdstuk 2 brengt de zeer omvangrijke 
verzameling van neurowetenschappelijke data samen in een coherente filosofische 
theorie van motor-representaties, iets dat tot op heden niet voorhanden was. Het doel 
van Hoofdstuk 3 is te laten zien dat emoties een cruciale rol spelen in het vormen van de 
mentale voorboden van handeling, in zoverre ze visie-voor-handelen assisteren vanaf de 
vroegste stadia van verwerking. Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op de verdediging van de volledig 
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nieuwe stelling dat de representatie van handelingseigenschappen, welk een functie is van 
motor-representaties, niet alleen mogelijk is voor normale objecten, maar tevens voor 
afgebeelde objecten. Hoofdstuk 5 stelt dat afgebeelde objecten niet het gevoel van 
aanwezigheid aan kunnen moedigen, aangezien dit gevoel strikt gekoppeld is aan de 
waarneming van absolute diepte-cues die leiden tot kwalitatief rijke stereopsis, welke 
gekoppeld is aan de waarneming van de mogelijkheid tot betrouwbare motor-interactie 
met het object waar we tegenover staan.  
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1 Introduction: The Jungle between Vision and Action 
 
 
The hand has a very complex anatomical structure. 
Functionally, movements of the hand require a 
coordinated interplay of the 39 intrinsic and 
extrinsic muscles acting on 18 joints. Among all the 
joints of the hand, of particular importance is the 
carpometacarpal joint of the thumb. This joint is of 
a saddle type and its immense significance for the 
hand function emanates from the extra mobility this 
joint is endowed with, resulting in the opposition of 
the thumb to the other fingers. The plethora of 
bones, joints, and muscles of which the hand is 
constituted gives to this structure amazing 
biomechanical complexity. From the kinematic 
perspective, the hand has over 20 degrees of 
freedom. Thus the question arises: how does the 
brain control the hand? (Raos et al. 2006: 709) 
 
 
This work is about the relationships between vision and action. Starting from 
experimental results in vision and motor neuroscience, the main aim of this thesis is to 
offer new insights in our understanding of the relationships between visual perception 
and action, by suggesting new functional characteristics – which are neglected in the 
literature - of vision-for-action and of motor perception, the crucial task of which is to 
compute the most suitable way we can interact, from a motor point of view, with the 
external environment. That means to investigate the nature of the computational 
mechanisms through which our visuomotor brain can lead us to perceive the possibilities 
of action in this external environment. 
             The relationship between visual perception and action is old as history of 
knowledge is. All the greatest scholars involved in the study of the mind (or, in particular 
historical periods, of the soul) and of its access and relation to the external world have 
tried to understand the way we can perceive the external environment and, then, how we 
can act, on the basis of how our perception works, on what we face with. From the 
ancient greeks, Plato (see Remes 2014), Aristotle (see Corcilius 2014; Tuominen 2014) to 
the medieval scholars, such as Augustine (see Silva 2014a), Avicenna (see Kaukua 2014), 
Averroes (see Brenet 2014; Silva 2014b), passing through the scholars of modern age, 
such as Nicholas of Cusa, Hobbes (for a review see Leijenhorst 2014), Descartes (see 
Wee 2014), Locke (see Lähteenmäki 2014), Spinoza (see Viljanen 2014), Berkeley (see 
Paukkonen 2014), Descartes and Kant (Hatfield 2014) – for a complete historical review 
in which all these works are recollected see (Silva and Yrjönsuuri 2014; see also 
Lagerlund 2007) – until the phenomenological tradition, which has been crucial in 
explaining the role of the body for the relation between perception and action (Husserl 
1907/1998, Merleau-Ponty 1962), one of the most important goal has been to explain 
the relation between our senses, our causal power on the external environment and the 
way our body shapes our relationship with the external world. 
              While the possible relationship between visual perception and action have been 
in the spotlight of the contemporary philosophical reflection (Gibson 1966, 1979; 
MacKay 1962, 1967, 1973; Merleau-Ponty 1968), the investigation of the specific nature 
of this relationship has been meticulously deepened, recently, thanks to the impressive 
amount of evidence straddling the divide between motor and vision neuroscience, with a 
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particular philosophical interpretation (Borghi and Riggio 2015; Chinellato and Del Pobil 
2015; Turella and Lignau 2014; Castiello 2005; Castiello and Begliomini 2008; Fadiga et 
al. 2000; Kandel et al. 2013, Chalupa and Werner 2004), as well as thanks to the 
philosophical reflection about these experimental results (Jeannerod 2006; Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2003; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Nanay 2013b; Grush 2004; Briscoe 2009; 
Briscoe and Grush 2014; Jacob 2005; Seth 2014, 2015; Friston et al. 2010, 2013; Clark 
1999, 2001, 2002, 2009, 2007; Prinz et al. 2013).  
            Here, I want to give a specific contribution about specific open issues, 
concerning this relation between visual perception and action, with respect to the 
literature concerning the philosophy of neuroscience.  
            There are two important background specifications I have to address before 
starting with the overview of my work here. First, I want to specify that I will not take 
part to the contemporary divide in the literature between those who believe that 
perception is the construction of internal representations (Nanay 2010a, b, 2011a, b, 
2012, 2013a, b, 2014a, b; Siegel 2006, 2010a, b, 2014; Campbell 2008; Martin 2008; Kelly 
2008; Noë 2008a, b; Prosser 2011) and those who, contrarily, deny this idea (Hutto and 
Myin 2013; Hutto 2005; Chemero 2009; Noë 2004; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Hurley 
1998, Varela Thompson and Rosch 1991; Findlay and Gilchrist 2003; Bishop and Martin 
2014). It is well know, indeed, that, though considering perceptual states as 
representations has been considered the most natural way of describing our perceptual 
system, this framework has recently been questioned. Notwithstanding this, the balance 
leans on representationalism, to the extent that describing perceptual states as 
representations has some important explanatory advantages (Pautz 2010, Nanay 2013a, 
b, 2014b; Ferretti forthcoming, Ferretti and Alai forthcoming). I leave aside this debate. 
Indeed, as we shall see in each section, this work is written in terms of (perceptual) 
representations. That is, I endorse the general picture about the mind which also suggests 
a representational view of perception.  
        Second, some authors inquired the extent to which action is important for visual 
perception, assuming that vision is a form of action and that a theory of vision can be 
grounded on action (Noë 2004; O’Regan and Noë 2001). However, several critics have 
shown the inefficacy of this attempt (Jacob 2006, 2008; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; 
Rowlands 2006, 2007; Albertazzi, van Tonder and Vishwanath 2010; Mandik 2005; 
Gangopadhyay and Kiverstein 2009; Gangopadhyay 2010; Pearson and Westbrook 
2015). Since, saying that vision is a form of action could lead to different 
misunderstandings, I detach my work here from this idea; however, most of the 
empirical evidence I report in this work might be interpreted as going in this direction. 
Here, I am just investigating the different computational aspects of those computational 
resources of vision that are crucial in order to guide our action, without committing 
myself to a constitutive or a causal relation between perception and action. Also, I am 
not assuming, pace Gibson, that action guidance is the only scope vision has to carry out 
(for a review see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Ch. 6; Nanay 2013b).  
  
           Finally, there are different general ways of coupling philosophy with neuroscience 
(Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2012; Bennett et al. 2007; Bickle et. al 2013; Brooks and 
Akins 2005). On the one hand we can (a) use the tools of analytic philosophy in order to 
answer to genuine philosophical problems concerning the foundation of neuroscience, 
which neuroscience constitutively fails to take into account. On the other hand, we can 
(b) use analytic philosophy in order to analyze experimental evidence whose 
interpretation is not clear. Also, we might (c) use empirical evidence from neuroscience 
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to have a good empirical background in order to strengthen a philosophical thesis that 
seems to be already properly defended with theoretical arguments – and, thus, the 
experimental result would be a further empirical confirmation of what we know as being 
the case following the philosophical arguments. However, sometimes (d) empirical 
evidence from neuroscience seems to play a crucial role in showing us which direction 
we have to pursue in order to sort out such and such philosophical issues the literature is 
divided about, leading us to some theoretical crossroad – at the same time, sometimes it 
is the neuroscientific reflection to be philosophy/theory-laden. In these occasions, 
empirical evidence - with a solid philosophical completion, though - can give us the 
answer to certain philosophical problems remained unsolved. Crucially, there are cases in 
which (e) important issues arise within the literature in philosophy of neuroscience, 
which are the result of the mix of the reflection from the two disciplines and cannot be 
accounted neither just from philosophy, nor just from neuroscience: they need the 
interplay of these two ways of looking at the problem.  
             The methodology of this work is primarily of the kind (e), though it also follows 
(c) and (d). So, before going in medias res, I have briefly to say something about the 
empirical framework my philosophical reflection starts from. 
           
1.2 The Empirical Background I start from: Vision and Motor 
Neuroscience 	  
Several contemporary debates involving both philosophy and neuroscience attempt to 
define the nature of the relation between visual perception and (vision-for-)action, with a 
special focus on space perception.  
           A very interesting idea is that, rather than propositional attitudes like beliefs and 
desires, what mediates between the sensory input of visual perception and the motor 
output of action is the presence of motor representations (MRs) involved in representing 
the action properties necessary for action performance (Nanay 2013b, 2014a; Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod 2006; Pacherie 2000; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012). 
           Describing in a coherent way the nature of the relation between the visual 
processes that allow us to guide action and the motor processes at the basis of our motor 
skills is one of the most yarned enterprises in both contemporary philosophy and 
neuroscience (Briscoe 2009), insofar as opening the “black-box” of the mental 
representations vision-for-action is subserved by, which in the literature are indeed called 
MRs, means to understand the way embodied agents can actively couple with the 
external environment.  
           However, the mental antecedents of action, that is MRs, are not always 
consciously accessible; thus, to investigate and naturalize them we must turn to 
neuroscience (Nanay 2014a). There are two major empirical frameworks we have to 
focus on if we want to investigate the relationships between visual perception and action 
by investigating MRs. The first one is the “Two Visual Systems Model” (TVSM) and the 
second one is the one about Motor Perception, which I illustrate in what follows. 
1.2.1 The Two Visual Systems Model  
 
A common ground to link visual perception with action is the TVSM, which suggests the 
presence, in humans and other mammals, of a separation of the visual pathways, 
grounded on distinct anatomo-functional structures (Milner and Goodale 1995): one for 
visual recognition, the ventral stream, and one for visually guided action, the dorsal 
stream. They can be dissociated due to cortical lesions. Lesions in the dorsal stream (the 
	  	  	  
13	  
occipito-parietal network from the primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal cortex) 
impair one’s ability to use what one sees to guide action (optic ataxia), but not object 
recognition; lesions in the ventral stream (the occipito-temporal network from the 
primary visual cortex to the infertemporal cortex) impair one’s ability to recognize things 
in the visual world (visual agnosia), but not action guidance (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). 
Moreover, we have behavioral studies of normal subjects involving visual illusions that 
can deceive the ventral stream but not the dorsal one; thus, it seems that, contrarily to 
ventral perception, dorsal perception is completely impenetrable by consciousness. As 
we shall see, this is not the whole story about the relationships between the ventral and 
the stream and, ipso facto, about the relationships between conscious perception and 
vision-for-action (Schenk and MacIntosh 2010; Bruno and Battaglini 2008; McIntosh 
and Schenk 2009; Briscoe 2009; Gangopadhyay, Madary and Spencer 2010; Jacob 2008, 
2014, 2015; Jacob and de Vignemont 2010; Jeannerod and Jacob 2005). 
 
1.2.2 (Visuo-)Motor Perception 
 
For decades the functions of motor areas have been reduced to executive tasks. This 
framework found the sensory areas in occipital lobe and motor areas in posterior part of 
frontal lobe. Between them, associative (temporo-parietal) areas put together information 
from sensory areas and send percepts to motor areas to organize movement: the idea was 
that associative areas were committed to higher cognitive functions, while motor areas 
dealt only whit motor execution. But this framework was not able to explain the way the 
motor system can translate visual perception in movement. Surprisingly, contemporary 
evidence suggested that while the motor system is not only involved in executive 
functions, the motor cortex influences the perceptual side of the parietal lobe which is 
strongly involved in motor activities so to be considered a part of the motor brain 
(Mountcastle et al. 1975; Fogassi and Luppino 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). 
             This idea has been confirmed by several experimental results about the existence 
of visuomotor phenomena, in the dorsal stream, responsible for the translation of object 
features in motor commands, involved in the visual perception of action possibility in 
peripersonal spatial coordinates, in which a distinction between the visual and the motor 
aspect of the process is constitutively indistinguishable, insofar the informational switch 
from the visual input to the motor output is functionally fuzzy and hardly detectable; a 
clear example of motor perception (Fadiga et al. 2000; Fogassi and Luppino 2005; 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Castiello 2005, Turella and Lignau 2014, Romero et al. 
2014, Raos et al. 2006, Gallese 2007, Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Graziano 2009; 
Rizzolatti 2000; Gazzaniga 2000; Jacob 2005; Borghi and Riggio 2015; Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2003, Jeannerod 2006; Romero et al. 2014). Furthermore, there are several 
experimental results - and several philosophical theories based on these results - 
suggesting the crucial importance of the motor system for our perception of action 
(Sinigaglia 2013; Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2015a, b; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011a, b, c, 
2013, 2014; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 2013). 
             These are the empirical frameworks my philosophical analysis starts from. I’ll 
use some important results coming from these two empirical frameworks, and use some 
of the different methodologies I reported in (§1), in order to propose my arguments. 
Now, I offer an overview of the philosophical issues I’m going to focus on. 
 
1.3 Visual Perception in Action: An Analytic Overview  
 
Starting from these two empirical frameworks, the main aim of this project is to shed 
new light on the mental processes that allow us to visually perceive action possibilities in 
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the external environment by converting the visual information about the objects we face 
with, in motor information we can use to interact with them. What kind of mental 
representations do these processes rely on? This is the foundational question guiding my 
overall research. However, several particular issues are related to this more general 
question. I try to confront with these issues, and thus to answer this question, by starting 
from the philosophical analysis of the processing of the cortical anatomo-functional 
correlates, as well as the computational mechanisms these mental phenomena - that is 
MRs - rely on.  
            Here’s a brief analytical overview of the chapters of this thesis, and the related 
issues I focus on.  
 
1.3.1 Through the Forest of Motor Representations 
I said that the mental antecedents of action are not always consciously accessible; thus, to 
investigate and naturalize them we must turn to neuroscience (Nanay 2014a). Following 
neuroscience, several philosophers assume that there is a single representational 
mechanism lying in (and mediating) between the visual and motor processes involved in 
different functions for shaping suitable action performances: a MR (see Nanay 2013b; 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012). The problem in the literature that motivates my project is 
the lack of common agreement about both the functions and the neural underpinnings 
of MRs. Hence, in the second chapter of this work, I suggest a solution by developing a 
non-monolithic view of MRs and arguing that a MR is the ensemble of different sub-
representational phenomena, each one with a different function and a precise neural 
underpinning in relation to the TVSM. Accordingly, I recollect the massive sets of 
neuroscientific evidence in a coherent philosophical theory of MRs, something we lack at 
the moment. 
 
1.3.2 Motor Representations and Emotions 
 
Another goal I want to pursue is to investigate the role of emotions in action 
performance, which is not considered by most authoritative action theorists (see Pacherie 
2002), as well as by the literature on MRs. In chapter 3, I suggest that the representation 
of the emotionally relevant properties of objects (being pleasant, dangerous, etc.) can 
influence, inhibiting or eliciting, the way we represent the action properties/possibilities 
(being graspable, climbable, etc.) of each object. I strengthen this argument with neural 
evidence that the neural underpinnings of MRs are deeply interconnected with emotional 
areas (Barrett and Bar 2009) and behavioral evidence that while neutral graspable objects 
approached without any risk activate a facilitating motor response, dangerous objects 
activate aversive motor responses, generating an interference-effect (Anelli, Borghi and 
Nicoletti 2012). My goal is to show that emotions play a crucial role in forming our 
mental antecedents of action, insofar as they assist vision-for-action from its early stage 
processing.  
 
1.3.3 Pictures, Action Properties and Motor Related Effects 
 
In chapter 4 I defend the idea, completely new, that the representation of action 
properties, which is a function of MRs, is possible not only with normal objects, but also 
with depicted objects. This idea is, following the TVSM (Nanay 2011a, 2015; Matthen 
2010), commonly denied in the philosophical literature, because depicted objects are not 
physically manipulable and egocentrically localized, as normal objects, by dorsal 
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perception. I want to suggest that, though depicted objects cannot be egocentrically 
localized as normal objects, face-to-face perception and the perception of depicted 
objects share the same subpersonal dorsal representation of action properties, and 
several sets of evidence are on my side (Romero et al. 2014; Chao and Martin 2000). This 
is possible only when the picture vehicle/surface falls within the peripersonal space of 
the observer (Borghi and Riggio 2015), because dorsal perception cannot distinguish 
between depicted and normal objects (Westwood et al. 2002). So, I defend the idea that, 
once an object, whether depicted or real, is perceived as apparently located in the 
peripersonal space of the observer, dorsal perception responds. Of course, this does not 
mean that we can act upon depicted objects, but just that our subpersonal dorsal 
representations are active when we visually perceive them. A further crucial implication 
of my new proposal is that, if also dorsal perception responds to depicted objects, then, 
picture perception and face-to-face perception are very similar perceptual states.  
            Issues in (§1.3.1, chapter 2), (§1.3.2, chapter 3) and (§1.3.3, chapter 4) are not 
distinct enterprises, but different parts of a comprehensive theory of MRs. 
 
1.3.4 Visual Feeling of Presence 
 
As argued in (§1.3.3, concerning the chapter 4) - both normal and depicted objects can 
be represented as offering action properties; thus, face-to-face and picture perception are 
not so different as concerns the visual system processing. Nevertheless, is indisputable 
that normal objects are perceived as present, at the visual level, in a way depicted objects 
cannot (Matthen 2010; Nanay 2015). According to the literature, depicted objects cannot 
foster the visual feeling of presence (FOP) because they cannot be represented in 
egocentric coordinates. In chapter 5 I strengthen this idea, but aims to specify that 
egocentric localization is responsible for visual FOP because it is strictly linked to the 
perception of absolute depth cues that give rise to the most important aspect of visual 
FOP: qualitatively rich stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014) which is linked to the perception of 
the possibility of reliable motor interaction with the object we face with. In relation to 
(§1.3.3, chapter 4), here I suggest that only normal objects can foster in us the conscious 
perception of reliable motor interaction, for which the subpersonal dorsal 
representations of action properties are not enough. I also aim to suggest that, contrarily 
to the received view about feelings (Dokic 2012), visual FOP is not the result of a 
metacognitive feeling attached to a perceptual state because there are enough differences, 
between face-to-face seeing and picture seeing, in perceptual cues visual FOP relies on, 
so that we should not invoke further cognitive states in order to establish their difference 
concerning FOP. This chapter is important, insofar as visual FOP is neglected in both 
neuroscience and philosophy.  
          Issues in  (§1.3.3, chapter 4) and (§1.3.4, chapter 5) develop a comprehensive, 
under-researched, new view of picture perception, in relation to vision-for-action. 	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2 Through the Forest of Motor Representations  
 
The importance of investigating the mind starting from the naturalization of the mental 
antecedents of actions has been recently and excellently brought to the attention of the 
philosophy of mind (Nanay 2013b). Accordingly, following neuroscience, and using 
different labels, several philosophers have addressed the idea of the presence of a single 
representational mechanism lying in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor 
processes involved in different functions and useful for shaping suitable action 
performances: a MR1. MRs are the naturalized mental antecedents of action – I am 
excluding mental action here. 
           This chapter presents a new, non-monolithic view of MRs, according to which, 
contrarily to the received view, when looking at in between (visual) perceptual processes and 
motor processes, we find not only a single representational mechanism with different functions, 
but an ensemble of different sub-representational phenomena, each of which with a 
different function. This new view is able to avoid several issues emerging from the 
literature and to address something the literature is silent about, which however turns out 
to be crucial for a theory of MRs. Before developing my account, I need to sketch the 
basic positions in the literature about MRs.  	  
2.1 The Positions in Play 
 
In order to sketch the basic positions held in the literature, a premise on neurophysiology 
is needed.  
           As said, a common ground to link visual perception with action is the TVSM, 
which suggests the presence, in humans and other mammals, of a separation of two main 
visual pathways, grounded on distinct anatomo-functional structures (Milner and 
Goodale 1995): one for visual recognition, the ventral stream, and one for visually guided 
action, the dorsal stream. They can be dissociated due to cortical lesions. Lesions in the 
dorsal stream (the occipito-parietal network from the primary visual cortex to the 
posterior parietal cortex) impair one’s ability to use what one sees to guide action (optic 
ataxia), but not object recognition; lesions in the ventral stream (the occipito-temporal 
network from the primary visual cortex to the infertemporal cortex) impair one’s ability 
to recognize things in the visual world (visual agnosia), but not action guidance (Jacob 
and Jeannerod 2003). Moreover, we have behavioral studies of normal subjects involving 
visual illusions that can deceive the ventral stream but not the dorsal one; thus, it seems 
that, unlike ventral perception, dorsal perception is completely inaccessible to 
consciousness (I’ll come back to this in § 2.4.2).  
           Starting from this specification, we now come to the list of the positions about 
MRs. I should specify that I will just mention the positions in the literature which 
propose a naturalized account of these mental antecedents of action, namely, those that 
follow neuroscience in order to build an idea of MRs. Indeed, I agree that, in order to 
understand MRs, we have to turn to empirical science (Nanay 2014a), something not 
always pursued in the literature about action-representations. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will ignore the different labels found in literature and simply talk about MRs.  
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2.1.1 MRs are Dorsal Phenomena, not Consciously Accessible and 
Represent Action Goals, Bodily Movements and Action Properties 
  
A widely agreed idea about MRs is that they are due to the dorsal stream (Pacherie 2000, 
2011) and, given its encapsulation, MRs are not normally consciously accessible (2000: 
Sec. 5; 2007: 8; 2011: 14; 2006 14; 2002: 63; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 252–255, 186, 
and Sec. 6.4; see Ch. 6; see Brogaard 2011: 1094; see Jeannerod 1994, 1997). MRs might 
become conscious by accessing the short-term memory long enough, when action is 
blocked, delayed, or through top-down attentional amplification (Jeannerod 1994; 
Pacherie 2006: 8; 2008: 195, 198; 2000: Sec. 5; p. 104). Also, since dorsal perception is 
not sensitive to certain perceptual illusions, thus MRs cannot therefore access ventral 
conscious semantic representations (I’ll suggest this is not completely true in § 2.4.2) – as 
suggested by cases of visual agnosia (Pacherie 2008: 196; 2000: 411-412). However, 
sometimes a slight inter-streams interaction is allowed (following Jacob and Jeannerod 
2003) (I’ll come back to this in § 2.4.1) and it is suggested that, while MRs are dorsal 
processes, pragmatic and semantic representations should not rely on the ventral/dorsal 
anatomical distinction (Pacherie 2000: 411, 412). Moreover, MRs guide action as long as 
it unfolds (Pacherie 2002: 61; 2010: 10, 11; 2011: 14 and sec. 4; 2006: 14; see also Nanay 
2014a: 4). In general, MRs represent an action goal (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Pacherie 
2000: 409; 2007: 2; 2011:13; 2002: 71-72), which determines the type of grip chosen for 
motor interaction (Pacherie 2008: 186; 2006: 8; 2011: 10, 13; 2007: 2, 8; 2000: 409, Sec. 5; 
2011:13; 2002: 71-72; Jacob 2005), and which is computed in egocentric coordinates 
(Pacherie 2011: 10; 2002: 70,71; 2000: 413; see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Ch. 8.2; see §§ 
2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.4.4) – the literature on MRs privileges the case of grasping, insofar as this 
specific motor act is the most studied one in the neuroscientific literature about 
visuomotor behavior; while I will follow the literature in privileging this kind of motor 
act, it is worth noting that the discussion can be extended to most of the motor acts we 
are able to perform (see Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). Furthermore, MR functions ‘fall 
between’ a sensory function (extracting objects’ features relevant for action) and a motor 
one (encoding motor acts) (see § 2.3.1) and those two aspects of the content of MRs 
(goal and object features) are not separate components of the content (see §§ 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 
2.4.4). Finally, MRs also represent how our body has to move in a given situation, being 
grounded on the simulation of the required motor acts (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Ch. 
6; Jeannerod 2006). This idea about the functions of MRs is also shared by Gallese (2000, 
2005, 2007, 2009). However, it is not clear how MRs can select a singular motor act with 
respect to different action possibilities that a singular object can offer (this problem is 
recognized by Pacherie 2002: 71-72) (I provide an answer in §§ 2.4.3, 2.4.4). 
 
2.1.2 MRs are subserved by both Streams, can be Conscious and 
Represent only Action Properties, not Goals or Bodily Movements 
Another view is that MRs represent action properties extracted from the object’s 
geometrical properties relevant/necessary for action performance (Nanay 2011c, 2013 b: 
39; 2014a: 4; 2013 a: 75). However, while for Nanay (2011c) MRs also encode action 
goals, for Nanay (2013 b: 41, 42) this is not the case and they do not represent bodily 
movements (Nanay 2013 b: 41). Furthermore, while dorsal perception plays an important 
role in the implementation of MRs, it is not the only one (Nanay 2013a: 1055, 2013b: 3.4, 
p. 64). To my knowledge, Nanay is the only one to explicitly suggest that MRs are 
subserved by both streams and can be conscious, although they are typically 
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unconscious. This idea seems to follow from empirical evidence about a lack of a clear-
cut distinction between the two streams’ processing, about the possibility of dorsal 
“consciousness”, the multimodality of dorsal perception and the sensitivity of MRs to 
top-down factors like the subject’s affective life, her/his language skills (Morgado et al. 
2011; Pulvermüller and Hauk 2005; Stein et al. 2004; Gentilucci et al. 1995; for a specific 
discussion of these empirical results see Nanay 2013 b: 3.4). However, dorsal processing 
is supposed to be quick and automatic and thus should not be sensitive to top-down 
influences. Therefore, MRs are not fully exhausted by dorsal perception. Finally, it is 
suggested that the expression “dorsal vision” deals with anatomical criteria, while action-
guiding vision deals with functional criteria and we should not use anatomical data in 
analyzing the cognitive impenetrability claim (Nanay 2013 a: 1058) confusing the 
functional level (vision-for-action) and the anatomical level (dorsal stream) (p. 1055). 
2.1.3 MRs arise from the Activity of the Premotor Cortex and mainly 
encode Goals 
Finally, there is the view according to which MR processing lies in the activity of 
premotor areas, without clarifying the precise cortical circuits, nor addressing the 
ventral/dorsal issue (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012). Following this view, the main 
function of MRs is to represent action outcomes. However, beside this main function, 
they can also represent ways of acting, objects (properties) on which actions are 
performed (2012: 137) - this is because action outcomes often specify both a way of 
acting and also what to act on. Also, they are useful in planning and in monitoring (p. 
123, 124; see also Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Pacherie 2000: 410–3; Gallese 2000). I’ll 
discuss this account more extensively later (§ 2.3.2)2.  
2.1.4 Philosophical Problems with (the literature on) MRs 
Reading this list, several philosophical issues remain unspecified for a theory of MRs: (1) 
There are accounts for which the same MR has not the same function (e.g. for some 
commentators the function is to represent the goal, for others it represents motor 
commands, and for others still it is both). We should precisely address all MR functions; 
(2) more than just one function is addressed for a single MR, which can be engaged in 
different tasks. The doubt is whether and how the same representation can deal with so 
many functions, enslaving different tasks, insofar as every representation should have a 
singular content, a singular vehicle, and thus, a singular function  (what the content is, in 
this case, what the function is about: goals, action properties, etc.), being this aspect 
crucial in determining the accuracy conditions of the representation (this is widely agreed 
in the philosophical literature about perception and neuroscience, see Siegel 2006, 2010a, 
b; Nanay 2010c; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003); (3) There is no clear-cut distinction between 
the functions addressed in the literature, it being unclear when one ends and the other 
begins. This issue is closely related to the following point: (4) While MRs are taken to be 
mainly dorsal phenomena, it is not clear as to how those functions are precisely 
subserved by the dorsal stream: even confining them to the activity of the dorsal stream, 
we do not know the precise dorsal neural correlates these functions arise from. Another 
issue (5) is that MRs are mainly, but not totally, dorsal phenomena. Ventral processing is 
involved in MR activity, in the light of evidence about the interplay between the two 
streams. If the precise dorsal contribution has failed to be addressed, the precise nature 
of the ventral contribution – and the possibility of conscious accessibility - is even more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here I do not talk about the direction of fit, the format and the link with imagery of MRs.  
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neglected.  Finally, (6) there is no reference to any emotional component for MRs. 
However, neuroscientific results strongly suggest the presence of a further affective-
emotional component of MRs.  
2.2 A new perspective on MRs 
 
The advantage of my proposal is that, maintaining the idea that MRs are mainly dorsal 
phenomena, but depend on ventral processing as well, I develop a theory of MRs able to 
avoid the aforementioned issues (§ 2.1.4), by clarifying what are the functions and what is 
the precise geography of the neural underpinnings of MRs. Indeed, contrarily to what is 
generally proposed, I argue that a singular MR can be decomposed into different motor 
representational sub-components3 with different functions (this resolves issues 1 and 2 
mentioned in § 2.1.4). For each of these components, I address the precise function and 
the precise neural underpinning in relation to both streams (this resolves issues 4 and 5), 
showing that these components are deeply interconnected, but in principle discernible 
(and this resolves issue 3). I also add an emotional component for MRs (resolving issue 
6). 
            Summarizing, my aim is twofold: to defend a non-monolithic view of MRs and to 
suggest, on the basis of this view, the precise relation they entertain with the two visual 
streams. Here’s the way I will develop my theory. 
            Since MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, in the first part of the chapter, I 
develop my decomposing strategy (§ 2.3), focusing on the dorsal contribution to MRs 
and suggesting that MRs can be decomposed into an ensemble of different sub-
representations, each one subserving a singular function, necessary for MR processing: (§ 
2.3.1) the visuomotor component and the simulative one; the goal-related component (§ 
2.3.2); the egocentric component (§ 2.3.3).  
           However, MRs also depend on ventral perception. Thus, in the second part of the 
chapter, I suggest the importance of ventral processing for the functions addressed 
above which mainly pertain to dorsal perception, showing that MRs depend on the 
dorsal/ventral interplay (§ 2.4). Then, I propose an unexpected function (§ 2.5) and an 
emotional component for MRs (§ 2.6), which are completely neglected in the literature. 
              Constructing my account is important for two reasons. Too often, MRs are 
invoked in terms of the perception of action of others, at the expense of the perception 
of action for the acting subject (Cook et al. 2014) – (see § 2.3.2). Also, though evidence 
about visuomotor behavior is constantly accumulating, we still lack a philosophical 
theory able to support it. My theory reconciles philosophy with neuroscience. So, let’s 
start with the decomposing strategy. 	  
2.3 The Decomposing Strategy  
 
This first part of the chapter limits the discussion to the neurological geography of the 
dorsal stream (and its projections), leaving aside the ventral contributions.  
          Saying that the functions of MRs primarily rely on dorsal activity is not trivial and, 
for this reason, may be too general a claim. Indeed, the dorsal stream is an extremely 
complex pathway whose activity starts from the primary visual cortex, V1, and, passing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Important specification: for Pacherie different action representations deal with different stages of action 
specification (2008: 195; 2002: 67), concerning a vertical differentiation about intentions. Differently, I 
argue that the same floor of action, that is MRs, can be decomposed into different sub-representations: I 
am drawing a horizontal, not vertical decomposition. This pertains to the lowest level of motor intentions 
and the linked level of MRs. 
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through the parietal lobe, projects to the premotor areas (with some projections until the 
motor one). Nevertheless, the complex connectivity of its cortical chunks should not 
lead us to couple MRs with dorsal activity, without specifying the nature of this coupling. 
Indeed, when we focus on a deeper level of grain, we find that different dorsal 
(sub)pathways subserve different representational functions. The sum of these processes 
shapes, at the high level of grain, the (apparent) single phenomenon we call MR. If we do 
not properly draw a distinction between those different processes, we risk using the word 
“MR” – with respect to those functions - as a folk notion: it makes no sense to talk 
about a general MR we can point our finger at when we locate it on the dorsal stream, 
just as we cannot generally point our finger at our belly and say: “well, this is where you 
find digestion”. In other words, an MR is the ensemble of different processes whose 
complex organization gives us the impression of a single phenomenon; but this is only an 
impression. Ignoring this leads us to fall into the problems mentioned in (§ 2.1.4). I 
would like to make my argument transparent here by pointing out that the separability of 
the functions of the sub-representations composing an MR are individuated through the 
separability of the anatomo-functional portions of our visuomotor system. That is, my 
argument is based on separability of functions in neural areas (see also Grafton and 
Hamilton 2007; Thill et al. 2013; cfr. with footnote 3).  
            Note that the dorsal stream, which is involved in several important visuomotor 
tasks, is divided (at least) into two: the dorso-dorsal stream (D-D, following the division 
of the intraparietal sulcus, which subdivides the posterior parietal lobe, it is related to the 
superior parietal lobule (SPL) - also known as the dorso-medial circuit, which projects to 
the dorsal premotor cortex) and the ventro-dorsal stream (V-D, related to the inferior 
parietal lobule, (IPL) - also known as the dorso-lateral circuit, which projects to the 
ventral premotor cortex) (Gallese 2007; Turella and Lignau 2014; Rizzolatti and Matelli 
2003). Though both chunks of the dorsal stream are crucial for motor interaction 
(especially grasping), V-D and the ensemble of its parietal-premotor networks (AIP-F5 
and VIP-F4), is the crucial pathway, both in humans and non-human primates, 
concerning the representational components of MRs listed above in (§ 2.1) - with respect 
to D-D, mostly involved in proprioceptive input, but with an important visual 
contribution (Gallese 2007):  
(a) The Visuomotor Component and the Simulative one 
(b)  The one linked with Goal/Outcomes  
      (c)  The Egocentric Component 
 
              I will now propose a neurological guided tour of the V-D pausing in each 
cortical site dealing with an MR component.  
          For the sake of coherence toward neuroscience, I should specify that, of course, 
while my analysis is more accurate than those in the philosophical literature, it is not so 
technical as those in the neurophysiological literature. But this is not a neuroscientific 
review of the neural underpinnings of action-guiding vision (Chinellato and del Pobil 
2015). It is a philosophical analysis that considers the necessary empirical background in 
order to avoid a too simplicistic monolithic view of MRs.  
                Now the decomposition, which starts from the visuomotor component, 
accompanied by the simulatiove one. 
2.3.1 The Visuomotor Component and the Simulative one 
 
Objects exhibit geometrical properties (e.g. size, shape, texture) that are, from a motor 
point of view, action/motor properties, to the extent that they permit a precise action  
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possibility4 satisfiable with a precise motor act. For example the geometrical features of a 
mug are action properties permitting an action possibility (grasping), which can be 
satisfied by a proper motor act: a power grip. This important function of MRs is due to 
their visuomotor component. This visuomotor transformation relies on a well defined 
parietal-premotor network lying in between the posterior parietal cortex and the ventral 
premotor cortex, that is, a precise portion of the V-D, whose main components for these 
tasks are the anterior intraparietal (AIP) area and area F5, in the most rostral part of the 
ventral premotor cortex (for a review of the leading role of AIP-F5 in the detection of 
action possibilities and the related visuomotor transformation of object properties into 
action properties and then of action properties into motor acts see Borghi and Riggio 
2015, Raos et al. 2006, Romero et al. 2014, Castiello 2005; Castiello and Begliomini 2008 
Chinellato and del Pobil 2015; Kandel 2013: Chap. 19; Janssen and Scherberger 2015; 
concerning lesion studies see Andersen et al. 2014; Turella and Lignau 2014; Graziano 
2009) – see footnote 19. AIP is one of the end-stage areas of the dorsal stream. AIP 
neurons respond selectively to objects during both passive fixation and grasping, 
extracting visual object information concerning action possibilities for grasping purposes 
(for a review see Romero et al. 2014, Raos et al. 2006); then, they relay this information 
to F5 neurons, with which AIP is directly connected (Borra et al. 2008), which then 
activate the primary motor cortex. In F5 we find visuomotor canonical neurons, which 
use the information received by AIP about action properties of the objects and compute 
the motor commands in order to interact with them. Also canonical neurons respond 
during object fixation, regardless the actual execution of an action. In canonical neurons 
activity, there is a strict congruence between their high selectivity for a particular type of 
prehension (executed grip) and the visual selectivity for objects that, although differing in 
shape, require prehension in order to be grasped (for a review see Raos et al. 2006). 
Imagine you have to grasp first a little box that can be contained inside your hand, and 
then a little stone: although their shape is different, these objects show the same action 
property; therefore the motor acts satisfying this action possibility (grasping the object 
with the whole hand) are the same. This is a first example of how features of objects are 
read (during visuomotor transformation) as contents of a (sensori)motor nature. 
Representational presence concerning the visuomotor component is also suggested by an 
automatic process of grip formation taking place during the transportation of the hand in 
which the fingers are preshaped long before the hand touches the object. At about 60% 
of its transportation the hand reaches its widest opening, or maximum grip aperture (hence 
forth: MGA) and the size of the finger-grip at MGA (though much larger than the object 
to be grasped) is linearly correlated with the size of the object: this process is largely 
anticipatory and pertains to an automatic action representation, not to a mere on-line 
adaptation of the motor commands to the object (Jeannerod 2006: 5; for the shown  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There is a crucial point here. The concept of action/motor property/possibility recalls the famous notion 
of affordance, proposed by Gibson (1979), which has captured the interest of both neuroscientists and 
philosophers in the last twenty years (Borghi and Riggio 2015; Thill et al. 2013; Ferretti, forthcoming; 
Jacob and Jeannerod 2013; Nanay 2013b; Chemero 2009). Affordances involve both perception and 
action, insofar as they consist in the visual perception of the invitation to action that is offered to the active 
subject by the objects she/he deals with in the environment. However, the notion of affordance is strictly 
related to the gibsonian idea of a direct visual perception of action possibilities, to the extent that we do 
not need to use any visual representation in order to detect them (for a complete analysis see Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2013). However, despite the original gibsonian anti-representational view of affordances (for an 
analysis see Chemero, 2009, Nanay 2013b), a lot of neuroscientists and philosophers agree that action 
possibilities are perceived through perceptual representations (Nanay 2013b, Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; 
for an argument built on empirical evidence see Ferretti, forthcoming) and avoid the use of the term 
“affordance” with an anti-representationalist stance. Here I follow this second view insofar as my account 
is framed in terms of MRs. Hence, I avoid the use of the term “affordance” and refer to the more neutral 
expression “action property/possibility”. 
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automaticity of the process see Gentilucci et al. 1995; for a review see Nowak and 
Hermsdörfer 2009). These visuomotor phenomena are the crucial process of the visuomotor 
component5. 
  
            A further specification. These cortical circuits exhibit both the visuomotor 
transformation processes and a mechanism of visuomotor resonance during object 
fixation, regardless of the action execution: motor simulation. Simulation is an automatic 
mechanism with a perceptual function to facilitate the motor preparation (Gallese 2009)6. 
Motor activation frames the represented action within the constraints of a real action7: 
represented actions correspond to covert actions as a neurophysiological simulation of 
the mechanisms normally involved in the physical action generation” (Jeannerod 2006: 
130-131)8. However, we have an issue here: for Jeannerod the representation of the 
action is basically the simulation of the action, even though he admits that the 
representations for executing and simulating do not completely overlap, allowing this 
distinction even in the absence of sensory reafferences” (Jeannerod 2006: 131).  
        In spite of this incomplete overlap I would like to suggest a distinction between 
motor simulation and visuomotor representation. Simulation concerns motor response 
during fixation with respect to the activity of both AIP and F5 visuomotor canonical 
neurons. The visuomotor representational mechanism concerns the interplay of (the 
resonance of both) AIP and F5 (the former resonating in the encoding of layout 
properties of objects as action properties and the latter in encoding the motor act with 
respect to these action properties) for the visuomotor transformation of object 
properties (both without the necessity of action performance). Therefore, I maintain that 
motor simulation and MRs are deeply linked (Jeannerod 2006: 130-131), but reformulate 
Jeannerod’s idea that the (overt) execution of an action is necessarily preceded by its 
(covert) simulation, while a (covert) simulation is not necessarily followed by an (overt) 
execution of that action. The simulation is possible only given the result of the 
visuomotor transformation. 
           All I said here recalls – and is deeply in line with - the idea of the common coding 
theory of perception and action planning, according to which perceptual contents and 
motor programs which instantiate action plans are coded in a common representational 
process to the extent that seeing an object activates the action associated with that object. 
In this view, perceptual representations and MRs are linked by shared representations in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 However, AIP needs the help of F5 for encoding action properties; thus, the encoding of motor acts and 
action properties cannot be properly divided (Romero et al. 2014, Theys et al. 2015). This is a form of 
motor perception (Fadiga et al. 2000: 165, 176; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 177). Accordingly, there is also 
evidence that in the AIP-F5 circuit 3D-shape selective neurons are co-localized with neurons showing 
motor-related activity a close relation of visual and motor information on the same clusters of neurons 
(Theys et al. 2015; Romero et al. 2013). This is in line with the evidence of several action-modulated 
perceptual effects that improve processing of action relevant visual features (Gutteling et al. 2015) and with 
the evidence that action preparation originating from activation in higher-order visuomotor control brain 
areas downstream from early visual cortex in the dorsal stream modulates visual processing according to 
the visuomotor constraints of the action that is encoded (van Elk et al. 2010; Gutteling et al. 2013). 
6 “What is a ‘plan’ to act? It is a simulated potential action’’ (Gallese 2007: 7; see also Gallese 2000; 
Jeannerod 2006; for a review see Borghi and Cimatti 2010; Decety and Grezes 2006). Motor simulation is a 
mental rehearsal of the motor acts able to satisfy an action possibility related to the object (Tipper et al. 
2006). 
7 …though neural commands for muscular contractions are effectively present, but simultaneously blocked 
by inhibitory mechanisms (Jeannerod 2006: 2.3.3). 
8 Overt action execution is necessarily preceded by its covert representation and simulation. Covert 
representation and simulation are not necessarily followed by overt execution. Representation can be 
detached from execution, existing on its own (Jeannerod 2006: 2; chap. 2, 6). Also, motor activation is 
highly specific to the action that is represented (Id.), involving the main neural structures needed in action 
execution. 
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a common code for both perception and action, insofar as actions are coded in terms of 
the perceivable effects they can generate (Prinz 1984, 1987, 1990, 1997; Hommel et al., 
2001; for a complete review see Prinz et al. 2013; for an analysis of the compatibility 
between these sets of evidence and the common coding theory see Borghi and Riggio 
2015: 7). 
          Summarizing, when I am looking at the cup of coffee on my desk, V-D responds 
to those 3D geometrical properties of objects that serve such visuomotor tasks as 
grasping them. The AIP-F5 parietal-premotor network is crucial in translating those 
geometrical features into action properties and then into motor acts. Thus we can grasp 
the cup. First of all, AIP detects the geometrical features of the handle that exhibit 
precise motor characteristics. This means that shape, texture, size are encoded. Thus, the 
geometrical features are read as action properties. This information is sent to F5, which, 
given the information received by the AIP, computes the most suitable motor act (with 
respect to my motor repertoire, say, a power grip) in order to grasp the handle of the 
cup. At the same time, during this translation, the simulation of the appropriate motor 
behavior is encoded: the visuomotor brain is both perceiving the action possibility and 
simulating its readiness for potential related motor interaction, setting a motor act “in the 
quiver”9. I’ll refer to this particular component and the brain areas it depends on several 
times in this work. I’ll be back to this in (§ 3), in particular in (§ 3.1) and in (§ 4), in 
particular in (§ 4.3). 
 
2.3.2 Goals/Outcomes  
 
Action performance presupposes a some sort of representation of the goal (for a review 
see Nanay 2011c, 2014a, for critics see Nanay 2013b) and this is due to the second of 
MRs component that deals with goals/outcomes. Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2012) have 
recently described the goal-related nature of MRs. As they suggest, “the representation of 
the goal is not a mere representation of a sequence of joint displacements, insofar as it 
captures something shared by different patterns of joint displacements/postures 
involving different effectors - e.g. hand, mouth, use of normal pliers (grasping requires 
closing the hand), use of reverse pliers (grasping requires opening the hand) (p. 121) - 
and discerns between the same sequence of joint displacements in different contexts, 
depending on distal outcomes, e.g. eating or throwing the object after having grasped it”. 
Indeed, the joint displacements realizing grasping in one context might in another 
situation realize scratching (p. 122)”. This is confirmed by evidence that “markers of 
motor processing, such as a pattern of neuronal discharge or motor-evoked potentials, 
carry information about action outcomes” (p. 122) and not joint displacements. On this 
matter, the Authors report experiments with varying kinematic features while holding 
constant the outcome achieved using different effectors (Rizzolatti et al. 1988, 2001; 
Cattaneo et al. 2010), studies where the same action outcome requires closing or opening 
the hand depending on the tool used (Umiltà et al. 2008; Cattaneo et al. 2009; Rochat et 
al. 2010), experiments with varying action outcome while holding kinematic constant 
(Fogassi et al. 2005; Bonini et al. 2010; Cattaneo et al. 2007), and studies about the same 
grasping movements performed in the presence/absence of a target object (Umiltà et al. 
2001; Villiger et al. 2010) or in the presence of objects which could, or could not, be 
grasped with such movements (Koch et al. 2010; see Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012: 121)10 
- (for the empirical reference see Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the behavioral counterpart of these experiments see (Borghi and Riggio 2015). 
10 They also suggest that MRs are useful in motor planning and monitoring. Since the literature contains a 
vast amount of evidence I can avoid this point (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012: 123, 124; Nanay 2014a: 4; 
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While the goal-related component can be completely exhausted by Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia’s account, there is an important point concerning the evidence exposed above, 
which I need to address in order to build my theory.  
        First of all, note that area F5 (§ 2.3.1) contains (at least) two large groups of 
neurons: the first is that of (A) purely motor neurons, whose activation is exclusively 
connected to actual movements. They constitute the overall majority of all F5 neurons, 
and belong to two kinds: (A1) neurons that fire whenever a movement is performed, and 
(A2) goal-related neurons, which code only the achievement of a goal regardless of the 
effector (i.e. the particular limb employed) (Fadiga et al. 2000, Rizzolatti and Matelli 
2003). But we also have (B) visuomotor neurons, also distinguished into two groups: 
(B1) canonical neurons described in (§ 2.3.1); (B2) mirror neurons, which respond when 
the monkey – see footnote 19 - observes an action performed by another individual, or 
when it performs the same or a similar action (Cook et al. 2014).  
         The experiments reported by Butterfill and Sinigaglia – I mentioned above - pertain 
to different families of neurons. However, most of them are about mirror neurons (B2) 
(Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Cattaneo et al. 2010; Cattaneo et al. 2009; Fogassi et al. 2005; Koch 
et al. 2010; Umiltà et al. 2001; Villiger et al. 2010). Since here I am interested in the 
individual dimension of our motor behavior, I would like not to focus on the evidence 
about the representation of goals during observation (B2) (for a complete review of these 
very important results see Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2015a, b; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011b, 
2013, 2014; Sinigaglia 2013; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 2013) - even if it is very useful, 
as shown by Butterfill and Sinigaglia - for the purpose of building my theory of MRs and 
explaining the representations allowing us to act. However, if we endorse my suggestion, 
there are important experiments quoted in their account, namely, that of Umiltà et al. 
(2008) - about grasping with normal and inverse pliers - which is the same experiment as 
Cattaneo et al. (2009), but without the mirror counterpart – that of Bonini et al. (2010) – 
which, however, is about both action organization and understanding concerning the 
activity of the ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortices – and that of Cattaneo et al. 
(2007) - concerning how parietal and premotor neurons involved in the encoding of a 
very specific motor act (e.g., grasping) show a significant different activation when the 
motor act is part of actions linked to different goals (e.g., grasping for eating vs. grasping 
for placing), see above (for the empirical reference see Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  So, I would like to point out here that into enquiring the goal-relatedness - of the 
dorsal underpinnings - of MRs, my research focuses on those last mentioned kinds of 
experiments on the individual side. For example among the neurons involved in 
representing outcomes are those called goal-related neurons (A2), which don’t encode 
elementary movements as joint displacements, but motor acts (coordinated movements 
with specific purposes) (Rizzolatti et al. 1988). They are interesting because the same 
elementary movement activating a neuron during a specific motor act (e.g., grasping) 
doesn’t activate it during a different motor act (e.g., scratching). There are thus different 
groups of neurons from F5: grasping neurons, grasping-with-the-mouth neurons, 
hugging neurons, etc. This is possible because during our ontogenetic development, the 
pruning of our neural networks under the pressure of experience selects in F5 the neural 
populations linked to the (representations of the) most effective motor acts. This 
learning mechanism is called “motor reinforcement”. 	  
              This is important because F5 is a vocabulary whose words are neural populations 
representing one kind of motor act as the ensemble of different motor words (rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pacherie 2008: 189, 90; 2002: 61; 2010: 10, 11; 2011: 14 and sec. 4; 2006:14; for a more general discussion 
about action control see Wong 2009, 2010, 2015: Shepherd 2014, 2015a, b). I am primarily interested in the 
MR functions necessary to transform the sensory input into motor output in order to explain the mental 
antecedents of actions.   
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a simple movement). The referent of these “words” can be of different generality: the goal, 
the execution, etc. (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Gallese and Metzinger 2003, 367). As Jeannerod 
puts it, in the ‘motor vocabulary’ actions are encoded element by element (2006: 12). 
Due to its somatotopic organization, this vocabulary provides computational efficiency, 
insofar as the appearance of the graspable object in the visual space will immediately 
retrieve motor words with the description codifying the appropriate motor act (Gallese 
and Metzinger 2003, 367-368)11, recorded in the motor vocabulary as an internal copy of 
an action (Fadiga et al. 2000). This is closely related with the activity of the visuomotor 
component (§ 2.3.1). Of course, goal encoding is not exhausted by these phenomena, 
insofar as the motor system plays a crucial role in the goal-component of MRs (Jacob 
and Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod 2006). However, I am particularly interested in the dorsal 
contributions – which are at the heart of the debate - leaving aside its projections to the 
motor system.     
         So, even if I completely endorse the philosophical analysis by Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia, I think that in order to properly investigate the goal-related component we 
should report only the evidence concerning the individual aspect of the goal-relatedness 
of these neural underpinnings, and not the mirror-social aspect.  
         An important related point: for Jeannerod actions are represented in terms of their 
goal, but the goal is only part of the content of the action representation 12 . By 
representing the goal, we can answer the question of ‘What the action is about’, but not 
the question of ‘How to do it’, insofar as this question requires motor simulation to be 
answered (Jeannerod 2006: 134). I completely agree with Jeannerod that actions are 
represented in terms of their goal, which are only part of the content of the MR. 
However, I think that goal representation is also concerned with the “how to do it” 
question. Computing a motor command depends on the goal to reach and, vice versa, 
trying to achieve a goal depends on the possibility of performing a motor act among 
those skills one has. The details of this interplay become clearer in (§§ 2.4.3, 2.4.4).  
             Summing up, visuomotor transformation and motor simulation are necessarily 
accompanied by the goal we have in mind (e.g. grasping the cup in order to lift it), on the 
basis of which we compute the motor act (e.g. a precision grip permitting me to grasp 
the cup and lift it to bring it to my mouth). All I said is strengthened by evidence that 
during action planning the action goal dominates over the hand grip (van Elk et al. 2011) 
and specific motor programs are selected on the basis of the action outcome (Bonini et 
al. 2012; Borghi and Riggio 2015: 7). However, we are usually faced with more than one 
motor possibility, and we have to figure out, with respect to the goal, which is the most 
appropriate way to interact (to grasp the cup with a power or a precision grip to better 
transport it to the mouth); matters on this point will become clearer in (§§ 2.3.3, 2.4.3, 
2.4.4). The next section is about the egocentric component. 
 
2.3.3 The Egocentric/Peripersonal Component 
 
When we try to reach and grasp an object, we need to represent where the object is 
located with respect to us13, since we can actively interact only with those objects 
presented within our peripersonal-action space. Visuomotor representation and motor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Different populations of goal-related neurons can be described as being different representations. I 
avoid this point here. 
12 This is in line with my idea that different portions of the information encoded by MRs are subserved by 
different sub-representations. 
13 For a philosophical defense see (Nanay 2011); for criticism see (Nanay 2013 b: 41-42). 
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simulation are deeply dependent on the peripersonal spatial location of the object 
(Costantini et al. 2010, 2011a, b; Holmes and Spence 2004; ter Horst et al. 2011; Borghi 
and Riggio 2015; Turella and Lignau 2014). 
                 This is due to corto-cortical functional interconnections of different areas 
within the circuits of grasping (Castiello 2005, Turella and Lignau 2014): namely, the two 
main – but not the only, see footnote 19 - parietal-premotor circuits in the ventro-dorsal 
stream: AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Gallese 2007; Chinellato and 
Del Pobil 2015). The circuit crucially involved in the mapping of our peripersonal space 
is composed of the ventral intraparietal area (VIP), located in the fundus of the 
intraparietal sulcus, and area F4, which occupies the posterior sector of the ventral 
premotor cortex, next to F5, with which it is adjacent (see Gallese 2007, Rizzolatti 
Matelli 2003). VIP neurons respond to both visual and tactile stimuli and the visual 
receptive field encompasses a three-dimensional spatial region around the tactile 
receptive field (peripersonal space). As for VIP neurons, most of the receptive fields of 
the F4 neurons do not change position with respect to the observer when the eyes move: 
F4 response does not signal retinal positions, but positions in space relative to the 
observer with respect to different body parts in egocentric coordinates and not to a 
single reference point. Multiple representations linked to different, coordinated, effector-
specific frames of reference (e.g. head-centered, torso-centered) are present (Graziano 
2009; Pesaran 2006 for the relation of these egocentric representations with the goal of 
action). F4 activity is due to simulated motor action directed towards a particular spatial 
location, which, in turn, creates a motor space. When a visual stimulus is presented, it 
directly evokes the simulation of the congruent motor schema which, regardless of the 
execution, maps the stimulus position in motor terms (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003, 
Gallese 2007, for a philosophical analysis of space in relation to the TVSM see Briscoe 
2009).  
           Interestingly for this chapter, the AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 circuits are extremely 
interconnected from an anatomo-functional point of view: largely segregated 
parietofrontal connections link the rostral intraparietal cortex (areas AIP and VIP) and 
the ventral premotor cortex (areas F5 and F4) (Luppino et al. 1999). Indeed, the VIP- F4 
circuit codes the peripersonal space, which coincides with the motor space for arm 
reaching in which motor interaction is encoded by AIP-F5 (Borghi and Riggio 2015: 9). 
For example, F5 canonical neurons respond only to those objects presented in the 
peripersonal space (Bonini et al. 2014). This is due to the connections between area F5 
and area F4 (Borghi and Riggio 2015: 7; Costantini et al. 2011a; Bonini et al., 2014). This 
spatial constraint holds in general for the ventral premotor cortex as well (Turella and 
Lignau 2014) – see footnote 19. All this means that the visuomotor transformation 
(performed by AIP-F5) is bound to the peripersonal/egocentric action space (performed 
by VIP-F4) – but see footnote 19. I’ll be back to this particular component and the brain 
areas it depends on in (§ 4), in particular in (§ 4.5). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Returning to the example of the cup, I can perform an appropriate motor act 
upon its handle because I can represent it as affording an action, due to the interplay of 
the visuomotor (and simulative) and goal related  components. However, representing 
the cup as affording an action, means to represent the cup as reachable for me (that is, in 
my peripersonal space). 
           To conclude this first part of the chapter, this decomposing strategy has suggested 
ensembles of different sub-representations dealing with different functions subserved by 
different neural correlates of the V-D at the basis of MRs. This is important, insofar as 
these functions are often mistakenly attributed to a single general MR, and too generally 
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to dorsal perception. This is a first way to avoid the confusions reported in (§ 2.1.4).        
            However, I take MRs to depend on ventral perception and on interstream 
interplay. The second part of the chapter explores this dependence with respect to the 
functions of MRs reported above and adds some features that can be explained only by 
referring to ventral perception. 
2.4 MRs between Ventral and Dorsal Perception 
 
My decomposing strategy defends a new non-monolithic view of MRs by addressing 
their different and specific representational functions in relation to dorsal perception. 
However, we know that any sophisticated visual behavior requires interstream 
collaboration (Schenk and McIntosh 2010; Kravitz et al. 2011, 2013: Box 3, p. 42; Bruno 
and Battaglini 2008; McIntosh and Schenk 2009; Briscoe 2009). The literature about MRs 
neglects these results14. By discussing them here, I defend the second important idea of 
this chapter: MRs also rely on ventral processing, which shapes important computational 
aspects of their components outlined in the decomposing strategy. I also report 
important insights on dorsal perception neglected even by those claiming that MRs are 
only dorsal phenomena.  
 
2.4.1 The Dorsal/Ventral Interplay in Action 
Neurophysiology of vision suggests there is no clear-cut functional distinction between 
the streams at various points in perceptual processing (Schenk and McIntosh 2010; 
Gallese et al. 1999): they integrate in early visual areas by feedbacks allowing each 
pathway to affect the other (Deco et al. 2004) and by sharing common early visual inputs 
(Schneider 1995), insofar as both connect with the frontal eye field, so that eye 
movements initiated by one stream might also impact the other (Kravitz et al. 2013). 
This interplay is at the basis of vision for action (for a complete review see Chinellato 
and del Pobil 2015), suggesting that MRs cannot be genuinely dorsal phenomena. 
Indeed, interplay is at the basis of attentional processes and visual memory in vision-for-
action: visual short-term memory representation of tools automatically evokes action 
possibilities in dorsal perception, priming visual memory for action-appropriate objects 
(Adamo and Ferber 2009; see also Kitadono and Humphreys 2009). Accordingly, dorsal 
perception is not only involved in on-line visuomotor coordination, because motor 
responses to action properties during off-line visual processing are possible by using 
visual memory even after 700 ms. after the object has been removed from view 
(Derbyshire et al. 2006: 95). Thus, (at least some) detection of action possibilities is not 
only dorsal, but results from an interstream interaction for off-line visual processing. 
Accordingly, we know that dorsal perception encodes action possibilities 
(unconsciously), whereas ventral perception does this consciously (Young 2006), 
following object semantic categorization (Gallese 2007: 3). Therefore, during delayed 
actions, dorsal perception plans and maintains coarse action goals, but at the time of 
execution, motor programming re-recruits detailed visual representations from ventral 
perception, particularly for grasping (Singhal et al. 2013) – see my (§ 2.4.3)15. Finally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nanay simply pointed out that MRs are not exclusively dorsal phenomena. Here I add a meticulous 
cortical geography of MR functions with respect to both streams.  
15 Also, motor planning with visual feedback at the onset of the movement is driven primarily by real-time 
visuomotor computations of dorsal perception, whereas grasping remembered objects without visual 
feedback is driven primarily by the perceptual memory representations of ventral perception (Prime and 
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while the motor planning/programming distinction is a boundary between ventral and 
dorsal influences on action (Milner and Goodale 2008), interestingly, some visual agnosic 
patients show impaired action planning  (high-level selection of action) with preserved 
action programming (low level parameterization), suggesting that planning depends on a 
perceptually based judgement of the awkwardness of alternative movements involving 
ventral perception, disrupted in visual agnosia (Dijkerman et al. 2009). Accordingly, 
misreaching affects not only extra-foveal visual targets, but also proprioceptive targets 
displaced from the direction of the gaze, suggesting that optic ataxia is not only a 
visuomotor disorder, and thus deep interstream collaboration in action (Jackson et al. 
2009). Finally, both visual agnosia and optic ataxia only support dissociation between 
central visual processing and peripheral visual processing: ataxic patients cannot reach 
and grasp in peripheral vision, but can in central vision (Rossetti et al. 2003). This 
interstream interplay subserving MRs becomes clearer when talking about the deception, 
of vision-for-action, to illusions. 
2.4.2 Dorsal Perception without Dorsal Deception?       
A big issue about the dorsal/ventral dichotomy concerning vision-for-action is whether 
or not illusions can deceive it. While the original response with the 3-D version of the 
Ebbinghaus illusion was negative (Aglioti et al. 1995), results in a variety of different 
experimental settings showed that the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion similarly deceives 
both vision and grasping, by deceiving a common representation of object size used by 
both (Franz and Gegenfurtner 2008) – of course, that means that the representation is 
non-veridical, not really deceived; subjects or persons are who get deceived. Accordingly, 
we have a huge meta-analysis showing that the Müller-Lyer illusion (Bruno et al. 2008; 
Bruno and Franz 2009) influences grip-scaling, that it is similar on both visual perception 
and grasping when grasping is executed without visual feedback, while it reduces 
progressively as visual feedback is increasingly available (Franz et al. 2009) and similarly 
affects grip programming, even if errors can be corrected online if the hand is seen 
approaching the target; indeed, we have relative resistance of pointing movements to this 
illusion only if vision is available during action programming (Bruno et al. 2008; Smeets 
et al. 2002). Also, evidence that visuomotor reaction time is sensitive to both the Ponzo 
and Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion suggested that vision-for-action can be subserved by 
ventral perception (Sperandio et al. 2009). While these results concern few illusions and 
few kinds of motor acts, a more general analysis revealed that visual perception seems to 
be fooled by illusions more than vision-for-action, only because dorsal perception is not 
attuned to contextual depth cues when action is automatic – e.g. MGA (Gentilucci et al. 
1995), but when these cues are inaccurate, or usual dorsal sources of spatial information 
are unavailable, or the action is slow, visuomotor vision is misled by making use of 
outputs from ventral processing (I am rephrasing Briscoe 2009: 441). An important 
point: the real result by Aglioti et al. (1995) – which is the cornerstone of this debate - 
found that the Ebbinghaus illusion has a slighter effect on perception than on action 
showing only a greater sensitivity of ventral perception to illusions than dorsal (see 
Briscoe 2009: 436, 441). 
               Summing up, of course there are illusions incapable of deceiving action, but 
only visual perception. However, at least in the case of particular illusions, also vision-
for-action can be deceived – something denied by Pacherie (cfr. with 2.4), because dorsal 
perception has ready task-specific access to sources of spatial content (contextual depth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Marotta 2013).  
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cues and other sources of 3-D spatial information) in the ventral stream. Thus, MRs can 
be deceived as well. This is in accordance with the idea that not all movements are 
mediated by dorsal perception. Ventral perception guides actions prior to their 
automatization (I’ll come back to automaticity in § 2.4.4), and in this case, conscious 
perception is incorporated into dorsal perception (Milner and Goodale 2010: 83). 
Moreover, even those who deny cognitive access to dorsal perception16 agree that 
conscious ventral vision affects dorsal vision-for-action (Brogaard 2011: 1094), insofar as 
illusions can affect the latter17. However, besides a general interstream interplay, precise 
ventral/ventro-dorsal connections shape MRs; the next section focuses on these. 
2.4.3 The Connection between V-D and Ventral Perception  
Everyday objects offer us a variety of action possibilities and thus different motor acts to 
perform upon them. The selection of the appropriate motor act does not rely only on the 
layout object properties (Cfr. with § 2.3.2), but also on what we intend to do with it, in 
relation to its functions and this is strictly related not only with what the object offers us, 
but also what we want to do with it. The interplay between the analysis of physical 
properties (pragmatic analysis) and object identity (semantic analysis) is due to 
connections lying between V-D and ventral perception and suggests the importance of 
ventral perception for MR functions. We saw in (§ 2.3.1) that AIP selects the geometrical 
properties to be translated into action properties and to be sent to F5 for the encoding of 
proper motor acts. Importantly, the action properties linked to the semantic functions of 
the object – e.g. think about the different grips we can use in order to use a pen in 
different ways: writing or placing the pen somewhere else - are possible because AIP 
receives information about the meaning of the object for high quality object recognition 
from both the inferior temporal (TEm, TE and TEO) and posterior parietal activity – 
thus, AIP is involved in object recognition (Fogassi and Luppino 2005: 627; Rizzolatti 
and Sinigaglia 2008; for a complete review, which I cannot offer here, of the complete 
functional processing of the pathways linking the early visual areas to the motor areas 
and about the relationships between the ventral stream and the ventro-dorsal stream see 
Chinellato and del Pobil 2015: 69; see also Theys et al. 2015). After the semantic analysis, 
the information processing from AIP to F5 results in a competition of the neural 
populations encoding different potential motor acts with respect to the action 
possibilities detected, on the basis of this semantic analysis – (cfr. with the last part of § 
2.1.1) (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008: 36-38; Cisek 2007; Cisek and Kalaska 2010; Kandel 
et al. 2013: Chap. 19; van Elk et al. 2014; for a complete review see Thill et al. 2013)18. 
We have related evidence of a semantic component for motor processing (Helbig et al. 
2006; Kalènine et al. 2013; Iachini et al. 2008; Tucker and Ellis 2004), and action 
preparation (Lindemann et al. 2006) given by the influence of ventral perception on 
action (Schenk and McIntosh 2010), as well a dorsal involvement in semantic encoding 
(Pulvermüller 2013: Box.1, Box.2) – we have also evidence that, in general, action usually 
shapes object categorization and that this influence is goal-related (Triberti et al. 2015). 
Also, MRs manage situations in which structural information and functional information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 There is no crucial evidence to suggest that dorsal processing cannot be conscious (Nanay 2015: 187), 
see (§§ 2.4.2, 2.4.5).  
17 I cannot survey here the complete literature concerning illusions and dissociation, for a more detailed 
account see (Bruno and Franz 2009; Bruno and Battaglini 2008; McIntosh and Schenk 2009; Bruno et al. 
2008; Franz and Gegenfurtner 2008; Franz et al. 2009; Vishton et al. 2003).  
18 It is unclear whether all action possibilities are automatically activated and then some of them decay, or if 
a single action possibility is directly encoded among others. Borghi and Riggio (2015: 13, see also p. 8 for a 
discussion of the empirical results I cannot review here) go for the second hypothesis.  
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may conflict (Jax and Buxbaum 2010). This is in line with the evidence by McIntosh and 
Lashleya (2008) discussed by Nanay (2013b: 66) that top down factors influence our MRs 
– e.g. the brand of a matchbox influences our grip size when grasping it. 
          Summing up the visuomotor comonent of MRs is always supplemented by 
semantic object recognition through ventral perception. The most ventral chunk of the 
dorsal stream, V-D, with its projections to the ventral stream, is the cutting edge of 
dorsal perception involved in MRs functions, bringing together all the dorsal 
computational characteristics with an important ventral computational shade in relation 
to the goal-related component (§ 2.3.2) and the visuomotor one (§ 2.3.1). Thus, MRs rely 
on the ventral/dorsal interplay (cfr. with the account by Pacherie, Jacob and Jeannerod § 
2.1.1). This also strengthens my remark about Jeannerod’s idea that the encoding of goals 
and motor properties are interconnected (cfr. with §§ 2.3.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4) and underlines 
the importance of goal encoding in order to compute action properties, both denied 
(Nanay 2013b) and endorsed (Nanay 2011c; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012) in the 
literature (cfr. with § 2.1). This specification is important because the dorsal stream 
contains another important chunk: the D-D. Pointing out the characteristics of the two 
chunks is crucial to understand the contribution of the different ventral and dorsal 
bifurcations, not of the visual brain in general, but of the dorsal stream in particular, to 
MRs. 
 
2.4.4 The many facets of our Visuomotor Interactions  
 
Here I want to specify that different specific MRs circuits, D-D and V-D19, compute 
specific kinds of action possibilities. We can distinguish between variable and stable 
mechanisms detecting action possibilities. Stable action possibilities derive from 
stable/invariant properties of objects due to the associations between the visual aspects 
of a precise object and the motor response it produces that can be incorporated into an 
object memory-stored representation (e.g., we ‘‘know’’ that this object is graspable with a 
precision grip) (cfr. with § 2.3.2) (Borghi and Riggio 2015)20. Differently, variable action 
possibilities are linked to the actions we are about to perform, but deal with rather 
temporary object characteristics which are not memory-stored. V-D is responsible for 
the former, and by managing how our knowledge of objects influences the way we 
represent them. D-D is responsible for the latter, in the online interaction with objects 
(in new motor situations), encoding the orientation of the wrist for grasping the object 
under visual guidance, and continuously adjusting the grip to the object online. This is 
really important for the issue concerning the online processing of MRs – cfr. with 
footnote 10. Accordingly, MRs’ detection of action possibilities is not so automatic, as 
agreed in the philosophical literature – indeed, the issue of automaticity of MRs is hotly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In line with (§§ 2.4.1 2.4.2) V-D, D-D and ventral pathways are strictly interconnected and finish in 
cortical frontal areas (Borghi and Riggio 2015: 351). The same dependence between spatial encoding and 
the visuomotor one in the V-D, holds for the D-D. However, data – that I cannot review here - suggest 
the leading role of (both AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 in the) V-D concerning the visuomotor transformation (in 
the peripersonal space); for a critical review see (for a review see Castiello 2005, Castiello and Begliomini 
2008; Turella and Lignau 2014; Kandel et al. 2013: 871; Janssen and Scherberger 2015; for the role played 
by the posterior parietal cortex MRs see Buneo ad Andersen 2006). All the evidence I reported is grounded 
on studies on both human and non-human primates and an important overlap between the different 
cortical areas is widely agreed (see Borghi and Riggio 2015: 3; Shikata 2003). This is not relevant for the 
purpose of this chapter. 
20 ‘‘Stable’’ does not mean that action possibilities are not processed and responded to online, but that they 
might need a certain degree of adjustment of the organism in relation to objects.  
	  	  	  
31	  
debated in the neuroscientific literature, in which it is suggested that the task ad the 
context are crucial in determining the “behavior” of the MR (see Borghi and Riggio 
2015: 8; Girardi et al. 2010; van Elk et al. 2014; cfr. with my footnote 18). Also, MRs 
handle contexts where multiple objects are present, hence where multiple action 
possibilities are activated with respect to memory stored information (Pezzulo et al. 2010; 
Derbyshire et al. 2006) and the different semantic, functional, spatial, geometrical, 
context and task relations existing between objects, strongly affect motor responses 
(Borghi et al. 2012; Cisek 2007; Cisek and Kalaska 2010; Borghi and Riggio 2015). In line 
with this and the notion of MGA expressed in (§ 2.3.1), we know that while a macaque 
plans to grasp a single object, its parietal neurons area involved in hand preshaping 
simultaneously encodes multiple potential grasp movements before one is chosen for 
action (Baumann, Fluet and Scherberger 2009).  
            This is how MRs manage different complex motor scenarios and deal with 
several motor possibilities with respect to a single object, as well as different objects in 
different contexts - something addressed, but left unspecified by Pacherie.  
2.4.5 Dorsal Multimodal Spatial Processing and MRs 
I need to point out here some important characteristics of dorsal perception, neglected 
even by those claiming that MRs are only dorsal phenomena. I suggest that dorsal 
representations can also be conscious – a possibility denied by Pacherie, Jacob and 
Jeannerod, for whom there are no conscious action-guiding representations (Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2003: 252–255; see Brogaard 2011: 1094) (§ 2.1.1).  
             First, dorsal lesions disrupt the conscious awareness of the quality of objects in 
the peripersonal space (Gallese 2007; see also Jacob and de Vignemont 2010). This 
means that ventral perception is insufficient to obtain conscious (spatial) perception 
without dorsal processing (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003), which even if functionally 
insufficient for normal visuospatial awareness, is nonetheless functionally necessary. 
Thus, conscious spatial processing depends on both streams. We have sufficient 
evidence for this claim. For example, posterior parietal and dorsal perceptions are crucial 
in the visual control of eye and hand movements in depth (Fearraina et al. 2009) and 
different families of AIP neurons encode the 3-D structure of shapes defined by 
binocular disparity linked to stereopsis (Romero et al. 2013)21. This suggests that dorsal-
parietal projections process a lot of cues that seemed to pertain exclusively to ventral 
perception. This is an important implication for the relation between “higher” vision and 
dorsal vision. Also, many neurons in the rostral part of V-D are multimodal, sensitive to 
somatosensation, motor activity and visual stimuli in peripersonal space (Kravitz et al. 
2011) – cfr. with (§ 2.3.3)22 and crossmodal influences on dorsal processing suggest that 
perception-for-action is effectively multi-modal (Gentilucci et al. 1995) insofar as several 
posterior parietal spatial representations exhibit a multimodal nature (Andersen et al. 
1997; Holmes and Spence 2004) – all this is in line with the idea that dorsal stream 
processing is definitely multimodal, as AIP is (Chinellato and del Pobil 2015). This is 
possible because V-D receives inputs from both streams providing - at least in the right 
hemisphere - the basis for higher-level spatial representation (Milner and Goodale 2006). 
This is because V-D integrates a variety of non-visual stimuli (including tactile, 
kinesthetic, proprioceptive) (Gallese 2007: 7; Kravitz et al 2011: 223, Box 1; Jeannerod 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Also, caudal intraparietal (CIP) neurons in the dorsal stream encode multiple depth cues (Tsutsui et al. 
2005). For the crucial link concerning action, depth cues, stereopsis and egocentric localization see 
(Vishvanath 2014). 
22 Cfr. with footnote 19. 
	  	  	  
32	  
2006: 1.2.3; Fogassi and Luppino 2005) and transmits information to ventral perception 
required to construct conscious spatial representations (Bullier et al. 2001). Finally, V-D 
is crucial in maintaining attention to current task goals, and orienting to salient new 
stimuli (Singh-Curry and Husain 2009). This is an important specification for the 
peripersonal component of MRs, as well as its conscious counterpart, in the light of the 
open debate about the exclusive identification of the contents of visual awareness with 
ventral perception (Clark 2009; Schenk and McIntosh 2010).  
              Summing up, this second part of the chapter has clearly shown that MRs are 
subserved also by ventral vision (§ 2.4.3) – and are, in general, dependent on interstream 
interplay (§ 2.4.1), even though dorsal processing itself is more complex than widely 
believed in the philosophical debate. With my addition, we gain a lot of explanations 
concerning the functions reported in the decomposing strategy and we can add features 
to these functions that are usually neglected in the literature: MRs are not always 
automatic, but they can alternate between automatic and online processing and conscious 
or unconscious processing (§§ 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5); they can rely on semantic computations 
(§ 2.4.3), due to their specific context dependency (§ 2.4.4). They can also be deceived, in 
some cases, by some kinds of illusion (§ 2.4.2), and can make use of both visual and 
motor memory (§ 2.4.1). But I want to suggest something very new for MRs. Also, in 
addition to what I said and against the view – which I criticized in the decomposing 
strategy - that MRs can be equated with dorsal perception without any specifications, it 
should be noted that, the dorsal stream can be divided not only into two sub-pathways, 
but, actually, into three sub-pathways – the divisions are compatible - all of them 
supporting conscious and non-conscious visuospatial processing, spatial working 
memory, visually guided action and navigation (Kravitz et al. 2011). 
2.5 MRs: an Unexpected Functioning  
Here I have a further important new point concerning MR processing. While dorsal 
perception distinguishes between images of graspable and non-graspable objects (Rice et 
al. 2007; Chao and Martin 2000), it cannot discriminate between normal and depicted 
objects, because this capacity is subserved by ventral perception: dorsal perception does 
not construct a complete 3D structural description of the target object. However, this 
description is necessary for response selection, in order to detect the action afforded by an 
object, or in the case of pictures, to understand that there is no possible interaction23. It 
is ventral perception that plays the key role in response selection, based on a 
comprehensive analysis of object volumetric structure, distinguishing between 3D 
objects and 2D images of objects by detecting conflicts between various visual cues24 and 
selecting different visuomotor strategies for a 2D image versus a 3D object. Instead, 
dorsal perception plans the precise metrics of the intended action, based on a pragmatic 
analysis of the object’s spatial features (see Westwood et al. 2002). For this reason, dorsal 
perception responds to depicted objects without the need of any volumetric 
representation, which is not possible in picture seeing25. Indeed, we have evidence that 
the visuomotor component (§ 2.3.1) is activated for depicted objects presented in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Volumetric object representation is necessary for the visual control of grip formation and response 
selection, to ensure that we do not attempt to reach for objects that cannot be grasped (Westwood et al. 
2002). 
24 It is computationally efficient for one visual system to handle both response selection and object 
recognition: both require complete/detailed information about 3D object structure (Goodale and Milner 
1992). 
25 For the difference between shape perception and volumetric object recognition see (Briscoe 2008).  
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peripersonal space of the observer (Zipoli Caiani 2013, Chao and Martin 2000; Romero 
et al. 2014; Costantini et al. 2010). This might be due to the fact that, in most cases, in 
the experimental settings the vehicle/surface of the depicted object (a monitor, a screen, 
a picture) actually falls within the peripersonal space of the observer as well and, since 
dorsal perception cannot really distinguish between a depicted object and a normal one 
once an object, whether depicted or real, is perceived - even if apparently - as located in 
the peripersonal space of the observer, dorsal perception responds. I’ll be back to this in 
both chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
        It follows that, if MRs were not subserved by both streams, it would be hard for us 
to discriminate the nature of the objects we try to act upon, it being difficult to activate 
response selection and discriminate between normal and depicted objects. We are able to 
perform motor acts without clashing against a picture because MR is based on 
ventral/dorsal interactions. So this is another crucial argument for the dependence of 
MRs on the processing of both streams.  
  
         But there is a further crucial notion I want to point out. A common intuition is 
that, first ventral conscious perception selects the target/goal of interest for action and 
establishes if it is actable upon - if it is a real 3-D object, then, it sends the information to 
visuomotor dorsal perception which, only at this point, sets the parameters for 
interaction (see Young 2006: 140; Pacherie 2008: 186-187). That is, it is widely believed 
that visual consciousness establishes whether the computation of the coordinates for 
motor action can start due to the response selection establishing whether we are dealing 
with a reliable motor scenario (a real object) or not (a picture). However, things are 
exactly the other way. Indeed, the visuomotor encoding is activated, despite the fact - 
and even before - that ventral conscious perception has computed whether the object is 
“real” or not. Few indeterminate cues are in fact sufficient in order to trigger the 
visuomotor transformation: before ventral volumetric reconstruction a motor act 
computed on the basis of the 2-D geometrical properties of the target is already stored in 
our motor quiver, regardless of the fact that actual overt interaction will follow. So, our 
visuomotor system doesn’t need any trigger, nor any confirmation from our conscious 
visual system in order to start the visuomotor translation. Rather, the translation is 
already ready to be used at the discretion of the ventral conscious response selection, 
which arrives later. This well explains the character of mental antecedents of action 
(Nanay 2013b, Jeannerod 2006) that MRs seem to have. The next section addresses an 
emotional component for MRs. 
 
2.6 Extending the Neural Correlates of MRs even further: the OFC 
cortex 
 
We saw that MRs extend beyond the two streams. Indeed, evidence shows that each 
stream projects to the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), an area involved in emotional-
affective encoding. This suggests an emotional component for MRs, crucially neglected 
in the literature26.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  During visual recognition, affective responses in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) – 
the orbital sector of the prefrontal cortex (Barrett and Bar 2009) - assist the visual 
perception of an object, integrating sensory input to build a contextually affective 
encoding of the world value (Barrett and Bar 2009). The two main OFC circuits connect 
with both visual streams: a medial OFC projecting to the dorsal stream computing initial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 To my knowledge, the only one that sketches the possible link is (Nanay 2013b: 155).  
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affective information and triggering the internal bodily changes suitable for action 
performance related to that object in context, by guiding autonomic, endocrine and 
behavioral responses. Due to connections with the lateral parietal cortex, the OFC’s 
encoding of these autonomic and endocrine changes is relayed back to the dorsal stream 
as an initial affective estimate (Barrett and Bar 2009: 1329). Secondly, a lateral OFC 
projecting to the ventral stream, with robust reciprocal connections to the inferior 
temporal areas (TEO, TE and temporal pole) of the ventral stream (Barret and Bar 
2009)27 computing a broad gist affective computation of the object. Interestingly, the 
medial OFC encoding starts before the lateral OFC (for technical details, see Barrett and 
Bar 2009). This strengthens the presence of a privileged way from V1, through the dorsal 
stream, to the OFC and back to the dorsal stream. Therefore, since MRs are mainly 
dorsal phenomena, they are deeply linked to emotional encoding. 
          However, since both streams are connected to those emotional areas, the failure to 
address a further emotional component for MRs is due both to those who argue that 
MRs are dorsal phenomena and to those who argue that they are also the result of the 
interplay between the two streams as well. Thus, MRs emerge from a complex encoding, 
given by both streams and their projections to the OFC. Crucially, not only can MRs be 
conscious or unconscious, but also their related emotional encoding can, due to the link 
with the OFC (Barrett and Bar 2009). This is confirmed by behavioral evidence that 
while graspable neutral objects that can be approached without any risk activate a 
facilitating motor response, dangerous objects that pose a potential risk evoke aversive 
action possibilities, generating an interference-effect: information about an object’s 
potential risks conflicts with the motor actions that are activated while observing that 
object (Anelli, Borghi and Nicoletti 2012). I cannot go into great detail here. 
Furthermore, this point is very important, insofar as affective perception might play a 
crucial role in shaping the process of competition of action possibilities I reported in (§ 
2.4.3).  
          Accordingly, this emotional aspect of MRs is very important for a theory that aims 
to account for all the representational aspects of an MR. Here, I just sketched the basic 
empirical framework of this emotional aspect of MRs. Next chapter will precisely explain 
this important representational interplay between MRs and the representations of 
emotional relevant properties of the objects we deal with. 
2.7 Conclusion of the Section 
Summing up, I have reported sufficient evidence to defend the main twofold claim of 
the chapter: that MRs are not monolithic representational processes, but an ensemble of 
sub-representations with different functions and that those functions primarily rely on 
the dorsal stream but are also deeply dependent on interstream interaction, the ventral 
processing being crucial for the dorsal components of MRs. This specification is very 
important, insofar as, while in the neuroscientific literature it is widely agreed that, at a 
certain level of fine-graining, very few representational processes can be monolithic, the 
philosophical literature always talk about MRs without meticulously specifying their 
components and their complex anatomo-functional nature (see § 2.1.4). So, my theory 
aims to bridge the gap between philosophy and neuroscience concerning the notion of 
MRs and to establish their functions with respect to their neural underpinnings. I do that 
by reconciling our best philosophical theory about MRs with the most important sets of 
empirical evidence we get from vision and motor neuroscience, especially these about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Remember that AIP connects with inferotemporal areas (TEm, TE and TEO). 
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motor perception and the TVSM, which are hotly debated in both philosophy and 
neuroscience. If we endorse my decomposing strategy, we are able to avoid the problems 
reported in (§ 2.1.4) and to add important features for MRs, which are usually neglected 
in the philosophical literature. This is also useful in order to build an account of MRs 
which can collect all the crucial empirical results coming from neuroscience, which, 
otherwise, risk being left out of our philosophical theory of MRs, remaining just a bunch 
of detached sets of evidence, with no background philosophical theory. 
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3 Motor Representations and Emotions  
 
What is the role of emotions in action performance? Philosophy of action has never 
explicitly answered this question. We can note this by taking a look at some of the most 
important works on action (Bratman 1984, 1999, 2007, 2014; Bradie and Brand 1980; 
Brand 1984; Mele 1995, 2009, 2014; Anscombe 2000). Some authors just mention 
emotions very marginally (Bach 1978; Vargas and Yaffe 2014: 117), or directly admit to 
not taking them into account in relation to action (Mele 1992: 117-111). Others specify 
that we should talk about them (Hursthouse 1991; Mele 1995: 102), but no specific 
relation between emotions and action is proposed (Kenny 2003: Ch. 7). Emotions and 
action are coupled only when mentioning akrasia - a state of the subject in which s/he 
acts against his/her better judgement through weakness of will - and self-control (Mele 
1995: Ch. 6, see also Mele 1987, 2003, 2009, 2014), or when talking about judgments 
(Mele 1995: 108-109-65-82), beliefs (p. 8), inferential errors (p. 86; see also Nisbett and 
Ross 1980: 228) and other mental states (Mele 1995: 106-122-138).  
            This omission arouses curiosity insofar as it seems natural to argue that emotions 
play some sort of role in our active evaluation of the environment. Indeed, the way we 
emotionally perceive the environment influences the way in which we manage our 
interaction with it. For this reason, establishing the relation between the mental 
antecedents of action and emotion is very important in order to explain the nature of the 
different motor situations we deal with. This is the main aim of this chapter. 
           First of all, note that emotions are largely absent in action theory (Zhu and 
Thagard 2002) because action is usually explained by pro attitudes like desires, intentions, 
or purposes, and epistemic factors like beliefs (Davidson 1963/1980) and the classic 
belief-desire models lack any explanation about the contribution of emotions to actions 
(Pacherie 2002).  
            An important point: not only does the belief-desire model lack any explanation 
about the relation between action and emotions. Also, this model, according to which 
beliefs and desires mediate between sensory input and motor output, has been recently 
judged incomplete for action explanation itself, insofar as, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, for most of the actions we perform, the only mental representational states 
mediating between sensory input and motor output are perceptual states named MRs, 
and not a set of beliefs and desires. Furthermore, even when beliefs and desires play an 
essential part in our actions, MRs still need to be involved (Nanay 2013b: 5, see 1.2; 
2014a) in order to shape the content of an intention (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012; 
Pacherie 2000). The advantage of explaining action by referring to MRs is that they code 
simultaneously for things that are coded separately in the belief/desire model. In the 
belief/desire model, the psychological antecedent of an action includes both conative 
and cognitive elements: “on the conative side, a desire about a certain result; on the 
cognitive side, an orienting belief that one is in situation S and an instrumental belief that 
in S action A brings about R. Situation, goal and means are thus represented separately” 
(Pacherie 2002: 69). No such dissociation occurs with MRs (Ibid.). Thus, MRs shape the 
essence of action performance, being the representational component of the immediate 
mental antecedent of actions we need to have in order to perform a goal-directed action 
(Nanay 2014a: 4; Nanay 2013 b: 39, 2014a; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003, Jeannerod 2006; 
Pacherie 2000, 2002; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012).  
             All I have said suggests that we can explain the relationship between action and 
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emotions by explaining the relation between emotions and MRs. This is also an 
advantage for a theory of MRs (Nanay 2013b; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012; Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2003) insofar as the literature on MRs is completely silent about an emotional 
component influencing them. I also said that, since MRs are not normally accessible to 
introspection, we need to turn to neuroscience in order to characterize and analyze them 
(Nanay 2013b, 2014a). This is a further advantage when it turns out that the influence of 
emotions on MRs may be not consciously accessible either and, for the same reason, 
only neuroscience can tell us something about this relation28, 29.  
          In the previous chapter I just sketched a possible way of coupling between 
emotions and MRs. Here I push the line further. This chapter aims to explain the relation 
between MRs and emotions, by suggesting that the representation of object emotional-
relevance properties (being dangerous, etc.), or emotional representations, can influence, 
through inhibition (or elicitation), the way in which we represent the action 
properties/possibilities (being graspable, climbable, etc.) inherent in the very same object: 
MRs can be emotionally charged.  
            Consider the following scenario: I am looking at a glass of water; it offers me an 
action property, the property of being grasped and an action possibility, the possibility of 
being grasped with a power grip. However, the glass is broken, thus my visual system 
attributes, through its projection to other cerebral areas subserving different mental 
representations, also another property to the glass: the property of being dangerous. 
Does the representation of the latter property influence the representation of the former? 
After all, even if the broken glass is graspable, I might cut my hand in trying to grasp it. 
If the glass is graspable, but the representation of the property of being dangerous is 
influencing my motor appraisal, I may decide not to grasp the glass. Hence, a sort of 
influence is in play here. Explaining this influence means to explain how MRs – and thus 
action - couple with emotions. 
             Before developing my idea, I have to mention two similar attempts. The first 
one is by Zhu and Thagard (2002), who suggested incorporating emotions within action 
theory for both the phases action can be divided into: the generation of an action (or 
action tendency) and the execution and control of an action. Unfortunately, their attempt 
is based on very old empirical evidence (LeDoux 1996: 164). Given the exponential 
growth of data in neuroscience, my account has the advantage of using recent results able 
to explain very carefully the role of emotion in the generation and selection of an action, 
which is the only action phase this chapter is interested in. I also sort out some problems 
raised by Zhu ans Thagard and Ledoux. The second attempt is by Pacherie (2002), who 
talks about MRs, but without giving an idea of how MRs couple with emotions at the 
cerebral level. Indeed, Pacherie wants to show how emotion can play a role in the causal 
theory of action. I precisely propose this coupling between MRs and emotions, in the 
light of evidence from neuroscience. 
            Another thing the reader should consider is that, differently from action theory, 
the connection between emotion and action (Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991)30 
is present, to a limited degree, in emotion theory, where emotions are taken to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Since MRs are the mental antecedents of action, it is not problematic to see a possible link with action 
tendencies, which concern the generation of an action. 
29 Here I am not concerned with the conative component of action. 
30 See (Colombetti 2007, 2014). 
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evaluative processes. Evaluation is usually twofold (Lazarus 1991): a primary appraisal 
specifies whether the situation is relevant for personal well-being; a secondary appraisal 
analyzes possible ways of coping with the situation, such as “What, if anything, can be 
done about the situation?” (quoted in Zhu and Thagard, p. 27)”. Someone has suggested 
that emotions do not impel actions directly (Zhu and Thagard 2002: sec. 8); they instigate 
the search for appropriate actions (Prinz 2004)31. A point everybody seems to agree on is 
that emotions are linked to tendencies to act  (Frijda 1986: 71; Roberts 2003: 168, 159, 
163; Elster 2003; Solomon 2003, 2004; de Sousa 2014). However, not only do emotions 
aid action, but they can also undermine action (Greenspan 1988; 2000; LeDoux, 
1996:177, in Zhu and Thagard 2002: 29). While this suggests the presence of action in 
emotion theory, instead my account wants to vindicate a special place for emotion in 
action theory, something we lack at the moment. 
           In defending the idea of a representational influence between emotions and MRs, 
I maintain the classical philosophical terminology in saying that we perceptually represent 
certain entities as having certain properties, or perceptually attribute certain properties to 
certain entities. Of course, not all properties that we represent objects as having are 
perceptually represented. I perceive a cup of coffe as black, as spatially located and as 
big. But I can also represent this object as having the property of being the same cup of 
coffee I used yesterday to drink water; this would be a non-perceptual attribution or non-
perceptual representation (Nanay 2011b). Consider also that another clarification is 
needed. Consider the following question: 
c) What kinds of properties does our visual system attributes to objects? 
          As we have said, concerning MRs it is commonly agreed that, thanks to MRs, our 
visual system attributes action properties - and thus action properties is one of the 
possible answers to (c). However, it is important to distinguish (c) from a very different 
question: 
(e) what properties does our perceptual system respond to/covary with in perception?  
          (c) is about which properties are attributed by the perceptual system (or what it 
represents entities as having) and not about which properties are out there (presumably 
in a causal relation with our perceptual system), as in the case of (e). The properties our 
perceptual system responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones it represents 
objects as having (Nanay 2011b). This distinction will be fruitful both in talking about 
MRs, and in the case of emotions (§§ 3.1, 3.5).  
              The chapter proceeds as follows. Since action has to be explained through MRs, 
whose investigation has to turn to empirical science, I underline the neural mechanisms 
pertaining to the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream (or V-D), which is the main cortical 
circuit for the MRs involved in the representation of action properties (§ 3.1). Since I 
have to couple emotions with MRs, I explicit the notion of emotion I am committed to 
and the neural correlate of emotion I refer to, namely, the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) (§ 
3.2). Then, I show that OFC is deeply linked to the dorsal stream (and to the V-D), 
which is the main neural correlate of MRs (§ 3.3). I then report behavioral evidence in 
line with the neural evidence (§ 3.4) and finally, on the basis of these sets of evidence, I 
offer a philosophical account explaining how emotional representations can influence 
MRs (§ 3.5). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 They beg for action without demanding it. Emotions are not output states, nor action commands, but 
perceptions of the body's preparation for action (p. 244). 
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3.1 The Ventro-Dorsal basis of MRs  
 
In the previous chapter I showed how action can be explained through MRs, whose 
investigation has to turn to empirical science. We saw that one important component of 
the MRs is the visuomotor component (§ 2.3.1), which is crucially involved in the 
representation of action properties. In this chapter I mainly focus on this component of 
MRs, as well as on its neural correlates, when coupling MRs with emotional 
representations – though, of course, all the others components remain crucial. However, 
since the discussion will be framed in terms of the anatomo-functional underpinnings of 
the visuomotor component of MRs, it is worth recalling them here in order to fully 
understand the relation between them and neural underpinnings of the emotional 
representations I am going to talk about in this chapter. 
          As said, objects exhibit geometrical properties (e.g. size, shape, texture) that are, 
from a motor point of view, action/motor properties, to the extent that they permit a 
precise action possibility satisfiable with a precise motor act. For example the geometrical 
features of a mug are action properties permitting an action possibility (grasping), which 
can be satisfied by a proper motor act: a power grip. This important function of MRs is 
due to the visuomotor transformation that relies on a well defined parietal-premotor 
network lying in between the parietal cortex and the ventral premotor cortex, that is, a 
precise portion of the V-D, whose main components for these tasks are the anterior 
intraparietal (AIP) area and area F5, in the most rostral part of the ventral premotor 
cortex (for a review of the leading role of AIP-F5 in the detection of action possibilities1 
and the related visuomotor transformation of object properties in action properties and 
then of action properties into motor acts see Borghi and Riggio 2015, Raos et al. 2006, 
Romero et al. 2014, Castiello 2005; Castiello and Begliomini 2008 Chinellato and del 
Pobil 2015; Kandel 2013: Chap. 19 concerning lesion studies see Andersen et al., 2014; 
Turella and Lignau 2014)32. AIP is one of the end-stage areas of the dorsal stream. AIP 
neurons respond selectively to objects during both passive fixation and grasping, 
extracting visual object information concerning action possibilities for grasping purposes 
(for a review see Romero et al. 2014, Raos et al. 2006); then, they relay this information 
to F5 neurons, with which AIP is directly connected (Borra et al. 2008), which then 
activate the primary motor cortex. In F5 we find visuomotor canonical neurons, which 
use the information received by AIP about action properties of the objects and compute 
the motor commands in order to interact with them. Also canonical neurons respond 
during object fixation, regardless of the actual execution of an action. In canonical 
neurons activity, there is a strict congruence between their high selectivity for a particular 
type of prehension (executed grip) and the visual selectivity for objects that, although 
differing in shape, require the prehension in order to be grasped (for a review see Raos et 
al. 2006). 
            Summarizing, I want to recall the example I reported above that when I am 
looking at the cup of coffee on my desk, V-D responds to those 3D geometrical 
properties of objects that serve such visuomotor tasks as grasping them. The AIP-F5 
parietal-premotor network is crucial in translating those geometrical features into action 
properties and then into motor acts. Then we can grasp the cup. First of all, AIP detects 
the geometrical features of the handle that exhibit precise motor characteristics. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Empirical data – that I cannot review here - suggest the leading role of (both AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 in the) 
V-D concerning the visuomotor transformation (in the peripersonal space) (for a critical review see Turella 
and Lignau 2014; Kandel et al. 2013: 871). For coherence toward neuroscience, I specify that, obviously, 
my analysis is not so technical as those found in the neurophysiological literature (Borghi and Riggio 2015). 
However, what I say here is sufficient in order to defend my point.  
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means that shape, texture and size are encoded. Thus, the geometrical features are read 
as action properties. This information is sent to F5, which, given the information 
received by the AIP, computes the most suitable motor act (with respect to my motor 
repertoire, say, a power grip) in order to grasp the handle of the cup. At the same time, 
during this translation, the simulation of the appropriate motor behavior is encoded: the 
visuomotor brain is both perceiving the action possibility and simulating its readiness for 
potential related motor interaction, setting a motor act “in the quiver”33.  
           Now, coming back to what I have said before, it is important to distinguish  
(c) What kinds of properties does our visual system attribute to the object?   
           from a very different question 
(e) what properties does our perceptual system respond to/covary with during 
perception?  
           (c) is about what properties are attributed by the perceptual system (or what it 
represents entities as having) and not about what properties are out there (presumably in 
a causal relation with our perceptual system), as in the case of (e). The properties our 
perceptual system responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones it represents 
objects as having (Nanay 2011b). I also said that the answer to (e) is fundamental to get 
the answer to (c). I’ll be back to this distinction in chapter 4. 
            The neural phenomena described above translate object attributes into motor 
commands: precisely, they represent S (object geometrical features) as being F (action 
properties) and F (action properties) as Q (motor acts) resonating with the simulation of 
the performable motor act. But I have said that	   the properties our perceptual system 
responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones it represents objects as having 
(Nanay 2011b). Concerning the visuomotor transformation process, our visual system 
responds to/covaries with particular “object geometrical features”. Thus, the 
information goes to the V-D, which reads those properties as action properties. In 
particular, I said that the properties our visual system responds to or tracks may not be 
the same as the ones it represents objects as having, those it attributes to objects (Nanay 
2011b). Thus,	   the properties our visual system responds to or tracks (geometrical 
properties) are not the same as the ones it represents objects as having (action 
properties), through the V-D processing. Yet, the detection of particular geometrical 
features allows these geometrical features to be transformed into (or read as) action 
properties, or, in other words, it allows the attribution of action properties to the object. 
Accordingly, while object geometrical properties are out there, action properties are core-
relational properties. This is accompanied by the motor resonance of both the two main 
components in the covariation and attribution: AIP-F5.	  Thanks to simulation, it is as if 
the brain were encoding that a performable motor act is “in the quiver”.      
           As I said in the previous chapter, it’s worth pointing out that the visuomotor 
transformation performed by MRs also needs the representation of a goal (Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia 2012, Pacherie 2000, Jacob and Jeannerod 2003) (my § 2.3.2) and MR 
correlates also involve a semantic contribution from the ventral stream (Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia 2008: 36-38; Fogassi and Luppino 2005: 627; Young 2006: 134; Borghi and 
Riggio 2015) (my §§ 2.4.1, 2.4.3), so that MRs can be considered as subserved by both 
streams (Nanay 2013b: 3.4) due to important evidence of interstream interaction at every 
stage of the visual processing (Schenk and McIntosh 2010), as meticulously explained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For the behavioral counterpart of these experiments see (Borghi and Riggio 2015; Chinellato and del 
Pobil 2015). 
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before in my (§ 2.4)34. So, on the one hand, I take the visuomotor transformation, and its 
dorsal neural correlates, the most important feature of MRs, insofar as it explains the 
mechanisms through which the visuomotor brain transforms the visual input in motor 
output, by building several MRs for potential motor interactions and this is a rigorous 
model for the explanation of the mental antecedents of action (Fadiga et al. 2000; Cisek 
2007; Cisek and Kalaska 2010; Kandel et al. 2013: Chap. 19); on the other hand, I 
maintain that, while MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, they can be subserved by both 
streams, as well as other cortical projections (see Nanay 2013a, b for a review)35 – that is, 
I maintain what I said in developing my theory of MRs in the previous chapter.  
               Since I have just introduced the notion of MRs and I intend to couple them 
with emotions, I have to say something about what I mean by “emotion”.  
3.2 Emotions 
 
Philosophically speaking, I assume, as most of the scholars of the literature do, that 
emotional states are representational states, they refer to something, they have content 
(Peacocke 2001; Barlassina and Newen 2013; Wollheim 1999; Charland 2002; Prinz 2004; 
Tappolet 2003; de Sousa 2014; Goldie 2000; Nanay 2013b), that they attribute salient 
emotional relevant properties to objects (I owe this expression to Nanay 2013b: 155; but 
see also Barlassina and Newen 2013) and, following those who attempt to naturalize 
emotions, that they depend on neurophysiological states, which is not controversial 
(Barlassina and Newen 2013; Prinz 2004; Roberts 2003; Doring 2003; de Sousa 2014; 
Nanay 2013b). The usual loci where we can detect emotional activity in the brain are the 
insular pathway (Craig 2002, 2003), the somatosensory pathway (Khalsa et al. 2009) and 
the orbito-frontal sector of the prefrontal cortex, that is, the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), 
connected with the amygdala and the ventral striatum (Barrett and Bar 2009). Here I 
mainly focus on the OFC, which is crucial for emotional encoding (Duncan & Barrett 
2007; Pessoa 2008), but the reader should know that these different cortical states are 
deeply interconnected through several projections (Barrett and Bar 2009: 1326).  
           An important point with the naturalization of emotions is to establish their 
content. A common view about emotions is that they are interoceptive states (bodily 
perceptions) of bodily changes (Prinz 2004: 5, 58). But, if emotions are interoceptive 
states, then, one has to explain how they are directed towards particular objects. The 
usual strategy is to talk about co-occurrence: “the neural representation of an emotional 
bodily state fires at the same time as the neural realization of the representation of its 
particular object” (Prinz 2004: 181). This notion presents a problem because emotions 
are, then, directed towards a myriad of things. But this should not be the case: though 
my fear of the tiger co-occurred with many representations, it was directed only towards 
the tiger. In order to avoid this problem, Barlassina and Newen (2013) suggested that 
emotions (E), are twofold states given by: (C) interoceptive states and (A) representations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 AIP is interconnected with inferotemporal areas (TEm, TE and TEO) of the ventral stream. Tem 
neurons process object recognition through 3D visual cues and AIP is involved in both inferior temporal 
and posterior parietal activity for the three-dimensional shape perception (Fogassi and Luppino 2005). 
35 This endorsement is important because, in what follows, I show the connection between MRs neural 
correlates and the representations performed by the emotional area OFC. We will note that, while the 
dorsal stream, and in particular, the ventro-dorsal stream, are deeply connected to the OFC, several 
projections of the ventral stream to the OFC pass through the connections between the ventral and the 
ventro-dorsal stream. This is the empirical ground for the claim that emotional representations can 
influence MRs and, thus, that MRs can be emotionally charged. 
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of external objects (events, or states of affairs)36. (A) provides an emotion with its 
particular object. The emotion of fear expressed by the perception of bodily changes is 
directed towards/represents that snake because it has the perceptual representation of 
that snake among its constituents as being dangerous, or has having a somewhat 
emotional relevance property37 - below the schema provided by the authors (p. 26).  
 
 
           Endorsing this notion of emotion, I now want to provide empirical evidence 
concerning the anatomo-functional link between the neural correlates of MRs reported 
in (§ 3.1) and the OFC, which is the example of emotional area I will focus on later. This 
will be the empirical ground in order to assess a philosophical explanation of the relation 
between MRs and emotions in the last part of the chapter. 
3.3 Visual Perception for Action and Emotional Charge: Neural 
Evidence 
I said that MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, while I endorse the presence of a ventral 
component for their processing (see chapter 2). Here I will show that these neural 
correlates are deeply interrelated with a cortical area involved in emotional encoding, 
namely, the OFC. This will be the crucial empirical background in order to establish the 
relation between MRs and emotions by explaining the link between their neural 
correlates. 
            First of all, we know that visual perception is always emotionally charged at an 
early visual stage because affective computations signaling an object’s affective impact 
and relevance assist the visual perception of an object from the very beginning of visual 
stimulation. Thus, affective and visual aspects of the environment are encoded 
simultaneously. This affective encoding is mainly due to the OFC (Barrett and Bar 2009), 
which activates between 80 and 130 ms after stimulus onset during the presentation of 
isolated objects and integrates sensory input from the world and the body to build a 
contextually sensitive, multimodal encoding of the world and its value.  
           However, we can distinguish two functionally related OFC circuits differentially 
connected to the dorsal stream and to the ventral stream, with different roles for 
affective encoding during object perception (I meticulously follow here the model 
proposed by Barrett and Bar 2009).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Given this, one might argue that using the term emotional representation could be redundant. But since 
it is useful to recall the representational nature of emotions, I will use the expression emotional 
representations when talking about the representational counterpart of emotions. 
37 I will use the expressions emotion and emotional representations interchangeably. 
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The Medial OFC projects to the dorsal stream and has strong reciprocal connections to 
its lateral parietal areas (MT and MST). Through largely magnocellular pathways, the 
medial OFC receives the same low spatial frequency visual information, devoid of 
specific visual detail, that is used to create a basic-level category encoding of the object’s 
identity (Barrett and Bar 2009) and computes initial affective information about what an 
object means for a person’s well-being, triggering the internal (autonomic, endocrine) 
bodily changes suitable for action performance related to that object in context (Price 
2007). Due to its neuroanatomical connections to the lateral parietal cortex, the OFC 
relays back this information about autonomic and endocrine changes with the 
information about the spatial location of the object to the dorsal stream as an initial 
estimate of the affective value and motivational relevance (Barrett and Bar 2009: 1329). 
The brain’s preparation to respond (based on this gist-level prediction) arrives even 
before the object is consciously perceived. This shows the intrinsic influence the 
emotional response might have on the motor response.  
               What is important to point out in the light of these sets of evidence is that, 
since MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, the link between these emotional areas and the 
dorsal stream is an important point in the way of establishing an emotional shade for 
MRs processing. Indeed, the medial OFC processing, with the related bodily preparation, 
starts before the lateral OFC. Following Barrett and Bar (2009: 1330), “visual 
information arrives more quickly to the medial OFC owing to a ‘magnocellular 
advantage’ in visual processing (Laylock et al. 2007). Magnocellular neurons projecting 
from the lateral geniculate nucleus (in the thalamus) rapidly conduct low spatial 
frequency visual information to V1 and the dorsal stream areas, compared with the 
parvocellular neurons carrying high visual spatial information to V1 and to the ventral 
stream. In humans, magnocellular neurons in V1 fire from 25 ms (Klistorner et al. 1997) 
to 40 ms (Paulus et al. 1999) earlier than parvocellular neurons in V1. Also, sometimes 
some neurons within the dorsal stream that receive input directly from the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (e.g. V538/MT; Sincich et al. 2004) become active even before V1 
(Ffytche et al. 1995; Buchner et al. 1997). Also, neurons in the prefrontal cortex become 
active at approximately 10 ms after neurons in the dorsal stream, but are coincident with 
the activation in the ventral stream (Foxe and Simpson 2002)”. This evidence seems to 
show that the affective computation is so fast that we cannot detach this from the 
processing of MRs. This also shows the presence of a privileged way that goes from V1, 
through the dorsal stream, to the OFC and back to the dorsal stream: vision-for action 
entertains a privileged emotional nature. 
              But, we also know that the MRs visuomotor transformation subserved by the 
ventro-dorsal stream relies also on ventral perception, so that MRs can be considered a 
product of the processing of both streams. To this extent, note that there are 
parvocellular pathways connecting the lateral OFC to the inferior temporal areas (TEO, 
TE and temporal pole) of the ventral stream (Barret Bar 2009 for a review) with which 
the ventro-dorsal stream is reciprocally interconnected (Fogassi and Luppino 2005) – see 
foonote 35. 
               To sum up, the OFC processing entertains reciprocal influences with both the 
ventro-dorsal and the ventral stream. But, since MRs are subserved by both streams 
(Nanay 2013b), this suggests that, concerning the neural correlates, MRs are linked to 
emotional encoding. The next section reports related behavioral evidence. Both these 
sets of evidence will be crucial, in (§ 3.5), to explain the relation between MRs and 
emotions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 It is important to know that V-D (related to the inferior intraparietal lobule, IPL, Gallese 2007) — of 
which AIP is part — receives direct inputs from the visual areas MT/V5, which in turn receive inputs 
from the primary visual cortex V1. 
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3.4 Behavioral Evidence 
In line with (§ 3.3), we have behavioral evidence that observing objects elicits facilitation 
effects of motor responses about action preparation (Anelli, Borghi and Nicoletti 2012) 
with respect to the object we are confronting. Indeed, while neutral graspable objects 
that can be approached without any risk activate a facilitating motor response, with 
dangerous objects that pose a potential risk, motor resonance evokes aversive motor 
responses, generating an interference-effect. That is, the information about an object’s 
potential risks might conflict with the motor actions that are activated while observing 
that object and then it is blocked, when aversive action possibilities are evoked. Indeed, 
due to this interference-effect, response times are slower with dangerous objects than 
with neutral objects.  
           This evidence is compatible with data revealing that response times are generally 
slowed down with emotional stimuli due to an inhibition effect provoked by a selective 
attention mechanism (Algom et al. 2004) and that the prefrontal cortex plays a double 
role, exerting both an inhibitory and an excitatory control39 (Munakata et al., 2011), 
allowing participants to inhibit the tendency to respond to action possibilities in the case 
of dangerous objects (Caligiore et al. 2013). Also, somatosensory cortices/IPL, anticipate 
the consequences of observed hand-object interaction with noxious objects, as the 
painful grasp condition is activated to a greater extent compared to all other conditions 
(Anelli, Borghi and Nicoletti 2012: 1637).  
              The same evidence comes from the study of broken or dangerous action 
possibilities. For example, the action possibilities offered by a broken handle are not 
activated, or are activated and then inhibited, due to a weaker activation of the cortical 
areas typically involved in performing action when the handle is intact (Buccino et al. 
2009; Riggio et al. 2006; Anelli et al. 2013a, b; Ohman et al. 2001; Algom et al. 2004; 
Caligiore et al. 2010, 2013). 
             This evidence clearly shows that the affective valence of objects influences 
motor behavior and is in line with evidence reported in (§ 3.3). Following the evidence in 
(§§ 3.3, 3.4) I will now develop my philosophical proposal about the representational 
interference between MRs and emotions. 
3.5 MRs and Emotions 
Here I develop my idea of a representational intereference between emotion and MRs. 
First of all, I have to  clarify the relation between OFC activity and the idea of emotion 
exposed in (§ 3.2). Then, I can develop my explanation (§ 3.5).  
             In (§ 3.2) I embraced a widely agreed idea of emotion and listed the neural 
correlates of emotions mentioned in the literature. The emotions I talk about here are 
those whose neural correlate is the OFC. That means, following the idea of emotion 
proposed by Barlassina and Newen (§ 3.2) - which is able to avoid several problems 
emotions encounter in the emotion theory - that OFC is a neural state at the basis of an 
interoceptive state dealing with the perception of precise bodily changes plus the 
representation of an object. This representation, linked to interoceptive states, represents 
the emotional relevant/salient properties of the object.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  During simulation, muscular contractions are effectively present, but simultaneously blocked by 
inhibitory mechanisms (see Jeannerod 2006: 2.3.3). 
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I distinguished questions (c) and (e) (§ 3.1) when talking about what MRs represent. But 
the activity of the OFC emotional states described in (§ 3.3) functions in a similar 
manner with respect to MRs, in relation to these questions. On the basis of the 
covariation of my visual system with respect to the object geometrical properties, the 
visual information goes to the OFC, which reads these properties as emotional salient 
properties. But the properties our perceptual system responds to or tracks may not be 
the same as the ones it represents objects as having (Nanay 2011b). Concerning the 
emotional representations, our visual system responds to/covaries with particular “object 
geometrical features”. Accordingly, on the basis of this covariation, and of the 
information arriving from the visual system, our OFC attributes “emotional-relevance 
properties” to the same object. However, while object geometrical properties are out 
there, emotional-relevance properties are core-relational properties (for the idea of core-
relation see Prinz 2004). 
           So, I specified a similar answer, concerning both emotions and MRs, concerning 
(c) and (e). Starting from this representational isomorphism between OFC states and 
MRs in relation to questions (c) and (e), I can explain how MRs are influenced by 
emotional representations, namely, by the representation of emotional relevant/salient 
properties. 
            Indeed, I said that emotional representational states represent emotional relevant 
properties, while MRs represent action properties and the related motor acts. Saying that 
an MR can operate in an emotionally charged manner means that the ascription of 
relevant-emotional properties from an emotional representational state can influence the 
ascription of action properties due to the MRs. For example, I can represent a graspable 
object as dangerous; that is, I can represent an object as both graspable and dangerous; 
or, I can represent that object as dangerous and thus non-graspable.  
           Twofold representational ascription is possible because there are some situations 
in which, though our visual system is covarying in its whole with the geometrical features 
of an object, our brain ascribes, on the basis of this covariation, two different kinds of 
properties to the same object, thanks to the information flowing between two different 
cortical states our visual system projects to: in this case, the V-D activity subserving the 
MR ascribes an action property (which is possible to ascribe also to a broken object), and 
the OFC activity subserving the emotional state ascribes an emotional-salient property.   
This is not controversial: we usually entertain parallel but different cortical/mental 
representations of the same object, while these two different representations may 
conflict. For example, we can entertain a dorsal visual and a ventral visual representation 
representing the same chip as having different size properties in the case of the 3D 
Ebbinghaus illusion (Nanay 2014b). Given this, while in the previous sections I provided 
an answer to (c) and (e), I will now explain, in the light of these answers, the overlap 
between the processing of MRs (§ 3.1) and emotional representations (§ 3.2).  
             First, concerning MRs, the visual system covaries with geometrical properties of 
the object, and, thanks to the information reaching the V-D, these geometrical properties 
are read, by the MR, as action properties, which trigger the relative motor acts: on seeing 
the object we obtain at the same time its visuomotor priming (i.e. the visuomotor 
representation of its “action property”), and the internal simulation of one of the actions 
we could perform upon it (i.e. the most suitable motor program required to interact with 
it with respect to the action possibility), regardless of actual action execution (§ 3.1).  But 
crucially, at the same time, on the basis of the covariation of the visual system with 
respect to the same geometrical properties of the object, the information goes to the 
OFC, which reads those properties as emotional salient properties, pertaining to the 
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same object; say, a broken handle of the very same mug (§ 3.4).  
              This means that the same geometrical property in the environment can be read 
by two representational states, namely an MR and an emotional representation, as 
instantiating two different properties: an action property and an emotional-relevant 
property. What is important to stress, for the purpose of this chapter, is that those two 
“representational readings” march in step, influencing each other reciprocally. For 
example, the represented action property in the case of a damaged object can lose its 
valence when my emotional state ascribes the emotional salient property of being 
dangerous40 which allows me to perceive the action property in an emotionally charged 
manner, (e.g. I am afraid of cutting my hand with that dangerous object if I satisfy the 
action property).               
          But we should not forget that emotional representations and MRs march in step 
with bodily changes linked to motor simulations (see § 3.1) and emotional responses (see 
§ 3.3), which share similar bodily activities: changes in heart, respiration, and 
cardiovascular rates during motor simulation, along with the representation with visceral 
cues about the degree of effort involved in the represented action (Jeannerod 2006, Ch. 
2), are quite compatible with the bodily changes due to OFC. Most of the bodily changes 
guiding motor inhibition and emotional inhibition are very similar. Then, it is reasonable 
to suppose that the OFC representation of a salient property (of being dangerous), which 
triggers a particular bodily state, inhibits the bodily changes motor simulation is 
accompanied by. Indeed, as I have pointed out throughout the chapter, both OFC and 
MRs states not only represent something in the environment, but are also linked to 
precise bodily states.  The description of my model is shown in the following schema. 
            	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 … which, in a certain sense, can be seen as another action possibility, the possibility for someone to cut. 
Thus, the representational influences of a representation sometimes lead to switching the nature of the 
attributed property of the other representation, even if the other representational device in question deals 
with particular properties (e.g. action properties).   
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Here’s an example. Imagine you have to grasp a cylinder whose surface is coated by 
spurs. The slots between the spurs are more or less as large as your fingers. The spurs are 
very sharp. The first time you are faced with the cylinder, the perception of the action 
possibilities given by the fissure will be accompanied by perception of this object as 
dangerous; we perceive an action possibility for this object in a “scared” manner. 
However, if we carefully practise laying our the fingers between the slots, so that, when 
we see the object, our brain can immediately compute the grip aperture41 in order to 
make the hand fit with the dispositions of the spurs, the object will be perceived in a 
different emotional manner, namely, in a less scary manner with respect to the first time. 
Thus, the represented motor act won’t be accompanied by the ascription of the same 
range of danger with respect to the initial attempts. The accuracy of our MRs has 
changed, but what has also changed is also the influence on them by the representation 
of the emotional relevant properties we ascribe to the object: they march in step. In 
behavioral terms, the priming of our motor response will not trigger a deep inhibition as 
in the first attempts. In neural terms, once our visual system has detected the geometrical 
properties of the object, two neural states will construct different representations 
influencing each other and, this time, the gist level prediction from the OFC to V-D, will 
not be as negative as at the beginning. This further strengthens the link between 
represented action properties and represented emotional-relevant properties.               
 
3.6 Conclusion of the Section 
 
I think that what I have said is sufficient for arguing that the representation of object 
emotional relevant properties can influence, through inhibition (or elicitation), the 
representation of an action property of the same object.  
          The way we emotionally perceive the environment influences the way in which we 
manage the interaction with it, insofar as emotions influence our MRs, which are the 
constitutive mental antecedents of action. If we avoid this important emotional feature 
of these mental antecedents, we are not able to explain a wide range of situations we 
encounter when we try to investigate action. 
         In the next chapter I defend the idea, completely new, that the representation of 
action properties, which is a function of MRs, in particular of the visuomotor 
component (§ 2.3.1), is possible not only with normal objects, but also with depicted 
objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 An automatic process of grip formation taking place during the transportation of the hand in which the 
fingers are preshaped much before the hand touches the object. At about 60% of its transportation the 
hand reaches its widest opening, or maximum grip aperture (henceforth: MGA) and the size of the finger-grip 
at MGA (though much larger than the object to be grasped) is linearly correlated with the size of the object 
(Jeannerod 2006: 5). 
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4 Pictures, Action Properties and Motor Related 
Effects                        
 
The most important question concerning picture perception is  
 
(1) What perceptual state are we in when we see an object in a picture?  
 
Here I maintain the classical philosophical terminology used in the literature in saying 
that our visual system uses perceptual representations and thus perceptually represents 
certain entities as having certain properties; it perceptually attributes certain properties to 
certain entities42. So, (1) can be reformulated: 
 
(1) what kinds of properties does our visual system attribute to the depicted object?43  
 
In order to answer (1), philosophers have used the results of the TVSM, according to 
which our visual system can be divided into two streams, a ventral stream for object 
recognition, allowing one to perceive from an allocentric frame of reference, and a dorsal 
stream for visually guided motor interaction, thus allowing one to perceive from an 
egocentric frame of reference. The dorsal/ventral account of picture perception (see 
Nanay 2015) was first proposed by Matthen (2005) and developed by Nanay (2011a). 
Following this model, the authors denied that we can be in a dorsal perceptual state 
when perceiving a depicted object. This is because a depicted object is not physically 
graspable or manipulable and, in turn, it cannot be egocentrically localized, as a normal 
object, by the dorsal stream. Thus, the impossibility of manipulating depicted objects and 
of localizing them from an egocentric frame of reference has led some people to be 
sceptical about the possibility of a representation of action properties in the perception 
of objects in pictures, which pertains to the dorsal visual system.  
          Summarizing, those who embrace the empirical results of the TVSM in order to 
answer to (1) seem to conclude that since our visual system cannot egocentrically 
represent the depicted object, we cannot represent its action properties, which is the 
main task of our dorsal stream. So, one of the big differences – and the most important 
one in the dorsal/ventral framework - between face-to-face perception and the 
perception of the depicted objects would be that we (our dorsal stream) can attribute 
action properties to real objects, but not to depicted objects44. 
          The aim of the present chapter is to show that, among the possible answers to 
(1)45, there is the precise claim that it is possible for the depicted object to be represented 
by dorsal perception. That means that we can ascribe action properties to depicted 
objects as well. The dorsal ascription of action properties depends on what I call the 
visuomotor component of MRs, and its neural correlates (§ 2.3.1) and on its relationships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I am not defending a representationalist point of view at the expense of the anti-representationalist one. 
Everything I say here can be reformulated in anti-representationalist terms (e.g. presentation). 
43 Of course, not all properties that we represent objects as having are perceptually represented. I perceive 
a cup of coffee as black, as spatially located and as big. But I can also represent it as having the property of 
being the same cup of coffee I used yesterday to drink water, and this would be an example of how it is 
possible to attribute properties non-perceptually to objects, or, to represent them non perceptually (Nanay 
2011b).  
44 Of course, in answering (1) it does not seem strange to argue there are properties that can be 
perceptually represented in both real object perception and picture perception (colors, shapes, etc.) while 
other properties can be attributed only to real objects – or picture surfaces, which are real objects (the 
spatial localization in egocentric coordinates) – but not to depicted objects.   
45 I mean among those that can be given in the framework of the dorsal/ventral accounts of picture 
perception.  
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with the egocentric/peripersonal component and its neural correlates (§ 2.3.3) – I leave 
out the goal related component here. So, I will recall them along this chapter, but only in 
order to explain how they can be involved in picture perception as well. 
           At first sight one might think that my attempt is implausible, because it is widely 
agreed, also by commonsense, that a depicted object cannot be physically grasped. So 
why argue that the main cortical circuit involved in the motor interaction with objects is 
also involved in the perception of depicted objects, which clearly cannot be grasped or 
manipulated? In order to properly understand what I am arguing for and what this 
chapter is about, think about the following situation: I am looking at the cup of coffee on 
my desk. I represent it as having action properties, given by its geometrical features and, 
in particular, its handle offers me an action possibility: for example, grasping it in a 
power grip, thanks to its geometrical configuration. However, there’s no more coffee in 
the cup, so I decide to get another one from the coffee machine. I look at the coffee 
machine and I notice on its cover a picture of a cup of coffee of the same kind as the 
machine delivered to me half an hour before. So I wonder: what is the relation between 
the perception of the real cup of coffee on my desk and the perception of the picture of 
the cup of coffee on the cover of the coffee machine with respect to the representation 
of action properties? Can the latter physically afford action possibilities pertaining to real 
interaction like the former? Of course it cannot, and, of course, I am not committed to 
this idea. Indeed, it seems trivially true that, from a physical point of view, we cannot 
grasp a depicted object. But does the physical impossibility of manipulating depicted 
objects mean that my visual system cannot attribute action properties to them? Following 
the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, the answer seems to be positive. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here I resist this conclusion by arguing that the same dorsal perceptual 
representation of action properties is shared by both face-to-face perception and the 
perception of depicted objects. Indeed, the fact that we cannot physically grasp a 
depicted object does not imply that our visuomotor brain cannot resonate to the action 
possibilities (simulating, for example, a power grip) fostered by the representation of 
action properties linked to the geometrical features of an object when the object in 
question is a depicted object. Hence the argument of the chapter. I report and discuss 
different sets of empirical evidence from motor and vision neuroscience showing that: 
first, dorsal perception can represent depicted objects as having action properties, insofar 
different components of the dorsal stream involved in the representation of action 
properties during the perception of normal objects are active during the perception of 
depicted objects as well; second, this is possible when, in the experimental settings, the 
depicted object is perceived as apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space 
and as apparently reachable (technical details below); third, this is strengthened by 
evidence that dorsal perception cannot really distinguish between a depicted object and a 
normal one. This means that, once an object, whether depicted or real, is perceived - 
even if apparently - as located in the peripersonal space of the observer, dorsal 
perception entertains a non-trivial egocentric relation with the target, and responds to the 
apparent motor possibility fostered by the distal target, regardless of the distinction 
real/depicted; a distinction indeed, that dorsal perception cannot draw.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Note that, philosophically speaking, my proposal has a crucial implication for the 
dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, as well as for the debate on pictures in 
general. If I am right, my account represents a sort of closure of the circle. Indeed, both 
streams can represent both the depicted objects (and their surfaces) and the normal 
objects in a very similar way, contrarily to what has been claimed. But if those two 
streams are the total components of the visual system of humans (and other mammals), 
then, our visual system functions in quite the same way in both picture perception and 
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face-to-face perception. Thus, pictures and normal objects do not differ that much for 
our twofold visual elaboration, as the accredited model suggested, that is, concerning the 
representation of action properties. On the one hand, this doesn’t mean that face-to-face 
perception and picture perception are precisely the same perceptual phenomenon; on the 
other hand, it means that they are more related than suggested by the dorsal/ventral 
account I am reviewing here. Moreover, my review represents an extension of this 
account, because I can address those cases that suggest this deep similarity, which have 
not been addressed before, while remaining in the same philosophical framework. 	  
             However, here I am not interested in the general literature on picture perception 
- which is trying to define the differences between picture perception and face-to-face 
perception. Again, I am not interested in the twofold experience of what Wollheim 
(1998) called seeing-in, namely, the relation between the perception of the picture surface 
and the perception of the depicted object (see Nanay 2011a). I am interested only in the 
latter term of this relation, while leaving aside the former. As I said, I am concerned with 
a precise portion of the literature, namely, with those accounts that use the 
dorsal/ventral distinction in order to answer to (1). But, again, my interest is for a 
particular claim concerning a particular issue raised by those accounts, namely, the issue 
concerning the (im)possibility of having a dorsal representation of action properties in 
the perception of the depicted object. Finally, note that this chapter deals with the case 
of normal pictures, leaving aside the case of particular pictures involving trompe l’oeil (see 
Nanay 2015 for the distinction dorsal/ventral with respect to those particular cases).  
          Before defending my claim, I need to introduce the dorsal/ventral account of 
picture perception.  
 
4.1 The “Two Visual Systems Model” meets the debate on Picture 
Perception 
 
The dorsal/ventral account is the best empirically framed philosophical account of 
picture perception in the light of vision neuroscience, which reconciles philosophy with 
neuroscience (Nanay 2015). This is because it applies the neurophysiological knowledge 
about vision we get from the TVSM in order to answer the main questions concerning 
the debate on pictures - especially question (1) - (see Nanay 2001a, 2015). Accordingly, 
despite the wide discussion about the implications of this model46 in the case of normal 
objects, however, it is the best neuroscientific account we have about vision (Kandel et 
al. 2013). It was Matthen (2005) who first suggested the possibility that the dorsal/ventral 
distinction may be relevant for understanding picture perception (see Nanay 2011a: 477). 
Recall that, in a nutshell, according to the TVSM, there is a separation of the visual 
pathways, grounded on distinct anatomical structures (Milner, Goodale 1995): one for 
visual representation or experience, and one for visually guided action. It is well known 
that, accordingly, these paths can be dissociated due to cortical lesions. Lesions in the 
dorsal stream (from the primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal cortex) impair 
one’s ability to use what one sees to guide action (optic ataxia), but not object 
recognition; lesions in the ventral stream (from the primary visual cortex to the 
infertemporal cortex) impair one’s ability to recognize things in the visual world (visual 
agnosia), but not action guidance (see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). That is to say, 
according to this model, the ventral stream is responsible for identification and 
recognition, allowing one to perceive from an allocentric frame of reference, whereas the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 There is an ongoing debate about the effective dissociation (the literature is too large to survey, see 
Nanay 2013a, 2015; Briscoe 2009). Here I do not use this argument to undermine in principle the 
dorsal/ventral account of picture perception.  
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dorsal stream is involved in guiding action, thus allowing one to perceive from an 
egocentric frame of reference. 
           A complete dorsal/ventral account of picture perception in this style, employable 
in answering (1), has been proposed by Nanay (2011a). He argued that: (a) since the 
perceptual representation of the depicted object is grounded on our recognitional 
apparatus, which in turn is grounded on the ventral subsystem, the depicted object is 
represented by ventral perception; (b) the depicted object is not represented by dorsal 
perception; (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception; (d) the surface of 
the picture is not necessarily represented by ventral perception. In other words, for 
picture perception it is necessary that our ventral vision attributes properties to the 
depicted object, whereas our dorsal vision attributes properties to the picture surface. 
When we see an object face to face, our dorsal and ventral visual subsystems attribute 
properties to the same object: the perceived object. When we see objects in pictures, in 
contrast, the dorsal and the ventral visual subsystems attribute properties to different 
objects. The ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas the 
dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the surface of the picture (pp. 466-477).  
           While Matthen holds that (b) is necessary, Nanay simply holds that while he is not 
committed to the idea that (b) is of necessity true, he accepts that, most of the time, it is 
the case. Note, however, that the fact that for Nanay’s (b) is not necessary becomes 
clearer only with his recent specification in (Nanay 2015)47.  
           Indeed, in his (2015), Nanay specifies that he does not actually claim that it is 
impossible that the depicted object is represented dorsally 48. It might be the case, he says, 
but normally it is not49 (Nanay 2015). So, considering the question of whether our dorsal 
stream represents the depicted object for Nanay, “it is important to point out that at least 
in the case of normal (non-trompe l’oeil) pictures, the answer is usually (emphasis mine) 
negative: when we see Mona Lisa, the depicted face is unlikely to be represented dorsally. 
Dorsal vision is supposed to help us perform perceptually guided actions. But we don’t 
and can’t perform actions on depicted objects. Further, a minimal condition on 
performing perceptually guided actions on objects is representing the spatial location of 
this object in one’s egocentric space: as in front of us, or to our left, etc. If we couldn’t 
represent the spatial location of an object in our egocentric space, then we would have 
no idea which direction to reach out to grab it or use it for any other action. But, 
crucially, depicted objects are not represented in our egocentric space: the depicted space 
is not our egocentric space. And while we may represent the depicted objects as having a 
spatial location in the depicted space, we can’t represent them as having a spatial location 
in our egocentric space” (2015: 189). Also, according to Nanay, “there is no fact of the 
matter about the distance between the perceiver and the depicted object. If I see a 
picture of an apple, there is always a fact of the matter about how far away the surface of 
the picture is from me, but there is no fact of the matter about how far away the depicted 
apple is from me. It is not represented as having an egocentric spatial location—thus, it 
is not represented dorsally” (Ibid.). This clarification about (b) is a further good reason to 
argue that our accounts are not in conflict, although I do argue about the notion that 
depicted objects elicit motor responses. I will come back to this in (§ 4.6). 
            So, depending on how we understand Nanay’s claim – either the one reported in 
(2011a), or the one reported in (2015) - my personal claim has a different impact on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 However, Matthen and Nanay share virtually the same ideas, albeit with some differences (Nanay 2011a: 
477). For the purposes of my chapter, the important one is the exception for the necessity of (b). 
Moreover, in place of ventral vision and dorsal vision Matthen talks about, respectively, descriptive vision 
and motion-guiding vision. Here this distinction is not important. 
48 …whereas, as we have said, Matthen does, but given what I have clarified above, there is no real conflict. 
49 The same applies to the ventral representation of the surface (Nanay 2011a, 2015). 
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literature. If we properly address Nanay’s account, in the light of the précis concerning (b) 
(2015), it is easy to understand that there is no conflict between Nanay’s claim and mine, 
which is simply a neurological extension of his. However, if we understand this claim as 
defending that (b) is necessary, which is the claim originally defended by Matthen, 
instead my claim might seem to contradict this thesis. But I’ll show that this is not the 
case in (§ 4.6).  
               Beside Nanay’s and Matthen’s proposals there is an interesting third proposal 
concerning the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. The proposal is by Voltolini 
(2013), who is the only one to argue that the cases of eminegligent patients (and similar 
brain damaged people) who unconsciously mistook pictures as their subjects, suggest 
that, not only does the identificative component of their unconscious perceptual states 
appear to be directed towards such subjects rather than to the pictures’ vehicles – cfr. 
with the four cases above proposed - but also the motor-guiding component is directed 
towards the depicted object. This is so because, as reported by Voltolini, there is 
evidence that eminegligent patients react to the grouping properties of what they face - 
even if they are not aware of this - both when they face a two-dimensional geometrical 
figure that has no pictorial value at all, and when they face a two-dimensional figure 
whose pictorial value can be retrieved. In the former case, they react to mere two-
dimensional geometrical figures involving an optical illusion (e.g. Judd illusion), like 
normal individuals (they bisecate the figure more on its left-hand side than at its real 
center) even though unlike normal individuals they are not aware of facing an illusory 
figure. In the latter case, these patients react to two-dimensional geometrical figures 
involving Kanizsa-items (they see a Kanizsa-item (e.g. a square) within the figure even 
when its contours are not physically traced) like normal individuals, although unlike the 
normal individuals they are not aware of facing one such figure. So, they have an 
unconscious ‘ventral’ identification of what amounts to a picture’s vehicle and they can 
also grasp a figure-ground segmentation like normal individuals: they can locate the 
Kanizsa item in front of a background, as if such an item were precisely a three-
dimensional entity. They unconsciously grasp the pictorial value of the two-dimensional 
geometrical figure they face: they unconsciously see in the figure precisely a three-
dimensional scenery (the Kanizsa item in front of a background). In other words,  they 
have an unconscious ‘ventral’ identification also of what amounts to a picture’s subject. 
However, in general, they manage to unconsciously identify both the picture’s vehicle—
the two-dimensional geometrical figure they face—and the picture’s subject—the 
Kanizsa item (three-dimensionally conceived) in front of a background. This evidence is 
closely related to what I am arguing here, suggesting that sometimes the motor-guiding 
component of our brain can be directed at the depicted objects (cfr. with my § 4.6). 
However, in this chapter, I leave aside Voltolini’s account, which is not devoted to the 
solution of the issue I am focusing on here. Moreover, I will use different evidence, 
which this debate on picture perception does not mention.  
           So this chapter deals with claim (b) defended in the literature: that the depicted 
object is not represented by dorsal perception, because dorsal perception localizes 
objects in egocentric action space. Egocentric space50 does not overlap with the space 
represented by/in the picture. Therefore we cannot localize the depicted objects in our 
egocentric space, hence the depicted object is not represented by dorsal perception 
(Nanay 2011a). For this reason, only the encoding in egocentric coordinates – subserved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 I do not address the different notions of egocentric space. Here, egocentric space is action space, 
sometimes referred to in the empirical literature as the peripersonal space “within our reach”. Moreover, 
Nanay appeals to a weaker notion of egocentric localization with respect to Matthen. For the purposes of 
this chapter this is not relevant. Indeed, even though with some differences Matthen and Nanay share 
almost the same ideas (Nanay 2011a: 477).  
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by the dorsal visual system - can detect the presence of real things offering action 
possibilities. But our dorsal stream attributes action properties to egocentric localized 
objects, which cannot be those in pictures, since egocentric action space does not 
overlap with the space represented by the picture. Therefore, we do not represent 
depicted objects as offering action possibilities, and, in turn, we cannot attribute action 
properties to the depicted objects (Matthen 2005)51. Moreover, since empirical evidence 
has shown that the dorsal subsystem is divided into two sides: the ventro-dorsal (V-D) 
and dorso-dorsal (D-D) subsystem, one responsible for manipulating objects (d-d) and 
one responsible for localizing in egocentric space (V-D) (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003), it 
has been argued that we do not localize depicted objects in our egocentric space insofar 
as our V-D visual subsystem does not represent the depicted object (Nanay 2011a). I’ll 
come back to this in (§ 4.5). 
          Now let us look into my proposal more precisely. 
 
4.2 The Structure of my Proposal  
 
Given the background ideas of the dorsal/ventral accounts of picture perception, it is 
now easier to understand what I mean when I say that the main claim of the present 
chapter is that both with real object perception and with the perception of depicted 
objects, our dorsal activity is activated, insofar as a portion of our dorsal stream, the 
ventro-dorsal stream, can represent depicted objects as having action properties. This 
claim constitutes one of the answers to (1), which were considered impossible by the 
other accounts. 
            As I did in (§ 3), before starting with my argument it is necessary to address the 
difference between (1) and a very different question 
  
(2) what properties does our visual perceptual system respond to/covary with respect to 
the perception of depicted objects?  
 
As I said in (§ 3). (1) is about what properties are attributed by the perceptual system (or 
what it represents entities as having) and not about what properties are out there 
(presumably in a causal relation with our perceptual system), as in the case of (2). The 
properties our perceptual system responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones 
it represents objects as having (Nanay 2011b; Burge 2010). I recalled this important 
philosophical point because here I will refer to it in a different manner with respect to (§ 
3). Indeed, I will show (§ 4.3) that the answer to (2) is fundamental to reaching the 
answer to (1). I’ll first show that it is so in the case of normal objects and, then, I'll show 
the similarity with the case of depicted objects. 
              The argument proceeds along the following lines. In (§ 4.3) I introduce evidence 
on a particular bifurcation of the dorsal stream, the ventro-dorsal stream. Saying that 
something is encoded by the ventro-dorsal stream implicitly means that the information 
has started to be mapped from the primary visual cortex, passes through the parietal 
cortex and arrives until the premotor cortex. Moreover, the ventro-dorsal stream 
contains a cortical circuit, the parieto-premotor network AIP-F5, which is the cortical 
circuit most involved in detecting action properties and in the construction of the motor 
acts in order to interact with those action properties. Here, I show that, in the case of 
normal objects, the ventro-dorsal circuit covaries with particular geometrical features of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Matthen uses the term affordance. For philosophical reasons, I prefer to use here the expression action 
possibility, and, in turn, the related component of action possibilities called action property; see footnote 4. 
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the objects we are faced with - the answer to (2) - and that, in turn, it attributes action 
properties to the objects we are faced with – the answer to (1).  
            In (§ 4.4) I claim that our dorsal visual system functions in a somewhat similar 
manner when we are perceiving depicted objects. This claim is empirically well founded 
with evidence concerning the sensorimotor activation of the dorsal stream, the sub-
components of the ventro-dorsal stream, as the parieto-premotor network AIP-F5, and, 
in general, the ventral premotor cortex, during the perception of depicted objects. This 
implicitly suggests that dorsal perception is active for the depicted objects. Hence, this 
can be considered as one of the true answers to (1). I also point out that, as in the case 
with normal objects, the ventro-dorsal circuit covaries with particular geometrical 
features which the depicted object seems to present – the answer to (2) – and that, in 
turn, it attributes action properties, on the basis of the translation of the particular 
geometrical features the depicted objects we are faced with seem to present. Thus, we 
can answer to (1) that our (dorsal) visual system attributes action properties to the 
depicted object. Remember that, as said before, the answer to (2) is fundamental to get 
the answer to (1). I also suggest that the functional interplay of AIP and F5 represents a 
possible explanation about dorsal response to depicted objects - as said in chapter 2 (see 
footnote 19) all the evidence I report here is grounded on studies on both human and 
non-human primates and an important overlap between the different cortical areas is 
widely agreed (see Borghi and Riggio 2015: 3; Shikata 2003).  
              My argument may seem completely explicated here. But given the dependence 
of dorsal perception to peripersonal encoding and given that the dorsal/ventral account 
of picture perception has defended the impossibility of peripersonal encoding with 
depicted objects, as said in (§ 4.1), something seems to be missing. So, in (§ 4.5), I specify 
that dorsal ascription of action properties to depicted objects is possible when the image 
of the target is apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space, that is when 
the target is perceived as apparently reachable by the observer.  
             At this point, my argument would really be complete: I have shown that 
depicted objects - those apparently located in the peripersonal space of the observer - are 
dorsally represented as having action properties. However, in (§ 4.6) I offer an 
explanation of how it is possible by reporting evidence that dorsal perception functions 
in a somewhat similar manner when it is faced with a normal object, or a depicted one, 
because it cannot really distinguish between depicted and normal objects; thus, once an 
object, whether depicted or real, is perceived as being in the peripersonal space of the 
observer, the dorsal stream responds to the apparent motor possibility fostered by the 
distal target, regardless of the fact that the source is a depicted object, or a real object. 
Here, I also address the implications of my proposal for the dorsal/ventral account of 
picture perception.  
               Although there are good reasons to affirm that the evidence I report is a good 
example of perceptual representations, I do not defend this idea here (see Nanay 2013b; 
Zipoli Caiani 2013; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2012; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). 
Furthermore, we know that perception can be conscious or unsconscious, and in turn, 
investigated from both the personal and the subpersonal level of description. Given that 
perceiving something in a picture does not need to be a conscious experience here I am 
concerned only with the subpersonal/unsconscious level of description.52 Finally, note 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This position is not different from the one endorsed in the dorsal/ventral account (Nanay 2011a: 461). I 
leave aside the issue concerning the cognitive penetrability of the visual streams. 
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that the empirical literature uses the term affordances. I do not use this term, see 
footnote 51.  
                So, let’s start with the explanation of how our visuomotor system works in the 
case of face-to-face perception. 
4.3 Visuomotor Circuits for the Detection of Action Properties in 
Normal Objects  
 
Before showing that our visuomotor circuits function in a somewhat similar manner 
both in the case of seeing face-to-face and seeing depicted objects, I first have to explain 
how those circuits work in the case of face-to-face visuomotor processing, so I will 
introduce here the main visuomotor circuit for the detection of action properties in 
objects, which, as said, is due to the visuomotor component of MRs (2.3.1). For ease of 
reference with respect to the functional similarity concerning the functioning of the 
visuomotor component in relation to both normal and depicted objects, I briefly recall 
here the evidence about this component and its neural correlates, so that the reader can 
bear in mind what are the neural cells involved in this process and can understand how 
similar is this brain functioning in the case of picture perception. 
           As said before, it has been famously shown that the dorsal stream is further 
divided into two: the dorso-dorsal stream, (D-D, related to the superior parietal lobule, 
SPL) and the ventro-dorsal stream, (V-D, related to the inferior parietal lobule, IPL) 
(Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003). Although the dorsal stream is crucial for the visual guidance 
of actions, the transformation of intrinsic object properties into motor acts relies on a 
well defined cortical network lying in between the parietal and the ventral premotor 
cortex (Gallese 2007), that is, the ventro-dorsal stream, whose main components for this 
task are the anterior intraparietal (AIP) area and F5 (in the most rostral part of the 
ventral premotor cortex; though the ventro-dorsal stream has other crucial components). 
AIP is one of the end-stage areas of the dorsal stream and few processing stages separate 
the AIP area from early visual areas. Empirical data (Castiello 2005; Sakata et al. 1995; 
Murata et al. 2000; Baumann et al. 2009; Srivastava et al. 2009; Theys et al. 2012 a, b 
2013) suggest that, since many AIP neurons respond selectively to objects during both 
passive fixation and grasping53, it is the AIP that extracts visual object information 
concerning action possibilities for grasping purposes and relays this information to 
neurons in the area F5, with which it is directly connected (Borra et al. 2008), which then 
activate the primary motor cortex (for a review see Romero et al. 2014). Accordingly, 
evidence shows the presence of visuomotor54 (canonical) neurons in F5, which encode 
the information received by AIP and translate the geometrical attributes of the objects 
into motor commands in order to interact with them. Note that also canonical neurons 
respond during object fixation, regardless of the actual execution of an action55 (Murata 
et al. 1997; Sakata et al. 1995; for a review see Raos et al. 2006). Furthermore, the entire 
inferior intraparietal lobule (IPL, related to the V-D) — of which the AIP is a part — 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 A large portion of neurons in this area discharge during object fixation and are selective for object 
properties, such as shape, size, and orientation (Verhoef et al. 2010). 
54 These “visuomotor” neurons showed a specific selectivity, discharging more strongly during the fixation 
of certain solids as opposed to others, the difference between them depending on the kind of grip afforded 
by those objects (e.g. precision grip, finger prehension, etc.). 
55 In experiments with monkeys, just as the subject looks at the object its neurons fire, activating the motor 
program that would be involved were the observer actively interacting with the object. The evoked motor 
potential (linked to MEP) is just a potential act. This will be important for the evidence in (§ 4.4). 
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receives direct inputs from the visual areas MT/V5, which in turn receive inputs from 
the primary visual cortex V1 and, as I have said, V-D (related to the IPL) projects to the 
areas of the ventral premotor cortex (areas F4 and F5). Note that V-D is the main site of 
convergence of the pathways from the extrastriate visual areas of the dorsal stream and 
this evidence suggests a direct connection between the visual areas that receive 
information from the retina and the sensorimotor areas of the parieto-frontal circuit 
(AIP and the premotor cortex), also called the ventro-dorsal stream (V-D) involved in 
visuomotor transformation. This evidence seems to show that on seeing an object we are 
at the same time getting its visuomotor priming (i.e. the visuomotor representation of its 
“action property”), and the internal simulation56 of one of the actions we could perform 
upon it (i.e. the most suitable57 motor program required to interact with it with respect to 
the action possibility), regardless of the actual action execution (Gallese 2000; Jeannerod 
2006; Jacob, Jeannerod 2003). In a nutshell, when I am looking at the cup of coffee on 
my desk, the ventro-dorsal circuit is crucial for my purpose of grasping the handle of the 
cup. Consider that, first of all, the AIP detects the geometrical features of the handle that 
exhibit precise motor characteristics with respect to my motor repertoire. This means 
that the shape, texture, size are encoded. This information is then sent to F5, which, 
given the information received by the AIP, computes the most suitable motor act (say, a 
power grip) in order to grasp the handle of the cup. This is of course an over 
exemplification of the extremely complex functions of the ventro-dorsal stream. 
However, while it is widely agreed that the process can be divided into the two steps I 
have described, new evidence will give a more detailed account of the apparent fuzziness 
concerning the fluid connectivity of this extremely complex neural circuit. For example, 
it has been argued that the task of AIP neurons is simpler than grasping action 
possibilities with respect to the motor acts, and there’s room to suppose that they encode 
action properties (the transformation of object geometrical features into action 
properties) and additional processing to encode the action possibilities in relation to the 
suitable motor acts requested by the situation, which seems to be due to F5, is necessary 
(Romero et al. 2014; Pani et al. 2014)58. However, for the purposes of this chapter the 
functional discrimination I have reported should suffice. We have only to keep in mind 
that action properties are those encoded by the process of visuomotor transformation, 
which, at its first step, reads object geometrical features as action properties. Action – or, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 There are different notions of simulation: here I mean an automatic mechanism with the perceptual 
function to facilitate the motor preparation (Gallese 2000, 2007, 2009). That is, when a visual stimulus is 
presented, it directly evokes the simulation of the congruent motor schema which, regardless of whether 
the action is executed or not, maps the stimulus position in motor terms. This is really important insofar as 
motor activation frames the represented action within the constraints of a real action: represented actions 
correspond to covert actions as neurophysiological simulation of the mechanisms normally involved in the 
physical action generation (Jeannerod 2006: 130-131). Also, motor activation is highly specific to the action 
that is represented. However, neural commands for muscular contractions are effectively present, but 
simultaneously blocked by inhibitory mechanisms (Jeannerod 2006: 2.3.3). From a philosophical point of 
view, this is really important because, while overt action execution is necessarily preceded by its covert 
representation and simulation, covert representation and simulation are not necessarily followed by overt 
execution (Jeannerod 2006: 2; chap. 2, 6). An important point: visuomotor representations deal with the 
process of transformation of the visual percept, that is, with the transformation of the geometrical 
properties of the objects into action properties and then into motor acts; the recruitment of the suitable 
motor acts, as a result of the visuomotor transformation, is linked to the motor simulation concerning the 
selection of a motor plan on the basis of the translation of the properties of the perceived object into 
action properties (Borghi and Cimatti 2010; Decety and Grezes 2006; Borghi et al. 2010) – see my (§ 2.3.1).  
57 The concept of “most suitable” is not linked to the demand character of action properties, but to the 
embodied motor possibilities of the subject with respect to the action he can perform. That is, the object is 
not prescribing a precise kind of action, even though our motor system detects only a small set of action 
possibilities to the extent that only few motor acts are possible due to bodily constraints.  
58 See footnote 60. 
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motor – possibilities are those encoded by the process of motor preparation, or 
simulation due to motor responses concerning the motor commands during object 
fixation with respect to the action properties encoded. Remember that these processes 
are activated also in the case of passive object fixation, regardless of the actual execution.  
          Now, coming back to what I said before, it is important to distinguish question 
(1) What kinds of properties does our visual system attribute to the depicted object?   
from a very different question 
(2) what properties does our perceptual system respond to/covary with during pictorial 
perception?  
 
             As I said, (1) is about what properties are attributed by the perceptual system (or 
what it represents entities as having) and not about what properties are out there 
(presumably in a causal relation with our perceptual system), as in the case of (2). The 
properties our perceptual system responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones 
it represents objects as having (Nanay 2011b; see Burge 2010). I also said that the answer 
to (2) is fundamental to reaching the answer to (1). Well, according to the empirical 
evidence, the neural phenomena above described translate object attributes into motor 
commands: precisely, they represent S (geometrical objects features) as being F (action 
properties) and F (action properties) as Q (motor acts) resonating with the simulation of 
the performable motor act. There could also be room to suggest (see above the analysis 
offered by Romero et al. 2014) that the AIP reads geometrical features as action 
properties and relays this information to F5, which transforms the action properties into 
suitable motor acts, even though, in order to defend my claim, it sufficient to say that the 
ventro-dorsal stream has a critical role in the extraction of visuomotor properties of 
objects (Shikata et al. 2003). But I have said that the properties our perceptual system 
responds to or tracks may not be the same as the ones it represents objects as having 
(Nanay 2011b). This is to say that, concerning the empirical evidence, according to the 
visuomotor transformation process with normal objects, our perceptual system responds 
to/covaries with particular “object geometrical features”. Accordingly, thanks to the 
visuomotor transformation, our visual system attributes “action properties” to the object. 
Thus, the properties our perceptual system responds to or tracks (geometrical properties) 
are not the same as the ones it represents objects as having (action properties). Yet, the 
detection of particular geometrical features allows these geometrical features to be 
transformed (or say, read) into action properties, or, in other words, to attribute action 
properties to the object. Furthermore, this encoding is accompanied by the motor 
resonance of both the two main components in the covariation and attribution: AIP-F5. 
Thanks to this, the motor resonance exhibited by the motor simulation is possible.  
               Here, I have explained how our visuomotor system works during face-to-face 
perception. In the next section, I show that our visual system functions in a somewhat 
similar manner when we perceive depicted objects. In order to defend this idea, I will 
introduce evidence concerning sensorimotor activation of the same areas I have talked 
about in this section, during the fixation of depicted objects. 
4.4 Visuomotor Circuits and Depicted Objects 
 
In (§ 4.3) I explained how those visuomotor circuits work in the case of face-to-face 
visuomotor processing. In particular, we saw that different portions of a chunk of the 
dorsal stream, the ventro-dorsal stream – the components of the parieto-premotor 
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network AIP-F5, projecting to the ventral premotor cortex – which are the main cortical 
areas in visuomotor transformation, are activated both during passive fixation of objects 
and during action execution. Now I need to report evidence showing that these areas are 
also activated during the perception of depicted objects. In other words, visuomotor 
processing activated in face-to-face perception is activated in a somewhat similar manner 
when we are faced with depicted objects. This will be a way to show that depicted 
objects are dorsally perceived and that, in turn, we represent them as having action 
properties for which our motor preparation, or simulation, is highly selective and indeed 
activated.  
           Several empirical data show that visually presented images of objects activate the 
same sensorimotor areas functionally involved in the execution of the actions afforded 
by the depicted objects “in the flesh”. In an experiment by Chao and Martin (2000), 
concerning the “representation of manipulable man-made objects in the dorsal stream”, 
the authors have shown the presence of a deep selectivity of both the left posterior 
parietal and left ventral premotor cortex, in particular F5 canonical neurons, for pictures 
of tools, in comparison with different categories of objects. This suggests that, the 
encoding of visuomotor information in the visual stimulus, with the related 
representation of action properties based on the information of visuomotor nature (see § 
4.3) is possible in the case of depicted objects as well and depends on the same neural 
underpinnings at the basis of the visuomotor transformations for overt motor 
interactions (see § 4.3). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the evidence by 
Proverbio et al. (2011), who showed that action possibilities (which in the experimental 
settings they call “affordances”) are encoded - within the 250 ms time course – when 
depicted objects are presented; precisely, images of manipulable objects. Another 
interesting experimental (TMS) study comes from Buccino et al. (2009), who recorded 
the presence of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of parts of the hand involved in the 
motor act of grasping in subjects faced with images of damaged and undamaged objects, 
e.g. mugs with a whole or a broken handle (see also below) (this practice is well-known in 
neuroscience, see Anelli, Borghi and Nicoletti 2012). Buccino et al. also suggest the high 
involvement of dorsal perception in object knowledge during this task. A further 
example comes from Costantini et al. (2010) and confirms that the presentation of virtual 
images of objects elicits motor-related effects related to the action properties of the 
presented objects. Importantly, Grezes and Decety (2002) have shown the precise 
response, among other areas, of the IPL, that is, the ventro-dorsal stream. Finally, Borghi 
et al. (2007) showed that pre-motor areas are activated during the naming and viewing of 
pictures of manipulable objects (as in the case of Chao and Martin 2000; see also Gerlach 
et al. 2002; Craighero et al. 2002).  
           In a nutshell, while evidence reported in (§ 4.3) suggested that end-stage areas of 
the ventro-dorsal chunk of the dorsal stream, such as the ventral-premotor cortex, in 
particular its canonical neurons, are active even during fixation of normal objects, that is, 
without execution, evidence here suggests that, similarly, the activation of those areas is 
possible in the perception of depicted objects, even if there is no request to perform any 
kind of motor interaction upon the visually presented target, insofar as the task consisted 
only in merely observing the depicted objects on the screen, or in photographs (with 
different requests on the subjects, and different experimental settings Chao and Martin 
2000; Grezes and Decety 2002; Buccino et al. 2009; Cardelliccho et al. 2011; Costantini et 
al. 2010; Tucker and Ellis 1998; for an excellent review concerning picture perception 
with respect to the activity of the (pre)motor areas see Zipoli Caiani 2013)59.  Now I will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See the case of canonical neurons in (§§ 4.3, 2.3.1).  
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report evidence that the same resonance with pictures is also given by the AIP. 
          Evidence by Romero et al. (2014; see also Pani et al. 2014), show that a subset of 
AIP neurons is also activated by two-dimensional images of objects and even by outline 
contours defining the object shape: neurons in the posterior AIP (pAIP) are selective for 
two-dimensional (2D) images of objects, a selectivity that is primarily based on the 
contours of the object shape (Romero et al., 2012), and this is fundamental in order to 
understand the sensorimotor resonance in the case of pictures. Note that neurons in the 
anterior AIP (aAIP) area also respond to images of objects, though are less frequently 
selected. However, the search stimulus set consisted of 21 2D area-equalized static 
images of objects (faces, hands, fruits, branches, and artificial graspable objects) termed 
“surfaces” because they all contained texture, perspective, and shading information. The 
authors recorded the activity of 82 single AIP neurons that responded selectively to 
images of objects during passive fixation. Neurons active during grasping were then 
tested in the passive fixation search test. All neurons responsive during grasping were 
also responsive during the passive fixation search test. The strong responses they 
observed confirmed that the recordings were performed in the AIP. Moreover, given the 
position of the AIP area in the hierarchy of visual areas, their finding that the neural 
coding of object shape in the AIP is largely based on a selectivity for small line 
fragments, which in their test appear to be more suitable for activating neurons in early 
visual areas (V1 or V2), and given that other studies are consistent with this low-level 
visual selectivity (for a review see Romero et al. 2014) concerning very short response 
latencies in the AIP area, they suggested that few processing stages may separate the AIP 
area from early visual areas. Given these anatomical and functional characteristics of 
AIP, the interplay between the AIP and F5 is crucial in the explanation of how our 
sensorimotor – in particular, visuomotor - areas can covary with particular (2D) 
geometrical properties which in turn can be represented as action properties – or, in 
other words, on the basis of the transformation of which (the geometrical properties) our 
visual system attributes action properties to the depicted object – (and this is possible 
due to the visuomotor mechanism I described in (§ 4.3) concerning real objects 
perception).  
             It is worth noting that the selectivity of the AIP for two-dimensional stimuli - 
and its interconnection to F5 - reported by Romero could explain the passage from the 
detection of a two-dimensional stimulus to the reconstruction of the suitable motor act 
to perform: the reconstruction of the possible motor interaction starts from the two-
dimensional features of the object and continues regardless of the fact that the features 
pertain to a real object or to a depicted object. The covariation of the same geometrical 
properties that an object in perspective in a picture and a real object in perspective share 
leads to the same representation of action properties, and this is possible because the 
dorsal system doesn’t distinguish between the distal cause encoded (cfr. with § 4.6 
below). Indeed, the same action possibility encoding holds both when the perceiver is in 
front of a real object, and when the perceiver is in front of pictures of it, showing that 
the perceptual system is attuned to shared sensorimotor layouts and configurations in 
both the real and the depicted target, without distinction from the distal source60.  
              Given the presence of this same mechanism with respect to (1) and (2) both for 
real objects that for depicted objects, it is possible to claim that action properties are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For technical, neurological details concerning AIP encoding with respect to action possibilities and 
geometrical figures and F5 encoding with respect to motor acts as well as the different contribution in the 
encoding on those by AIP and F5 see (Romero et al 2014). 
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dorsally represented both in the case of perception of real objects perception and in the 
case of the perception of depicted objects.  
          This section reported sufficient evidence in order to suggest that dorsal 
representation of action properties is possible for depicted objects. But, we know that 
dorsal processing is linked to the encoding in peripersonal coordinates. So, one might 
wonder about the possibility of having a dorsal representation of action properties in the 
perception of depicted objects, even though it has been denied, by the dorsal/ventral 
account of picture perception, that they can be egocentrically encoded as much as 
normal objects can. In the next section, I address empirical evidence showing that 
different experimental settings can lead the subject (and her/his dorsal vision, see below 
§ 4.6) to apparently perceive the depicted object as falling within her/his peripersonal 
space and as apparently reachable. In these cases, dorsal perception can attribute action 
properties to the depicted objects. I also report the neuroanatomical underpinnings of 
this process. 
4.5 Depicted Objects and Action Space 
In the footnote 50 I said that I use the expressions "egocentric space" and "peripersonal 
space" interchangeably and as near synonyms in denoting the action space, that is, the 
space within our reach (for a review concerning this synonymy see Holmes and Spence 
2004). This space is linked to the motor perspective as well as to the motor 
capabilities/skills of the individual agent. Here, the reference to the anatomo-functional 
relation between the visuomotor component and its neural correlates (§ 2.3.1) and the 
egocentric/peripersonal component, and its neural correlates is crucial (§ 2.3.3) insofar as 
I am going to suggest that this functional link is maintained even in the case of the 
perceptual representations of depicted objects. 
        While the main purpose of this chapter is just to show that dorsal perception 
can ascribe action properties to depicted objects, an important point needs to be 
addressed here: results from motor neuroscience suggest that motor resonance is often61 
due to peripersonal/egocentric encoding of the target. The same holds for depicted 
objects as well - even if, the fact that the depicted object is perceived as falling in the 
action space and as being reachable is, of course, only apparent, and it is fostered by the 
experimental settings. For example, the experiment by Costantini et al. (2010) clearly 
shows that the motor response with respect to action possibilities is deeply dependent on 
the perceived spatial location of the object and on the apparent possibility 62  of 
interaction for the subject. Costantini and his colleagues presented their subjects with 
virtual images of a mug and divided the space into both reachable and non-reachable 
subspaces by presenting the image of the mug either in front of or behind a transparent 
panel. The compatibility effect was detected only when the image of the target was 
perceived as located within the subject’s peripersonal space63; that is, when it was 
apparently reachable by the observer. This result suggests that the motor response is due 
to the peripersonal encoding of the depicted object, which is apparently presented in the 
peripersonal space of the observer and is apparently reachable. In accordance with this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For exceptions, see footnote 67.  
62 The notion of apparent possibility of interaction will be important given the nature of dorsal processing. 
I will talk about this in (§§ 4.5, 4.6). 
63 As already said, for the purposes of this chapter, it not necessary to question the concept of egocentric 
space. Here I use this as a synonym of peripersonal space: both are concerned with action space, or the 
space within one’s reach. 
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evidence, Janyan and Slavcheva (2012) tested the encoding of action possibilities using 
symbols superimposed on a picture of a pan, showing a faster response when the visual 
action possibility of a graspable object (e.g., a pan) corresponds to the response location 
and thus suggesting that the location64 of the virtual depicted object is important for 
inducing motor resonance. In other words, the activation of the visuomotor response is 
modulated by a non-trivial egocentric relation with the depicted target due to the 
apparent possibility of interacting with the target’s functional parts (e.g., a handle), as well 
as by their apparent spatial location: once again, response is found when the depicted 
object is apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space, and when it is 
apparently reachable by the observer (see Zipoli Caiani 2013 for this point). 
         As just said in (§ 2.3.3), the importance of peripersonal encoding of the target for 
detecting its action properties is widely agreed upon in the literature (De Stefani et al. 
2014; Ambrosini and Costantini 2013). For example, F5 canonical neurons in the ventral 
premotor cortex selectively respond only to those objects presented in the peripersonal 
space but not in the extrapersonal space (Bonini et al. 2014). This spatial constraint holds 
for the general activity of the ventral premotor cortex as well (Maranesi et al. 2014; 
Turella and Lignau 2014; Bonini et al. 2014). More generally, action possibilities are 
detected, and the related motor acts are encoded, only when objects fall into the action 
space (Borghi and Riggio 2015: 7; Fattori et al., 2001, 2005; Hadjidimitrakis et al., 2011, 
2013; Bosco et al. 2014). 
          This is due to corto-cortical functional interconnections of different areas within 
the circuits of grasping (Castiello 2005, Turella and Lignau 2014), precisely, the two main 
parieto-premotor networks the ventro-dorsal stream can be divided into: AIP-F5 and 
VIP-F4 (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Gallese 2007). The circuit crucially involved in the 
mapping of our peripersonal space is constituted by the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) 
and F4. F4 occupies the posterior sector of the ventral premotor cortex, next to F5, with 
which it is adjacent. The VIP is located in the fundus of the intraparietal sulcus (Gallese 
2007, Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003). AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 circuits are extremely 
interconnected from an anatomo-functional point of view: largely segregated 
parietofrontal connections link the rostral intraparietal cortex (areas AIP and VIP) and 
the ventral premotor cortex (areas F5 and F4) (Luppino et al. 1999). Indeed, the VIP-F4 
circuit codes the peripersonal space, which coincides with the motor space for arm 
reaching (Borghi and Riggio 2015: 9)65. Thus, canonical neurons space dependency is due 
to the connections between area F5 and area F4 (Fogassi et al. 1996; Matelli et al. 1996; 
Borghi and Riggio 2015: 7; Costantini et al. 2011a, b)66. Accordingly, motor simulation is 
spatially dependent as well: only those objects presented in the peripersonal space are 
automatically mapped, from a motoric point of view, through simulation (ter Horst et al. 
2011, Gallese 2005, Grade et al. 2015). 
           My claim was that dorsal perception can ascribe action properties to depicted 
objects. Following this neural evidence, I can suggest that this is likely to happen when 
the image of the target is apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See also Vainio et al. (2011), who revealed a compatibility effect for the orientation of the image of a 
graspable object. 
65 As in the case of the connection between the AIP and F5, and VIP and F4, the same extremely complex 
interplay holds between the entire parieto-premotor networks VIP-F4 and AIP-F5 (see Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia 2008). 
66 See footnote 67. 
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when it is apparently reachable by the observer67 (the object in the monitor is perceived 
as being located within the peripersonal space of the onlooker). Indeed, crucially, this is 
in line with the different experimental settings in which presented images (Chao ad 
Martin 2000), or transparencies (Ellis and Tucker 1998) are presented near to the 
participants’ heads 45 cm in front of the screen (Ellis and Tucker 1998), or 57 cm, 
(Cardellicchio et al. 2001, but see also Romero et al. 2012, 2014), that is, in which the 
depicted objects are apparently presented within the peripersonal space of the observer 
and are apparently reachable. I will consider the implications for the dorsal/ventral 
account below (§ 4.6), where I will report further evidence in line with these reported 
here. 
          I want to point out that my claim that these objects are represented as apparently 
being in the peripersonal space of the observer and apparently reachable is not 
problematic in the literature (see Zipoli Caiani 2013). In (§ 4.6) I explain why such 
apparent, but non-trivial, egocentric relation with the depicted object is possible for 
dorsal subpersonal vision, that is I provide further technical details about how dorsal 
subpersonal vision represents depicted objects as apparently located in the peripersonal 
space of the onlooker and attributes action properties to them and I also explain that my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 There is also evidence that sometimes egocentric/peripersonal encoding might not be necessary. 
Cardellicchio et al. (2011) showed that, whereas MEP can be modulated by the orientation of the part of 
an object which is suitable for motor interaction, it can also be modulated by its spatial location, regardless 
of the fact that this location overlaps with the peripersonal space of the observer. Similarly, Tucker and 
Ellis (2001) suggested that in order to detect action possibilities it is not necessary for the object to be 
placed in the peripersonal space. This appears to conflict with the result by Costantini et al. 2010. 
However, as Zipoli Caiani (2013: footnote 5) observes, while in the experiment by Costantini et al. 2010, 
motor elicitation is observed only when the image of the target was apparently located within the subject’s 
peripersonal space and apparently reachable by the observer, contrarily, for Tucker and Ellis (2001), 
“affordance-related compatibility” effects (as they are called in neuroscience) are not dependent on the 
object being presented within the actual reaching space of the observer. This is because in the experimental 
settings of Tucker and Ellis, objects are presented behind a plastic LCD screen that inevitably biased any 
attempt to modulate their reachability by varying the spatial distance between the target and the observer 
(see also the end of § 4.6 for similar discussions). I would like to point out that, moreover, while in the case 
of Costantini et al. action is evoked “only” when the object is presented within the portion of the 
peripersonal space, in the case of Cardellicchio et al. (2011) also non-reachable objects can evoke motor 
responses; however, the authors found “higher” MEPs during the observation of graspable objects falling 
within the reachable space compared to the observation of either a non-graspable object or a graspable 
object falling outside the reachable space. But, as the authors affirm, this evidence clearly indicates that 
visuomotor recruitment is spatially constrained, as it depends on whether the object falls within the actual 
reaching space of the onlooker. Note that, in the case of Cardellicchio, we are still talking of virtual two-
dimensional images of objects on a computer screen with a resolution of 1024 horizontal pixels by 768 
vertical pixels, at a distance of approximately 57 cm (1370). The response may arguably be due to the fact 
that the computer screen may be perceived, by the subjects, as being in the peripersonal space, and thus, 
even those objects that are apparently located in the virtual extrapersonal space are perceived as being 
reachable - and, maybe, just smaller. On the other hand, in the case of Costantini, the presence of the panel 
influenced the visual perception of the participants, as in the case of Tucker and Ellis (2001). I am not 
concerned with this exception here. Indeed, my claim is that dorsal perception can ascribe action 
properties to those depicted objects which are apparently located within the peripersonal space of the 
observer and which are apparently reachable and this is sufficient in order to extend the dorsal/ventral 
account of picture perception.  I just require that action properties can be represented on the basis of 
motor responses. Establishing whether or not this is really possible also in the case of those objects which 
cannot be egocentrically encoded goes beyond the purposes of this chapter. Finally, the difference in 
experimental setting may be investigated from the perspective of inflection. Inflection is the phenomenon 
according to which some of the seen features of the picture’s surface are relevant in characterizing some 
features of the depicted object as seen in that vehicle (see Voltolini 2013, Nanay 2010b). Here I do not 
need to account for this phenomenon, insofar as different (similar kinds of) pictures induce the same 
“dorsal” response. Moreover, as I have said, I am not concerned with particular kinds of pictures involving 
trompe l’oeil - I’ll be back to this issue in chapter 5. 
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idea is not in conflict with the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. Also, while 
my claim is about the subpersonal level of perception, insofar as it is about dorsal vision, 
some authors have suggested that even our conscious ventral stream can quasi-
egocentrically represent, to some extent, depicted objects as well (Briscoe 2009). Indeed, 
the idea that we can quasi-egocentrically perceptually represent depicted objects and their 
relative depth cues is an uncontroversial idea in both philosophy (for a brief review see 
Briscoe 2009: 447, 6.1–6.4; Grush 1998, 2000, 2007; see also Schwenkler 2014) and 
neuroscience (Pani et al. 2014; Bruzzo et al. 2008; for a complete review see Vishwanath 
2014; Cutting 2003; Hecht et al. 2003): “perceptual discrimination of 3-D object and 
surface layout in films and photographs involves a quasi-egocentric perception of 
depicted space inasmuch as, when watching a film or looking at a photograph, one non-
reflectively assumes the perspective of the camera” (Briscoe 2009: 447). As Briscoe 
observes, this idea is also compatible with the results of the TVSM – for example, with 
the evidence that grasping can be influenced by the size-contrast illusions (p. 447).  
          An important clarification here is that when saying depicted objects offer action 
possibilities this does not mean, of course, that we can act upon them. It just means that 
some part of our dorsal brain behaves – with respect to the neural firing - as if the action 
properties pertaining the depicted object, such as its geometrical configuration, pertained 
to a real 3D object. Indeed, the simulation linked to the motor act we can perform in the 
given motor situation - on the basis of the visuomotor transformation of object 
attributes into motor commands. The same visuomotor transformation, with the 
simulation of the motor act, is activated both in the case in which the geometrical 
features pertain to a real object and to a depicted object68. One could argue that this 
evidence shows only that the dorsal stream responds to pictures because it is involved in 
the perception of the surface of the pictures, that is (c) The picture surface is represented 
by dorsal perception. However, evidence shows that the affordance related effects69 
registered are deeply related with the kind of motor act (e.g. power grip) one can perform 
on the depicted object (e.g. the handle of a mug), which is, in these cases, different from 
the act one can perform on the picture surface (precision grip)70. In many of these cases, 
as we saw, pictures are presented on a monitor, which, of course, cannot afford the same 
action afforded by the depicted object. In other words, looking at an image of an object 
triggers the activation of a suitable motor pattern for the execution of actions and the 
motor activation is highly specific to the action that is represented (Jeannerod 2006, see 
my footnote 56). Once again, think about the case of Buccino et al. where subjects were 
asked to observe virtual images of objects, in this case of handles. Note that in this 
experiment the motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) are from the right opponent pollicis 
and from the first dorsal interosseous muscle. These anatomical components are crucial 
in grasping, and the presence of this kind of motor response shows us that the motor act 
encoded pertains to the handle and not, of course, to the surface of the image, since in 
this case the image is not a normal picture, but an image on a monitor, which cannot 
involve grasping. The experiment shows that motor response is dependent on particular 
pragmatic features of objects (for example, a handle) (see my footnote 56). Thus, here (c) 
is not the case. The same holds for the other similar experimental settings. Also, 
following what I said at the beginning of the section, while the subjects may not be able 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See footnote 56. 
69 Here I have maintained the neuroscientific terminology. 
70 The practice of using pictures in cognitive neurosciences to study how seeing tools automatically 
activates motor information. I cannot survey all of them; see (Craighero et al. 2002; Ranzini et al. 2011; 
Borghi et al. 2012). See § 4.6. 
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to actually act on these action properties, nonetheless to be highly specific 
representations of action properties they should have non-trivial relation to egocentric 
representations of the depicted object, and this is what happens in the experimental 
setting in which the depicted objects are perceived as apparently reachable because 
apparently located in the action space of the observer. But I have a further empirical 
explanation for this non-trivial egocentric relation of dorsal vision with the depicted 
object in (§ 4.6). 
 
            Now, we can move on to the next section, in which I report evidence concerning 
the dorsal stream which might give a further empirical reason to the claim exposed in (§ 
4.4) and, in turn, go towards the idea that dorsal perception can detect more of those 
common cues shared by face-to-face perception and picture perception than we can 
expect if we were following the dorsal/ventral account on pictures. 
            Before doing this, another important point needs to be addressed. As we have 
said, in claiming that dorsal vision cannot represent the depicted object, Nanay has also 
recalled evidence that the dorsal subsystem is divided into two sides: the ventro-dorsal 
(V-D) and dorso-dorsal (D-D) subsystem, one responsible for manipulating objects (D-
D) and the other responsible for them in egocentric space (D-D) (Rizzolatti and Matelli 
2003); hence, he has reformulated the claim (b): we do not localize depicted objects in 
our egocentric space, that is, our v-d visual subsystem does not represent the depicted 
object (Nanay 2011a)71. But I clearly showed that the ventro-dorsal stream can represent 
depicted objects which are perceived as being in the peripersonal space of the observer, 
as having action properties72 - see also my (§ 2.3.3).  
           Furthermore, in accordance with the insights of Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003), the 
difference between D-D and v-d is not that manipulation is encoded in D-D while 
egocentric localization is encoded in V-D, because also V-D is concerned with 
manipulation; in fact, this is the main cortical portion involved in the visuomotor 
translation (§ 4.3). Following a distinction made between variable and stable mechanisms 
pertaining to the detection of action possibilities, it has been suggested that the former 
are performed in the D-D, while the latter in the V-D (this is not the place to focus on 
this topic; see Borghi and Riggio 2009, 2015; Sakreida et al. 2013): D-D is involved in the 
online interaction with objects (in new motor situations), while V-D is responsible for 
how our knowledge of objects influences the way in which we represent them.  
            So, the distinction Nanay is looking for can be found in those two different 
parieto-premotor networks in the V-D – AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 - and not between D-D 
and V-D: it is one portion of V-D, namely the parieto-premotor network VIP-F4, that is 
involved in the egocentric localization and it is the other portion of V-D, namely the 
parieto-premotor network AIP-F5, that translates those motor geometrical features of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “My strategy was to show that we do not localize depicted objects in our egocentric space. Thus, the 
argument I presented in this section, rephrased using the terminology of the three visual subsystems 
framework, aimed to show that our ventro-dorsal visual subsystem does not represent the depicted object” 
(Nanay 2011a: 470). See also the notion of “the perceptual individuation of visual objects by location” in 
Jacob and Jeannerod (2003). 
72 Note that, while Nanay suggests that D-D deals with manipulation, whereas it is V-D that deals with 
egocentric localization, we have evidence that neuronal activity in area V6A of the dorso-dorsal stream can 
also specify object position with high specificity for the peripersonal (reachable) space not only during 
reaching tasks (Fattori et al. 2001, 2005; Hadjidimitrakis et al. 2013; Bosco et al. 2014). However, data 
suggest the leading role of V-D concerning reaching and grasping activities (Maranesi et al. 2014; Turella 
and Lignau 2014; Gallese 2007; Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Borghi and Riggio 2015; Bosco et al. 2014, 
Castiello 2005). For the purpose of this chapter, this should suffice. 
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objects into motor properties (and this is possible, both for picture perception and for 
real object perception) (§ 4.4). However, it is important to keep in mind that the neural 
correlates for visuomotor transformation and those for egocentric localization are really 
interconnected, so that talking about a possible divide concerning their processing does 
not make much sense73 - for a review see (§ 2.3.3). I will come back to the implications of 
this remark in the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception at the end of (§ 4.6). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To summarize (§§ 4.4, 4.5) show something important. First, like normal 
objects, depicted objects can be dorsally perceived as well, since the visuomotor system is 
activated by the apparent possibility of interacting with the depicted object’s functional 
parts exhibiting motor-related properties (e.g., a handle), even if, of course, they do not 
really afford the apparent motor interaction they seem to evoke (§ 4.4). Second, this 
happens when the subject (or, her/his dorsal vision, see below § 4.6) entertains a non-
trivial peripersonal/egocentric relation with the depicted object, that is, when the 
depicted target is apparently presented, in the experimental setting, in the peripersonal 
space of the observer and perceived as apparently reachable, even if the task only 
consists in the observation of virtual images of objects. 	  
               So, all I have said till now has been sufficient in order to defend my claim that 
depicted objects can be dorsally represented by dorsal perception as having action 
properties. However, in the next section (§ 4.6), I would like to address further evidence 
related to the fact that dorsal perception entertains a non-trivial egocentric relation with 
the depicted target suggesting a possible philosophical explanation of the empirical 
reason for why those depicted objects we face and perceive as apparently located in the 
peripersonal space and as apparently reachable are able to foster motor-related effects in 
our dorsal vision. In turn, I will discuss the implications of this explanation for the 
dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, suggesting that there is no conflict with my 
claim. 
 
4.6 Action, Pictures and the Dorsal Stream 
 
So, now we know that dorsal perception can attribute action properties to these depicted 
objects which, in the experimental settings, are apparently presented in the peripersonal 
space of the observer and are perceived as apparently reachable. Here I report further 
evidence suggesting that I am on the right track in arguing that depicted objects - those 
apparently presented within the peripersonal space of the observer - especially of “3D” 
objects, such as tools - activate the same processing areas in the visual brain as are 
activated by those real objects of the same kind, and that this is the case not only for the 
ventral stream  – this is claim (a) of the dorsal/ventral account (see Nanay 2011a, 2015) - 
but also for the dorsal one. 	  
              For example, neurons in the dorsal intraparietal sulcus selectively respond to 
depicted objects exhibiting particular depicted 3D shapes and orientations (Nelissen et al. 
2009, James et al. 2002, Taira 2001, Sakata et al. 2003) 74. And this is in line with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The same dependence between the two processings seems to hold for the D-D. See footnote 72. 
74 Tsutsui et al. (2002) explored the sensitivity of caudal intraparietal (CIP) neurons in the dorsal stream to 
texture-defined 3D surface orientation. CIP neurons are involved in high-level disparity processing (the 
reconstruction of 3D surface orientation through the computation of disparity gradients). Some CIP 
neurons are sensitive to texture gradients, which is one of the major monocular cues. Some of them are 
sensitive to disparity gradients, suggesting their involvement in the computation of 3D surface orientation. 
Moreover, those sensitive to multiple depth cues were widely distributed together with those sensitive to a 
specific depth cue, suggesting the involvement of CIP neurons in the integration of depth information 
from different sources. The convergence of multiple depth cues in CIP seems to play a critical role in 3D 
vision by constructing a generalized representation of the 3D surface geometry of objects (Tsutsui et al. 
2005). See footnote 80. I’ll be back to this in chapter 5. 
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evidence exposed above about both AIP and F5. Indeed, there is evidence that F5 is 
better suited for the decoding of the grip type, while AIP is more accurate in predicting 
object orientation (Baumann, Fluet and Scherberger 2009; Gallivan and Wood 2009; 
Fluet, Baumann and Scherberger 2010) – for an analysis concerning depth perception 
and 3D perception in relation to the AIP-F5 circuit see (Theys et al. 2015). In line with 
this, dorsal perception seems to be sensitive, to some extent, to depth cues apparently 
exhibited by depicted objects (Gonzalez et al. 2008; Berryhill and Olson 2009; Marotta 
and Goodale 2001) and seems to discriminate between images of depicted graspable and 
non-graspable objects (Rice et al. 2007). In accordance, the most important end-stage of 
the dorsal stream concerning visuomotor interaction, the ventral premotor cortex, is 
highly selective during manipulable objects observation with respect to non-manipulable 
objects: images of tools, but not of houses, animals, and faces, activated the ventral 
premotor cortex (Grafton et al., 1997; Knight et al., 1999; as in the case of Chao and 
Martin 2000), and that the ventral premotor cortex was activated with manipulable 
objects but not with non-manipulable ones (e.g., Gerlach et al. 2002; Kellenbach et al. 
2003) (this experimental evidence is crucial for what I said in § 4.4). This is sufficient for 
my claim (for the different activations of dorsal and ventral perception with different 
images see Proverbio et al. 2011).  
            However, notwithstanding these characteristics of the dorsal stream, there is one 
feature that seems to be crucial for the claim defended in this chapter: dorsal perception 
does not discriminate in a precise manner between objects seen face-to-face and depicted 
objects, because this capacity is subserved by the ventral stream75. Indeed, as shown by 
(Westwood et al. 2002), the dorsal stream does not construct a complete 3D structural 
description of the target object. Such a description, nonetheless, is necessary for response 
selection, in order to detect the action afforded by an object, or in the case of pictures, to 
understand that there is no possible interaction76. Accordingly, it is the ventral stream 
that plays the key role in object recognition and response selection, distinguishing 
between 3D objects and 2D images of objects by detecting conflicts between various 
visual cues77 and selecting different visuomotor strategies for a 2D image versus a 3D 
object78. Thus, ventral perception selects an appropriate response for a particular visual 
stimulus, based on a comprehensive analysis of object volumetric structure, whereas the 
dorsal stream plans the precise metrics of the intended action, based on a pragmatic 
analysis of the object’s spatial features. In other words, dorsal perception can control 
grasping without ever constructing a volumetric representation of the distal stimulus, 
which is due to the ventral stream. However, though dorsal perception explores depth 
cues and 3D shape perception without constructing a precise volumetric representation 
of the target object, which is due to ventral perception79, we saw in (§ 4.4) that 2D 
structure is sufficient in order to activate the dorsal detection of action properties80. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Accordingly, prior to discriminating depicted objects as such, infants seem to perceive depicted objects 
as real objects affording action and they even grasp at the pictures as if trying to pick up the depicted 
objects (DeLoache et al. 2004: 68; see also Pierroutsakos and DeLoache 2003; Deloache et al. 1998).  
76 Volumetric object representation is necessary for the visual control of grip formation and response 
selection, to ensure that we do not attempt to reach for objects that cannot be grasped (Westwood et al. 
2002). 
77 It is computationally efficient for one visual system to handle both response selection and object 
recognition: both require complete/detailed information about 3D object structure (Goodale and Milner 
1992). 
78 One must perceive objects to be different in order to treat them differently. 
79 For the difference between shape perception and volumetric object recognition see (Briscoe 2008). 
80 We have further evidence that picture perception and face-to-face perception are, in general, very close 
with regards cues relevant for action. Indeed, while the perception of depicted objects lacks a precise 
sensation of a possibility of complete egocentric localization (in line with the claim of Matthen and Nanay) 
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This evidence might offer an explanation for why dorsal perception can represent 
depicted objects – at least those apparently presented within the peripersonal space of 
the observer - as having action properties.  
          We know that dorsal perception ascribes action properties to both normal objects 
(§ 4.3) and depicted objects (§ 4.4); this representation seems to be possible when normal 
objects are presented in the peripersonal space of the observer, or when, in the 
experimental settings, depicted objects are apparently presented in the peripersonal space 
of the observer (§ 4.5). So, the basic point is that dorsal perception entertains a non-
trivial egocentric relation with the target, regardless of the fact that the object is real or 
depicted. However, dorsal perception distinguishes between graspable objects - like tools 
- and non-graspable objects, but not between real and depicted objects. This means that 
it attributes action properties to the object which is presented in the peripersonal space - 
or depicted objects apparently presented in the peripersonal space – regardless of the 
nature of the distal target that is causing the selective motor resonance; that is, regardless 
of the fact that it is a depicted object or a real one, to the extent that, after all, it cannot 
distinguish between them - note also that, most of the time, these depicted tools are the 
same size as a normal tool (that is, scale one to one) we use in our everyday life, so that, 
for the dorsal subpersonal processing, it is very difficult to discern between a real tool 
and a picture of it, which, in the eyes of the subpersonal dorsal computations are very 
similar objects.	   In other words, since dorsal vision cannot distinguish between real and 
depicted objects, everything that is apparently found in the peripersonal space can be 
represented as having action properties, fostering the apparent possibility of interaction: 
in order to foster visuomotor activation in dorsal vision, the important thing is to be 
faced with a geometrical configuration that is usually linked to an action property (see § 
4.4), and that is apparently located in the peripersonal space of the observer, perceived as 
apparently reachable, no matter if the configuration pertains to a 2-D object or a real 
object81.  
            Summing up, due to its particular computational nature, dorsal vision can 
entertain a non-trivial egocentric relation with depicted tools that are perceived as 
apparently located within the peripersonal space and as apparently reachable and can 
thus attribute action properties to them, insofar as, in the eyes of the subpersonal dorsal 
perception, there is a real egocentric relation with the depicted target.  
            All this suggests that the dorsal peripersonal/egocentric representation of the 
vehicle, which enables the consequent attribution of action properties to the vehicle is 
one thing, while the dorsal peripersonal/egocentric representation of the depicted object, 
which enables the consequent attribution of action properties to the depicted object - 
what I am concerned with in the chapter - is another. 
         All I said is strengthened by empirical evidence that motor response is activated 
when simple 3-D contours of the shape of the depicted objects, salient from a motor 
point of view are detected; for example, different neural populations of both AIP and F5 
respond to the contours of the depicted objects which can be extracted as salient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that a normal object can offer, because the perception of depicted objects leaves absolute depth cues 
optically unspecified, depicted objects can foster in us the experience of 3D shapes, orientations, relative 
sizes, and depth ratios, which resemble those real properties found in ordinary 3D objects, for which 
egocentric localization is not needed (in accordance with § 4.4; for a review see Vishwanath 2014). This 
strengthens the fact that we can represent depicted objects as having action properties. Furthermore, if, 
according to recent evidence, we were to explore the connections between the two streams, we would have 
a more complete account of how different cues for action can be transferred between the streams. This 
would better explain the resemblance between face-to-face perception and picture perception concerning 
all the empirical data reported here on action properties. I do not address this issue here.  
81 This is in line with what I said about the AIP and its interplay with F5 during the perception of depicted 
objects (§ 4.4). I’ll be back to this in chapter 5. 
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geometrical properties automatically represented as action properties. Indeed, AIP's 
selectivity is primarily based on the contours, aspect ratio and orientation of the depicted 
objects (Romero et al. 2013). It’s not by chance that, in this circuit, 3D-shape selective 
neurons are co-localized with neurons showing motor-related activity, indicating, even in 
the case of depicted objects, a close relation of visual and motor information on the 
same clusters of neurons (Theys et al. 2015). This is in line with the evidence of 
several action-modulated perception effects that improve processing of action relevant 
visual features (Gutteling et al. 2015) and with the evidence that action preparation 
originating from activation in higher-order visuomotor control brain areas downstream 
from early visual cortex in the dorsal stream modulates visual processing according to the 
visuomotor constraints of the action that is encoded (van Elk et al. 2010; Gutteling et al. 
2013). There are also other interesting aspects of dorsal processing in relation to 2-D 
perception. However, a focus on them would go beyond the scope of this chapter. 
       All this strengthens what I said about the unexpected functioning of MRs (cfr. with 
§ 2.5): at the beginning I mentioned a widespread temptation, among those who use the 
dorsal/ventral account: assuming that, since we cannot really grasp a depicted object, 
because our visual system cannot egocentrically represent the depicted object, we cannot 
represent its action properties, which is the main task of our dorsal stream. I suggested 
that dorsal perception can in fact represent depicted objects as having action properties. 
However, I now need to address other common intuitions linked to this temptation, 
which I reject. First, that our visual conscious system – the ventral stream - detects the 
object of interest for us, establishes if it is actable upon - if it is a real 3-D object - and 
then sends the information to our visuomotor brain which in turn, only at this point, 
encodes a suitable motor act. This is because it is widely believed that it is visual 
consciousness that establishes whether the computation of the coordinates for motor 
action can start. This would depend on the result of the response selection that 
establishes whether we are faced with a reliable motor scenario (a real object) or not (a 
picture). In other words, it is common idea that, first of all, our conscious visual system 
detects a reliable motor situation, then, if this is the case, the information can be sent to 
the subpersonal visuomotor system, which can now compute the information necessary 
in order to act. This would suggest that the visuomotor system is not activated in the 
case of depicted objects, because visual consciousness would never send the command 
(with the relative) information for translating the properties of a depicted object into a 
motor act. After all, we cannot act upon a picture. But evidence shows that things are 
different. The visuomotor encoding is activated, despite the distal stimulus, despite the 
fact that – and even before – our visual conscious system has computed whether the 
object is “real” or not. Indeed, just a few indeterminate cues are sufficient in order to 
trigger the visuomotor transformation. In other words, before our conscious visual 
system encodes the appropriate response selection concerning a reliable motor scenario 
and establishes that we are dealing with a reliable motor situation (a real object and not a 
picture) the suitable motor act computed on the basis of the 2-D geometrical properties 
of the target is already stored in our motor quiver, regardless of whether the actual overt 
execution would be followed, that is, regardless of whether we can interact with the 
object or not. So, the visuomotor transformation is activated simply because our 
visuomotor system doesn’t need any trigger, or any confirmation from our conscious 
visual system in order to start the visuomotor translation. Rather, the translation is 
already prepared and will be used at the discretion of the conscious response selection 
encoding the motor scenario. This is linked to the fact that, most of the time, we do not 
guide action with visual consciousness. Instead, our brain encodes our motor acts due to 
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automatic processes, which can be then corrected or controlled82.  
           To sum up, the evidence reported in (§ 4.6) suggests that our dorsal stream 
cannot discriminate between depicted and real objects. I have said that the dorsal stream 
is activated for similar cues that pertain to both face-to-face perception and picture 
perception (§ 4.4) - the important point being that the distal source is presented, even 
though apparently, within the peripersonal space of the subject (§ 4.5). Therefore, these 
two kinds of perceptual states – face-to-face perception and the perception of a depicted 
object - are not very different. This could be due to the fact that the covariation of the 
same geometrical properties shared by an object in perspective in a picture and a real 
object in perspective lead to the same representation of action properties (cfr. with § 4.4); 
and this is possible because the dorsal system does not distinguish between the distal 
cause encoded, arguably because the AIP-F5 processing exhibits the same encoding in 
these different situations (cfr. with § 4.4), where the location – even - in the peripersonal 
space of the depicted object seems to be the only relevant thing for motor related effects 
to be represented. So, I think I have provided enough evidence to strengthen the main 
claim of this chapter.  
           But now a question arises: if what I’ve said is true, what does this imply for the 
dorsal/ventral account of picture perception I mentioned at the beginning of my 
chapter? I now want to clarify the compatibility of my claims with those of Nanay and 
Matthen. 
            We saw that, concerning the commitment about (b), two positions can be 
considered for Nanay’s account: the one in Nanay (2011a), and the one in Nanay (2015). 
Indeed, in his (2015) Nanay exposes his specifications for possible misunderstandings 
concerning (b) in relation to what he says in (2011). While in the (2011) one might 
understand (b) as being necessary – and this is the same position as defended by Matthen 
- in his (2015) he points out that (b) is not necessary in his account. My account is 
compatible with both positions, though the second one is the one we should prefer. 
           Concerning the first position from (2011), which is related to Matthen’s position, 
my account is compatible with the dorsal/ventral account, insofar as it establishes that 
those depicted objects which are perceived by the subject as apparently being in his 
egocentric space and as apparently reachable can be represented as having action 
properties. This idea does not violate - but follows - the intuition that dorsal perception 
is involved in egocentric encoding. Nor does it conflict with the claim that we cannot 
really egocentrically localize a depicted object as a normal one. Indeed, there is no 
conflict because the dorsal representation of depicted objects that are perceived by the 
subject as apparently located in his egocentric space is possibly due to the experimental 
settings fostering the apparent peripersonal localization of these objects which are 
perceived as apparently reachable, as well as due to the fact that dorsal perception cannot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Of course there are cases in which we guide action using visual consciousness. However, in most cases, 
dorsal perception does not attach much relative importance to contextual depth cues in situations in which 
action is extremely rapid or automatic (Briscoe 2009), which seems to be the usual scenario (Pacherie 
2007). But sometimes, when the dorsal stream’s preferred sources of spatial information are unavailable or 
when “there is time”, dorsal perception uses the outputs from ventral processing; thus, the process might 
be conscious (for a complete overview see Briscoe 2009: 441). Note that, at a first step, the visuomotor 
system processes a gist of the motor act suitable in the given situation regardless of the fact that, in a 
second step, this motor act will be automatically executed or inhibited, or consciously monitored or 
diverted, or irrespective of whether we actually guide action consciously or not. This doesn’t conflict with 
what I say in (§ 4.5; cfr. with 2.4.4) concerning different encodings (automatic/online) for the ventro-
dorsal and the dorso-dorsal stream.  
	  	  	  
70	  
discriminate between real and depicted objects.  
           If we do not endorse this explanation, all the sets of evidence from vision and 
motor neuroscience I have reported in (§§ 4.4, 4.6) remain unexplained under the 
dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. Keeping in mind the dorsal lack of 
discrimination is useful also for the notion of egocentric localization that Nanay offers in 
his (2011a): egocentric localization is “the ability to localize an object in one’s egocentric 
space” (Nanay 2011a: 468). However, as he specifies, this ability does not necessarily 
have to rely on the ability to interact with the object, even though this will be a good way 
of arguing for (b) - and thus (c). I agree that manipulation is not necessary in order to 
egocentrically localize an object. So, according to Nanay, in order to localize an object in 
one’s egocentric space, we have to be able to represent the distance between the 
perceived object and ourselves in some way and to have expectations about how this 
distance can change by moving closer to, or away from, the object” (p. 469). Once again, 
due to its computational inability, dorsal perception represents the depicted object and its 
action properties on the basis of its apparent location in the peripersonal space. Of 
course, this does not conflict with (c) (see also § 4.4), depending on whether dorsal 
perception is attuned to the surface or to the depicted object83.  
         For these reasons, my claim can be understood as a genuine (neuro)logical 
extension of the dorsal-ventral account, it being compatible with what I have said84.  
           Finally, concerning the second version according to which (b) is not necessary in 
Nanay’s account (2015), another way to read my chapter is considering it as an attempt 
to explain what happens when (b) is not the case. 
4.7 Conclusion of the Section 
I have suggested that dorsal perception can represent depicted objects as having action 
properties. Therefore, the reach of my proposal offers a crucial implication for the 
dorsal/ventral account of pictures, as well as for the debate on pictures in general. 
According to the accredited model, ventral perception can represent both the surface and 
the depicted object, but dorsal perception can represent only the surface (the picture 
vehicle), while it cannot represent the depicted object. But demonstrating, on my part, 
that also dorsal perception can represent the depicted object might entail a sort of 
closure of the circle85: both streams can represent both depicted objects (and their 
surfaces) and normal objects, in a very similar way86. This is suggested by the fact that, in 
the “eyes” of dorsal perception, they are almost the same distal target. But if those two 
streams are the total components of the visual system of humans (and other mammals), 
then our visual system functions in almost the same way in both picture perception and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 It has been claimed that, most of the time, when we look at pictures we ignore the surface (Levinson 
1998; Lopes 1996) and that we represent both the depicted object and some of the properties of the 
picture surface (while we may or may not attend to the surface) (I found this discussion in Nanay 2011a: 
463-464). 
84 I want to clarify that I am not arguing that it is not possible. I simply do not focus on this possibility.  
85 Crucial for this - and in line with this and with what I say in (§ 4.4) - evidence shows that action 
possibilities are not coded only by the dorsal stream, but by both visual pathways (Young 2006: 134; cfr. 
with my § 2.4). 
86 Although I have reported several differences, the point, with respect to the received view, is that also the 
dorsal stream can, in some way, encode depicted objects. 
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face-to-face perception87. Moreover, action properties are not properties that we can 
attribute only to normal objects.  This doesn’t mean, though, that face-to-face perception 
and picture perception are almost the same perceptual phenomenon; it means that they 
are more related than suggested by the dorsal/ventral account I am reviewing here. 
Moreover, a further advantage of my review is that it could be viewed as an extension of 
such account, while remaining within the same philosophical framework.  
           As argued in this chapter, both normal and depicted objects can be represented as 
offering action properties; thus, face-to-face perception and picture perception are not so 
different as concerns the visual system processing. Nevertheless, is indisputable that 
normal objects are perceived as present, at the visual level, in a way depicted objects 
cannot (Matthen 2010; Nanay 2015). According to the literature, depicted objects cannot 
foster the visual feeling of presence (FOP) because they cannot be represented in 
egocentric coordinates. The next chapter strengthens this idea, but aims to specify that 
egocentric localization is responsible for visual FOP because it is strictly linked to the 
perception of absolute depth cues that give rise to the most important aspect of visual 
FOP: qualitatively rich stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014) which is linked to the perception of 
the possibility of reliable motor interaction with the object we face with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The most important difference between face-to-face and picture perception is the impression of stereopsis, 
which is not possible in pictures, whose relative depth cues cannot be scaled in absolute depth cues, 
through which stereopsis is induced (see Vishwanath 2014). I cannot deal with this here.  
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5 Visual Feeling of Presence 	  
Our everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with real things we can interact 
with. I look at the glass on the table, the glass shows up in my visual experience as 
physically present in front of me, as really occupying a portion of the external 
environment; I literally feel the “outside” presence of that “real” physical object via visual 
perceptual experience. As Matthen (2010) observes, 
            “When I look down at my hands right now, it looks as if they are working on a 
black computer keyboard. There is something about my visual state that makes it seem as 
if the keyboard is really there, and that it is really black. (…) When I am relaxing in an 
armchair, I can close my eyes and summon up a fairly detailed and vivid image of my 
hands on a black keyboard. This state of visual imaging is different from my present 
visual state. It does not make it seem as if the keyboard is really there, nor that it ever 
was, or that it is really black. What is the difference between these two states? Why does 
the keyboard have (as I shall say) a feeling of presence in my present visual state, but not in 
the state of visual imaging?” (p. 107, 108) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  I shall avoid here the issue about the relationship between visual content and the 
content of visual imagery (see Nanay 2014a). Rather, the rationale of this chapter is that 
the visual feeling of presence (henceforth: FOP) is a crucial feature of vision that is 
largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision 
neuroscience (Seth 2014, 2015). Broadly speaking, the general literature on FOP deals 
with three main cases. The first concerns neurological disorders regarding “those 
situations in which someone experiences a powerful hallucination, not explicitly sensory 
at all, concerning the feeling of presence of someone or something nearby, a presence 
felt as malevolent or benign. This feeling is about the strong and irresistible conviction 
that someone is there” (Sacks 2012: Chap. 15). Since I am interested in visual FOP, we 
can skip this case. Another case concerns the dissociations between face identification 
and the FOP of a familiar person despite recognizing his/her face (Dokic 2010). 
However, this case involves other non-visual features such emotions, familiarity and 
memory and thus I shall bypass this case as well. Hence, I think the best candidate88 for 
an investigation about the nature of visual FOP is the remaining case, namely, the debate 
on picture perception, where it is widely agreed that, although depicted objects foster in 
the onlookeers a sort of visual experience similar to that obtained in face-to-face 
perception (Kulvicki 2014; Nanay 2010b, but see also 2011a; Lopes 2005; Wollheim 
2003; Berger 2011), they cannot foster any FOP (Nanay 2015), or at least not as much as 
real objects can89: they show up as not present (Noë 2012: 84), involving a distinct 
presence-in-absence structure (p. 86), while face-to-face experience is comparable to 
touching the object (p. 87). A good and novel strategy in order to find out what makes 
real objects really present to us is the investigation of the nature of such difference 
concerning this FOP that we have in face-to-face perception and that we cannot gain 
from the perception of depicted objects.  
               The aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate the way we entertain this 
FOP with external objects, which we cannot entertain with depicted objects. I will 
suggest that FOP depends on the perception of egocentric absolute depth cues giving 
rise to a peculiar visual feature linked to FOP: qualitatively rich stereopsis. Since we have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 I do not mention here the case of visual imagery, or amodal completion (see Briscoe 2011; Nanay 
2010a). 
89 It is one thing is to say that face-to-face perception and the perception of depicted objects do not foster 
the same FOP, it is another to say that picture perception cannot foster FOP at all (see § 5.6). 
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no account about the nature of visual FOP, my chapter constitutes a genuinely novel 
proposal. Indeed, to my knowledge, the only one who has talked about the difference 
between FOP in normal objects and that in pictures is Matthen (2005, 2010), although 
many others have commented on this attempt (Noë 2012; Fridland 2012; Dokic 2010; 
Nanay 2015). However, Matthen is interested in the semantic significance of FOP and 
not in the conditions under which our visual system certifies something as present/real 
(2010: 107-108), which is my specific interest here.  
             In the first part of the chapter, I explain the perceptual nature of visual FOP (§ 
5.1). I suggest that FOP depends on the perception of absolute depth cues giving rise to 
a peculiar visual feature of FOP: qualitatively rich stereopsis (§ 5.2) - I have to point out 
that here I follow the notion of stereopsis developed by Vishwanath and colleagues (see 
Vishwanath 2014), who offered the most recent theory of stereopsis in the literature of 
vision science; I show that FOP about the picture vehicle/surface hinders the FOP 
about the depicted object (§ 5.3). I also suggest that egocentric depth is linked to the 
observer’s knowledge of the depth relations scaled in a meaningful way to the observer’s 
motor action space (§ 5.4). I report the links between the 
neurophysiological/psychophysics level and the phenomenological level concerning 
visual FOP (§ 5.5) and offer some important remarks about the experimental evidence I 
use for my theory (§ 5.6). Finally, in (§ 5.7) I frame the debate on visual FOP in the 
empirical framework of the TVSM, insofar as the debate on vision generally follows this 
model. Thus, I address the neural correlates of FOP with respect to the TVSM. 
5.1 FOP and its Perceptual Cues 
I start here from the widely agreed empirical evidence that, while we can get an 
unambiguous perception of depth and 3-D structure during monocular perception or 
during the visual perception of a pictorial image of a 3-D scene (Koenderink and van 
Doorn 2003; Koenderink, van Doorn and Wagemans 2011; Vishwanath, Girshick and 
Banks 2005; quoted in Vishwanath 2014: 154; Vishwanath 2010, 2014; Albertazzi et al. 
2010), face-to-face binocular perception of depth is qualitatively different from any other 
visual situation. This difference is due to the vivid impression of tangible solid form and 
immersive negative space, namely, stereoscopic vision, or stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014: 
151, 154, 156, 159, 171). From this definition, it is easy to understand that stereopsis 
deals with the visual features we engage with when we experience visual FOP: presence 
of stereopsis means presence of FOP90. In other words, if we want to look for a 
description of FOP, we need to investigate the nature of the visual attribute that leads 
our visual system to “establish” that a thing is real. Stereopsis is the best candidate for 
defining this visual attribute. Accordingly, we have to consider our most recent theory 
about stereopsis, which is able to collect all recent data from vision neuroscience. Here, 
in order to explain the nature of FOP, I follow the most recent account on stereopsis, 
which is proposed by Vishwanath and colleagues (see Vishwanath 2014). 
5.2 Stereoscopic Vision 
 
Following to the most recent theory of stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014), which is based on 
the Absolute Depth Scaling Hypothesis, the perception of 3-D structure depends only on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90  The fact that we perceive a “real” external reality due to stereopsis is uncontroversial in the 
neuroscientific literature (Kandel et al. 2013). However, defining the visual process through which we 
reach stereopsis is another issue (see my § 5.6) and using this account to explain FOP is something 
neuroscience seems not to care about. 
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relative depth estimates, while the impression of stereopsis depends on the perception of 
egocentric absolute depth values (p. 155). Relative depth concerns the fact that an observer 
understands the metric relative to depth relations within and among objects (3D surface 
shape, surface slant, depth order, etc.) and the ratios of distances or depths among points 
in the visual field - in the example of Vishwanath (2010: 222). Egocentric absolute depth 
concerns the fact that the observer understands the depth relations scaled in some 
meaningful way to his/her own actions (egocentrically scaled depth separation). 
Stereopsis is primarily based on the relation between the vivid impression of solid object 
shape and the impression of a palpable invisible negative space between objects, both 
responsible for the impression of “real separation” between points in depth, either within 
an object (perception of solid shape) or between objects (the impression of a palpable 
invisible space). This impression of ‘real separation in depth’ varies as a function of the 
precision of absolute depth estimates. 
            Crucially, relative depth (3D surface shape, slant, depth order) and absolute 
(egocentric) depth are separate, dissociable perceptual constructs, from both a 
phenomenal and a psychophysical standpoint, insofar as they differ concerning the cue-
combination. Indeed, depth cues only provide relative depth information that has to be 
scaled by egocentric distance information to derive absolute depth (Vishwanath 2014: 
154). What is important here is that this visual scaling is not possible in picture 
perception, insofar as pictures permit us to perceive only relative depth cues. Indeed, 
since we can perceive metric relative depth structure (3-D object shape and layout) in 
conditions that fail to induce stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014: 171), we can thus perceive 
relative depth when looking at depicted objects, even though, without distance 
information, these cues cannot be scaled to derive absolute depth or size (Vishwanath 
2014: 158-159): distance signals such as vergence, accommodation and so on specify 
distance from the picture surface and not from its pictorial contents (p. 224 for a review).  
             To sum up, pictures and real scenes differ in terms of the presence of stereopsis, 
insofar as the impression of real separation in depth varies as a function of the precision 
of absolute depth estimates and the value of this function is null when we perceive 
depicted objects (p. 170-171). During binocular picture perception no combination of 
retinal or extra-retinal information can specify the absolute depth separation between 
objects in the pictorial scene (Vishwanath 2014: 158) and thus we lack the sense of an 
immersive negative space between them. More importantly, there is no optical distance 
cue specifying the distance of pictorial objects from the onlooker, who lacks the 
egocentric, viewer-relative locations of its objects (Vishwanath 2014: 158; Vishwanath 
2010: 202-206) and the vivid impression of tangible solid form, which is possible in 
ordinary seeing (Vishwanath 2010: 223-224; Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013). Thus, we 
lack FOP 
             This idea that FOP depends on the perception of egocentric absolute depth is 
perfectly compatible with Matthen’s account (see 2005: 315-316; 2010).  
5.3 Surfaces 
Another crucial reason why FOP is not experienced with pictures is that surface 
invisibility plays a role in the induction of stereopsis (Vishwanath 2014: 164): FOP about 
the picture vehicle/surface hinders the FOP about the depicted object (Vishwanath 
2014: 158-175): “in the absence of visible picture surfaces, the brain attributes the 
accommodation response to the pictorial objects, and assigns any associated distance 
information to them, allowing absolute depth values to be derived: viewing conditions 
yielding only a partial reduction in surface visibility results in a greater variability in the 
assignment of distance information to the pictorial objects and a correspondingly 
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reduced sense of stereopsis” (Vishwanath 2014: 159-160). So, the relation between 
surface perception and the perception of the depicted object is crucial:  when the picture 
surface is not visible, distance information is assigned to the pictorial object allowing a 
derivation of size and absolute depth values (I do not want to venture into technical 
details, see Vishwanath 2014: 160). In other words, the fact that we perceive the pictorial 
surface, leads to the lack of the impression of FOP during picture perception. Since, 
unlike experimental conditions with different settings built ad hoc for the experiments (see 
§ 5.6), during ordinary seeing we always perceptually represent the picture surface, then 
we never run into FOP with pictures. This seems to be a form of inflection, that is to say 
the phenomenon according to which some of the visual features of the picture’s vehicle 
are relevant in characterizing features of the picture’s subject (as seen in that vehicle) 
(Voltolini 2013; Nanay 2005). This deals with the twofoldness of pictorial perception 
(seeing-in), namely, the fact that our visual system perceptually represents both the 
surface/vehicle of the picture and the depicted object (Wollheim 1998; Nanay 2005, 
2011), something uncontroversial in the debate on pictures (for an analysis of the nature 
of the visual representations involved in seeing-in see Nanay 2011: 462-464; Lopes 2005: 
Chap. 1) - I’ll be back to this point in (§ 5.7). 
5.4 Presence in Motor Space 
An important point linked with what I have said above is that we perceive the objects in 
the external environment as affording motor interaction, an impression that pictorial 
objects cannot foster (but see § 5.7). This is because absolute depth perception linked to 
stereopsis concerns the observer’s perception of the depth relations and spatial 
parameter scaled in a meaningful way for potential motor interaction, while relative 
depth perception only relates to the capacity to visually match the 3-D shapes of objects 
(Vishwanath 2014: 174; Vishwanath 2010: 232). There is, indeed, significant evidence 
that stereopsis is important for visually-guided grasping (Watt and Bradshaw 2003) – this 
is in line with Matthen’s idea (2005, 2010) of a link between FOP, egocentric localization 
and the perception of action possibilities.  
5.5 Phenomenological Reports 
We have also experimental results showing that the phenomenological reports 
concerning the impression of stereopsis in different experimental settings are in line with 
the results I have reported in the previous sections (cfr. with § 5.6). Naïve and expert 
observers alike suggest that stereopsis is associated with several specific qualitative 
characteristics. First, a sense of real separation in depth between points on an object or 
between objects themselves; the former yields the visual impression of ‘solidity’, the 
latter the impression of a ‘real’ negative space; second, a sense of clarity and visual 
sharpness, which does not depend on depth, and which leads to a more enhanced 
impression of color (variation) and material qualities (glossiness, shininess, roughness 
etc.); third, a sense of tangibility (impression of the manipulability of a material object) 
and of spatial immersion (impression of the capacity to move through a palpable 
negative space) (Vishwanath 2014: 174; Barry 2009; Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013). 
These three features realize a vivid sense of protrusion in which a tangible solid object 
reaches or looms out through the negative space toward the observer. These features 
give us the sense of ‘reality’ linked to binocular stereopsis, often called the “plastic 
effect” (see Vishwanath 2010: 224, 225; Vishwanath and Hibbard 2010), related to a 
sense of capacity to interact with real objects in a 3-D space; this is precisely the effect 
FOP gives us.  
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An important thing: we saw that FOP is massively linked to motor space. It’s not by 
chance that the strongest plastic effect is found within the (peri)personal action space, while 
it diminishes going beyond this space into distant space (vista space), which fosters little or 
no perceptible plastic effect: observers comment on how distant landscapes often appear 
“pictorial” (Vishwanath 2010: 228, 225) - this has been claimed by Matthen as well (2005: 
322). This is because the reliability of sources of egocentric distance information and 
absolute depth estimation relying on distance estimates (vergence, accommodation, 
disparity) reduces when distance increases (Vishwanath 2010: 225). For the same reason, 
we have a complete absence of the plastic effect in the binocular viewing of pictures, in 
which, as said, absolute scaling is impossible (Vishwanath 2010: 227). I think that, beside 
the neuroscientific accounts, everybody - I refer to healthy individuals - realizes that a 
depicted glass of water cannot induce in our visual experience the same FOP that a real 
glass solicits in us.  
             These results suggest that there are so many differences, between face-to-face 
seeing and picture seeing, at a perceptual level, concerning those necessary perceptual 
cues FOP relies on (stereopsis, egocentric depth estimates and the plastic effect), that we 
do not need to invoke further mental states in order to establish their difference in terms 
of FOP. An important implication of this view is that, differently from the widely agreed 
idea that feelings are metacognitive or cognitive states to be attached to a perceptual state 
(Matthen 2010, Martin and Dokic 2013; Dokic 2012), FOP is just the result of a 
perceptual state: real-scene vision is actuality-committing (this expression is from 
Matthen 2010: 3), in a way that picture seeing is not insofar as it has access to this 
perceptual stereoscopic information that only normal objects can provide our visual 
system with and that we cannot gain from depicted objects. Thus, I continue to talk 
about a “feeling” and not about a “perception” of presence, just for the sake of 
continuity with the philosophical literature. This feeling is not something to attach to a 
perceptual state. 
5.6 An Important Remark about the Experimental Results concerning 
Stereopsis  
For coherence with the results in vision science provided by Vishwanath account, I shall 
now specify important implications about this theory of stereopsis I have mentioned. It 
is widely agreed that, in binocular visual perception, different views of the object are 
simultaneously seen with each eye (binocular parallax) and, during self-motion, different 
views of the object or scene are seen in temporal sequence (motion parallax): 
simultaneous or successive presentation of different perspectives of an object (visual 
parallax) are usually responsible for stereopsis (I rephrase Vishwanath 2014: 152). 
Against the common view that stereopsis emerges from binocular disparity, or at least 
from motion parallax, this theory claims that monocular stereopsis - and the related 
plastic effect – is possible and can be induced by reducing the factors responsible for the 
visibility (perceptual representation), of the picture surface (Vishwanath 2014: 158) (cfr. 
with my § 5.3), for example, when absolute depth scaling is made possible in picture 
while monocularly viewing a picture through an aperture91 (Vishwanath 2014: 160; for a 
review see Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013). This implies that, contrarily to what is 
believed, stereopsis is not a by-product of binocular vision (Ponce and Born 2008) and 
that we should distinguish between binocular depth perception (the capacity to perceive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Blur gradients can induce stereopsis in different not experimental situations that go far beyond ordinary 
seeing, such as with monocular viewing or even if when surface visibility is present (Vishwanath 2010: 
227). 
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quantitative depth relations using the visual information from two eyes) and stereopsis 
(qualitative vividness of depth that is often obtained as a result of this capacity) 
(Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013). Indeed, “stereopsis from binocular image pairs with 
disparity should be significantly stronger than monocular stereopsis (viewing through an 
aperture), not because disparity is the main cue for the impression of stereopsis but 
because disparity can be scaled by binocular convergence, which is a more reliable 
distance cue than accommodation (Howard & Rogers 2002), and should yield a more 
precise estimate of absolute depth” (Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013: 1684). This implies 
that the distinction concerning stereopsis is not between pictorial and real space, but 
between relative and egocentrically scaled depth, insofar as the latter can be reliably 
present or absent in pictures and real scenes depending on the available egocentric 
distance information (I have rephrased Vishwanath 2010: 230; see also p. 226; see also 
Vishwanath 2007, 2008; Mausfeld 2003). Indeed, the distinction between relative and 
absolute depth perception depends on the differences in depth perception between 
pictures and real objects, monocular and binocular viewing, and vista space and 
peripersonal-action space (Vishwanath 2010, 2014). This undermines the idea that, in 
absolute, either we entertain with FOP, or we do not and there are no middle states. 
Indeed, depth relief of stereopsis decreases in the following order: binocular viewing of a 
real or stereoscopic images of the object; monocular viewing of a picture or monocular 
viewing of a real object; binocular viewing of a picture. This is the rank of the reports 
about reduced impression of stereopsis given by participants in the experimental settings 
(see Vishwanath 2014: 173). The perception of relative depth (3D surface shape, slant, 
layout) during picture seeing (monocularly or binocularly) is more or less veridical although it 
may not be metrical in the absolute sense” (Vishwanath 2010:  223). Veridical means that the 
perception of the relative depth in a picture is more or less the same we see during 
binocular vision of real objects (p. 223). The same holds for monocular vision of a real 
object (p. 224). From this evidence it follows that, if FOP depends on (the degrees of) 
stereopsis, then FOP can come in degrees as well, with respect to the visual situations we 
are dealing with in different experimental settings - an analysis of ordinary seeing follows 
what I have said all along (§ 5.1). The reason why I do not need to take into account this 
fact is that stereopsis is possible in pictures due to particular experimental settings we 
cannot be in in everyday life. But my investigation here is about the difference in 
stereopsis and FOP concerning two ordinary cases92: binocular face-to-face seeing and 
binocular picture seeing. Therefore, the fact that the real nature of stereopsis does not 
depend on binocular seeing, insofar as it can be fostered in particular situations 
concerning monocular viewing of pictures we never deal with in ordinary life scenarios is 
not relevant for the purpose of this chapter. It would be interesting to investigate FOP 
taking into account the real nature of stereopsis, through different experimental settings, 
following the philosophical implications of this new theory of stereopsis. But this is not 
the place to do so. 
          To sum up, an important consequence of this evidence is that FOP is not 
necessarily attributed to real objects only. Indeed, the explanation I endorse - that our 
visual system “defines” an object as being really there only when particular cues are 
perceivable – is able to explain why it is possible for us to perceive the cues necessary for 
FOP also during picture seeing, but in particular experimental settings, which are far 
from our ordinary situations in everyday life. So, my explanation has the advantage of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This focus on ordinary seeing is unproblematic. Even Matthen’s claim is about veridical perceptual 
situations and is that normal scene vision is actuality-committing while pictorial vision is not (2010: 15, 19); 
thus, Matthen’s idea is about ordinary, everyday life visual states (2010: 14), without considering illusions, 
imagery, dreaming, hallucinations, etc. - the same holds for Martin and Dokic (2013).  
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establishing the difference between picture and face-to-face ordinary (binocular) seeing, 
while remaining also compatible with this evidence that goes beyond ordinary seeing and 
considers the possibility of FOP for pictures. However, as said, here I am interested in 
the difference, concerning visual FOP, between binocular picture seeing and binocular 
face-to-face seeing. 
5.7 FOP and the TVSM 
Now, since the debate on vision – as well as the debate on picture perception (see Nanay 
2011a, 2015) - is framed in the TVSM, the relation between visual FOP and the TVSM 
needs to be addressed.  
             As seen in chapter 2 and chapter 4, the TVSM suggests a twofold anatomo-
functional dissociation of the visual pathways (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006): a ventral 
stream responsible for identification and recognition, allowing us to perceive from an 
allocentric frame of reference, and a dorsal stream is involved in guiding action, allowing 
us to perceive from an egocentric frame of reference (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). 
Usually, ventral perception is taken to constitute the mark of conscious vision, while 
dorsal perception remains completely subpersonal. Indeed, the streams can be 
dissociated due to cortical lesions. Lesions in the dorsal stream (the occipito-parietal 
network from the primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal cortex) impair one’s 
ability to use what one sees to guide action (optic ataxia), but not object recognition; 
lesions in the ventral stream (the occipito-temporal network from the primary visual 
cortex to the infertemporal cortex) impair one’s ability to recognize things in the visual 
world (visual agnosia), but not action guidance (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). Moreover, 
we have behavioral studies of normal subjects involving visual illusions that can deceive 
the ventral stream but not the dorsal one; thus, it seems that, contrarily to ventral 
perception, dorsal perception is completely impenetrable by consciousness (Bruno and 
Battaglini 2008; McIntosh and Schenk 2009).  
                      Here I place my account on visual FOP in relation to the framework given 
by the TVSM in vision neuroscience by explaining the relation between FOP and the 
neural coordinates the TVSM relies on. Of course, I do not take my explanation to be 
complete for neuroscience: it only aims to give a sketch of what is the crucial relation 
between FOP and the two streams, which turns out to be very important for a 
philosophical theory of visual FOP that is based on empirical results. Of course, I do not 
take my explanation to be complete for neuroscience: it only aims to give a sketch of 
what probably is the relation between FOP and the two streams. I argue that FOP 
depends on interstream interaction: ventral perception is crucial for high perceptual 
reconstruction, while dorsal perception is crucial for visuomotor perception; two 
processes - as we saw in this chapter - crucial for FOP.  
             First of all, as explained in the previous chapters, we know that dorsal 
perception is the one crucially involved in constructing visuomotor representations for 
suitable motor interaction. However, we also know, as shown in (§§ 2.5, 4.6), that dorsal 
perception is sensitive, to some extent, to depth cues apparently exhibited by depicted 
objects (Gonzalez et al. 2008; Berryhill and Olson 2009; Marotta and Goodale 2001; 
Taira et al. 2000; Tsutsui et al. 2002, 2005; James et al. 2002, Sakata et al. 2003; Nelissen 
et al. 2009; Chinellato and del Pobil 2015) and seems to discriminate between images of 
depicted graspable and non-graspable objects (Rice et al. 2007). However, as we saw in (§ 
5.1), all those 3-D depth cues are not sufficient for stereopsis and visual FOP. So, even if 
dorsal perception is the one involved in egocentric localization (Milner and Goodale 
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2006), it cannot be, alone, responsible for FOP. Consider also that dorsal perception 
cannot discern between real graspable objects and graspable objects in pictures, insofar 
as dorsal perception cannot construct a complete 3D structural description of the target 
object (Westwood et al. 2002), which is, nonetheless, necessary for response selection, in 
order to detect the action afforded by an object, or in the case of pictures, to understand 
that there is no possible interaction93. Accordingly, ventral perception plays a key role in 
object recognition (Turnbull, Driver and Mcarthy 2004; Kravitz et al. 2013) and response 
selection, distinguishing between 3D objects and 2D images of objects by detecting 
conflict between various visual cues 94  and selecting different visuomotor strategies 
encoded by dorsal perception, concerning whether we are dealing with a 2D image or a 
3D object. That is, ventral perception is the one able to perceive qualitative visual 
features in order to construct complete volumetric representations of objects (for a 
review see Westwood et al. 2002)95 – and this is really important, if we do not want to 
attempt to reach for non-graspable objects, risking to hit a wall – (see chapter 4). All this 
is a starting point to suggest an interstream interplay in order to obtain FOP: dorsal 
perception for the computation of motor action in an egocentric coordinates and ventral 
perception for high resolution volumetric reconstruction and response selection.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Accordingly, from chapter 4 we know that	   the same dorsal representations 
active when we look at manipulable objects are active for depicted objects as well. Recall 
that, indeed, several portions of the ventro-dorsal stream, which is the crucial cortical 
portion of the dorsal stream involved in the transformation of intrinsic object properties 
into action properties with the consequent translation of those properties in suitable 
motor acts, are activated during picture perception: F5 in the most rostral part of the 
ventral premotor cortex (Chao and Martin 2000; see also Buccino et al. 2009; Costantini 
et al. 2010; Proverbio et al. 2011; Grezes and Decety 2002; for a review see Zipoli 
Caiani 2013), parietal neurons in the dorsal stream and the anterior intraparietal area 
(AIP) (Romero et al. 2014; Pani et al. 2014). Therefore, the ventral premotor cortex, 
which is an end-stage projection of the dorsal stream, is highly selective for manipulable 
objects observation with respect to non-manipulable objects (Gerlach et al. 2002; 
Kellenbach et al. 2003). As explained in (§ 4.5), this is likely to happen when the depicted 
object is apparently presented in the peripersonal space of the observer and is apparently 
reachable. 
           Of course, this does not mean that we consciously perceive depicted objects as 
affording a real possibility of action, but only that dorsal perception responds to those 
similar geometrical patterns exhibited by depicted objects, that usually instantiate the 
arrangement of an action property in a normal object – (for a review see §§ 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6)96. This evidence that dorsal perception responds to depicted objects undermines the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Volumetric object representation is necessary for the visual control of grip formation and response 
selection, to ensure that we do not attempt to reach for objects that cannot be grasped. 
94 It is computationally efficient for one visual system to handle both response selection and object 
recognition: both require complete/detailed information about 3D object structure (Goodale and Milner 
1992). 
95 For the difference between shape perception and volumetric object recognition, which is crucial here in 
the light of what I said in (§ 5.1) see (Briscoe 2008). 
96 Note that, in line with what I have said in  (§ 4.5), dorsal response to depicted objects is active only when 
the surface of the depicted object is presented within the peripersonal space of the observer (Costantini et 
al. 2010; Cardellicchio et al. 2011). This is arguably because, as said, dorsal perception cannot distinguish 
between normal and depicted objects, and then responds to those objects apparently presented within the 
peripersonal space of the observer, regardless of the real nature of the distal target - (for a review see §§ 
4.4). This confirms the idea – expressed in (§§ 2.3.3, 4.5) - that the possibility of interaction and 
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possibility that FOP depends on dorsal perception only: if dorsal perception is involved 
in the representation of both depicted and normal objects, and if FOP is experienced 
only in the case of (binocular) perception of normal objects, but not in the case of 
(binocular) perception of normal pictures, dorsal perception cannot be the particular 
perceptual state responsible for the visual FOP.  All this is in accordance with what I 
have said in (§ 5.4). Indeed, when it comes to conscious visual perception of normal 
objects, we need both dorsal perception constructing visuomotor representations for 
interaction and ventral perception selecting the real object in the environment by 
performing the response selection. In accordance with all what I said, we know that the 
conscious egocentric localization linked to the conscious perception of possibility of 
motor interaction – crucial for FOP - is due to interstream interaction (Briscoe 2009: 
6.1–6.4), insofar as dorsal perception can have ready access to sources of spatial content 
in the ventral stream and makes use of contextual depth cues and other sources of 3-D 
spatial information in the ventral stream – for a complete overview about the neural 
processing concerning the interaction between the visual representations involved in 
stereoscopic perception and the MRs allowing us to interact with the environment see 
(Chinellato and del Pobil 2015, Romero et al. 2013, Theys et al. 2015). 
            Finally, the dependence of FOP on both streams is suggested by the fact that 
dorsal lesions produce deficits in the conscious awareness of the quality of objects 
presented within peripersonal space (Gallese 2007) and that the ventro-dorsal stream, 
(related to the inferior parietal lobule), which is the most ventral portion of the dorsal 
stream, engaging in several interconnections with the ventral stream (see Fogassi and 
Luppino 2005), is crucial for visual awareness and information specified in egocentric 
coordinates that requires higher ventral processing (Gallese 2007; Jacob and Jeannerod 
2003: 252–255; Brogaard 2011: 1094). Also, while dorsal processing alone is not 
responsible for visual consciousness, given all the visual cues it cannot have access to, 
ventral processing is not sufficient to obtain perception without parietal spatial 
processing, nor can it encode motor interaction without dorsal processing (Rizzolatti and 
Matelli 2003) - this explains the interplay of both streams and the related interplay, 
expressed above, of the response selection and of the visuomotor encoding - for a review 
of these experimental results see above (§ 2.4.5). In turn, this suggests that FOP is a 
result of the interaction between the streams.  
             Of course, from what I said in chapter 2, especially (§ 2.4), my point about 
interstream interactions is not problematic, insofar as it has been shown, going beyond 
the TVSM, that any sophisticated visual behavior – a fortiori, two complex visual 
processes like stereopsis and FOP - requires collaboration between both streams at every 
stage of the process (Schenk and McIntosh, 2010; Kravitz et al. 2011, 2013; Deco et al. 
2004; Grill-Spector et al. 2001; Gallese et al. 1999; Gallese 2007: 1). Accordingly, recall 
that several chunks of the dorsal stream are interconnected with inferotemporal areas 
(TEm, TE and TEO) of the ventral stream and the visuomotor transformations of 
objects properties in motor commands rely on the analysis of both physical properties 
(pragmatic analysis) and object identity (semantic analysis) (see Fogassi and Luppino 
2005, Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003 and Gallese 2007; Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia 2008: 36-38; 
Cisek 2007; Kandel et al. 2013: Chap. 19) – for a review see (§§ 2.4.1, 2.4.3). 
             Summing up, several empirical arguments exclude that FOP depends on the 
activity of a singular stream, insofar as a lot of cues that FOP depends on cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
peripersonal encoding march in step (see Turella and Lignau 2014), but, an important point, in the case of 
dorsal perception only, they are due to subpersonal processing - (for a review see §§ 4.5, 4.6). 
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processed only by a singular stream. On the one hand, ventral perception, with its 
response selection and volumetric reconstruction, is crucial for FOP, which depends on 
the high perceptual resolution linked to stereopsis and absolute depth cues – and, indeed, 
the ventral stream goes from the primary visual cortex V1 until the inferotemporal 
cortex, a crucial pathway where the highest informational processing about qualitative 
rich visual cues are computed; on the other hand, dorsal perception, is crucial in 
encoding visually guided action performance in egocentric coordinates. In line with a 
recent proposal by Briscoe (2009), it is interstream interaction that allows visual 
experience to represent 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of 
reference and in order to gain a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual 
experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions.  
           A particular point for a theory of FOP needs to be considered here. Sometimes 
we have the chance of being deceived by trompe l’oeil pictures for a moment, and thus 
we experience FOP.  
          Some authors do not consider trompe l’oeil pictures as a genuine case of pictures 
(Wollheim 1987, 1998; for a discussion see Nanay 2015, Voltolini 2013; Hecht et al. 
2003), and even those who underlined the impressive sense of reality fostered by them 
(and even by other non trompe l’oeil paintings) argued that pictures foster “blind” 
visuomotor experiences, corresponding not to actual movements, but to “virtual” 
movements internal to acts of perception, even though the subject perceives a full sense 
of the physicality of things (Smith 2014: 102). However, while some claimed (Wollheim 
1987, 1998) that trompe l’oeil paintings are not pictures because they do not fall under 
the visual phenomenon of seeing-in, or two-foldness, which is the perceptual mark of 
figurativity - what makes a representation pictorial (see Voltolini 2013: Sec. 2; Lopes 
2005 pp. 34-36; see also Nanay 2005, 2010b) - it has been suggested that this argument 
might be undermined (see Feagin 1998: Sec. 2; Levinson 1998; see also Nanay 2011a: 
footnote 11). Stepping back from this debate, what is important for the point I am 
discussing here is that it is widely agreed that, even though for just a moment, we are in 
fact fooled by trompe l’oeil paintings (see Lopes 2005, in particular Sec. 1). So, I endorse 
that trompe l’oeil pictures foster in us the FOP for a while, until we are not able to 
recognize that they are pictures and not real scenes insofar as our visual system is 
temporally fooled. For this reason, I have to account for this special kind of picture 
rather than avoiding this point by arguing that tromp l’oeil pictures are not actually 
pictures. Accordingly, the FOP experienced during the perception of trompe l’oeil 
pictures can be taken into account in my theory.  
          First, I already said that particular experimental settings given by particular pictures 
are able to foster FOP; this leads me to consider the case of trompe l’oeil as one of the 
particular cases reported above concerning particular pictures. Furthermore, I said that 
experimental evidence does not show that pictures - even normal pictures - cannot 
induce stereopsis and FOP, but just that, in ordinary visual experience, that is, without 
particular kinds of pictures and/or experimental settings, real objects can give us access 
to absolute depth cues that pictures cannot offer. This is not in conflict with the fact that 
trompe l’oeil pictures, in their quality as special kinds of pictures, are able to foster in us, 
even if just for a while, the impression of the possibility of absolute depth scaling of the 
depicted object, which is a crucial feature in order to obtain stereopsis: this is in line with 
the idea by Nanay that, when we look at trompe l’oeil pictures we do (mistakenly) 
represent the depicted object as having a spatial location in our egocentric space (2015: 
194; see also Lopes 2005), or, in the expression I used above, we have the impression of 
an absolute depth scaling. This depends on the fact that we have, for a moment, no 
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recognition of the picture surface (see my § 5.3), as commonly suggested in the 
philosophical literature (Lopes 2005: 35-36; see also Voltolini 2013; a good review is 
offered by Hecht et al. 2003), presumably because the chunks of our visual system 
involved in high recognition - which are mostly, but not exclusively, linked to ventral 
vision, insofar as ventral vision is, as said, highly interconnected with the dorsal one - are 
not attuned to the surface in this perceptual situation (see the related empirical point in 
my § 5.3), in accordance with the argument given by Nanay (2015: 194). All this is in line 
with my view that, with respect to the TVSM, FOP depends on interstream interactions, 
insofar as when entertained with FOP - and with the perception of the possibility of 
reliable motor interaction (which, in the case of pictures, is only apparent) - we dorsally 
as well as ventrally represent the object, even in the case of a depicted object as a trompe 
l‘oeil picture (Nanay 2015: 194) - however, since dorsal perception represents even 
normal (that is, non trompe l’oeil) depicted objects, what I take to be peculiar of the 
occurrence of FOP in the case of trompe l’oeil pictures is the missing representation of 
the surface; I would like to be clear on the fact that we should avoid the idea that the 
difference concerning the occurrence of FOP between binocular viewing of trompe l’oeil 
pictures and binocular viewing of normal pictures is given by the fact that – in addition 
to the lack of the recognition of the surface - the dorsal component (the visuomotor 
system) comes into play in the case of trompe l’oeil, while it was not active with normal 
depicted objects; indeed, as said – and this is a crucial point here – the dorsal visual 
processing is always responsive to depicted objects, because it cannot distinguish 
between a normal and a depicted object; therefore, maintaining that the dorsal response 
is important for FOP, my idea is that FOP depends on the fact, I mentioned above, that 
we (the processing in our visual brain subserving high level visual object recognition, see 
above) cannot properly represent the picture surface (see my § 5.3).  
          All I said is perfectly compatible with the idea that the perception of reliable motor 
interaction is not only due to dorsal vision, but to the dorsal/ventral interplay: if ventral 
vision is not representing the surface, it is likely that the response selection, which is due 
to ventral vision, is triggered, because the trompe l’oeil depicted object is not perceived 
as such and, as said, the subject (her/his visual system) “has the impression” of the 
possibility of absolute depth scaling of the depicted object, which is a crucial feature in 
order to obtain stereopsis; thus, while, on the one hand, dorsal vision cannot distinguish 
between normal and depicted objects, on the other hand, in the case of trompe l’oeil 
depicted objects, even ventral vision cannot “realize” - even though for just a moment - 
that we are dealing with a picture and, thus, it triggers response selection. Note that, as 
said in (§§ 2.5, 4.6), the response selection is linked to the motor act we want perform, 
which is stored in the quiver of the visuomotor system due to the dorsal response, even 
before that ventral vision has computed whether the object is “real” or not. Indeed, 
following what I said in (§§ 2.5, 4.6), before ventral volumetric reconstruction a motor 
act computed on the basis of the 2-D geometrical properties of the target is already 
stored in our motor quiver, regardless of the fact that actual overt interaction will follow. 
However, in the case of trompe l’oeil depicted objects, the perception of the possibility 
of motor performance, which is due to the complex dorsal/ventral interplay I described 
here, is the result of the momentary illusory impression of the possibility of absolute 
depth scaling of the depicted object. But, still, we have to bear in mind that, even normal 
pictures can foster FOP in particular experimental settings. Indeed, my general claim is 
that the impression of FOP can be fostered by particular pictures, as well as normal 
pictures in particular experimental settings, but that, in ordinary visual scenarios, that is, 
in ordinary binocular seeing of normal (non trompe l’oeil) pictures – even when the 
picture is in the peripersonal space of the onlooker – and in binocular seeing of normal 
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objects, the difference between (usual, non trompe l'oeil) picture perception and face-to-
face perception is the possibility of stereoscopic perception of absolute egocentric depth 
scaling, which is possible with normal objects in a way it is not with pictures. This seems 
to be in line with the insights of the philosophical accounts of picture perception about 
tromp l’oeil pictures (Lopes 2005; see also Voltolini 2013; Feagin 1998; Levinson 1998) 
as well as with the analysis of the behavior of our visual system(s) during picture 
perception (Nanay 2011a), coming from our best attempt to reconcile the neuroscientific 
knowledge about pictures with that of the philosophical literature (Nanay 2015; I cannot 
review all the literature here, but see Rogers 2003; Niederée and Heyer 2003; Koenderink 
and van Doorn 2003; Mausfeld 2003; Cutting 2003; Hecht et al. 2003). 
            Finally, it is worth noting that my account is not in conflict with that of Matthen. 
Matthen holds that egocentric localization - and the related perception of reliable motor 
interaction - is responsible for FOP, and this is in line with what I said in (§ 5.1). Also, 
for Matthen it is motion-guiding vision that is responsible for FOP, egocentric 
localization and the perception of the possibility of motor interaction. For him motion-
guiding vision denotes the ensemble of the functional visual processes allowing motor 
interaction. The fact that for him FOP depends on motion-guiding vision is not a 
problem here, if we assume that motion-guiding vision is the result of interstream 
functional interaction. And this is possible because he talks about, respectively, 
descriptive vision and motion-guiding vision and he clearly specifies that he is not 
concerned with the anatomical details of these data-streams, but only with a broad 
functional difference and the (double) dissociability of these functions (2010: Sec. 5). 
5.8 Conclusion of the Section 
In conclusion, visual FOP depends on the perception of absolute depth cues giving rise 
to a peculiar visual feature of FOP: qualitatively rich stereopsis. I followed the notion of 
stereopsis developed by Vishwanath and colleagues (see Vishwanath 2014), who offered 
the most recent theory of stereopsis in the literature of vision science. Also, the visual 
FOP about the picture vehicle/surface hinders the FOP about the depicted object. 
Crucially, egocentric depth is linked to the observer’s knowledge of the depth relations 
scaled in a meaningful way to the observer’s motor action space. All I said is confirmed 
by links between the neurophysiological/psychophysics level and the phenomenological 
level concerning visual FOP. Finally, I suggested that FOP depends on the interplay 
between the ventral visual stream and the dorsal visual stream. Accordingly, my account 
is neither in conflict with the idea that dorsal perception is crucial for visual FOP (Nanay 
2015), nor with the idea that dorsal perception is not sufficient for FOP (Noë 2012). 
Indeed, not only I stressed that dorsal perception is important in order to perceptually 
obtain FOP, but also it is the interplay with ventral perception that gives rise to the 
peculiar visual FOP we entertain with normal objects. 
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